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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO ACTION 
Petitioners/Appellants. Mast Construction Company was 
the Defendant below in C-85-1607, C-85-3067, C-85-4885. Mast 
Construction was substituted for Debenham Electric Supply Co. on 
December 16, 1986. R-III-1179 to 1185. 
Ron Mast: Ron Mast was substituted for Intermountain 
Glass and Paint Co. and Marathon Steel Co. on December 16, 1986. 
Id. Masts appear as mechanic lienholders at their own right and 
also as assignees of various other mechanics' lienholders. Mast 
Construction Company and Ron Mast will usually be known 
hereinafter as "Masts". 
Respondent. American Savings & Loan Association 
("American Savings"), was the Plaintiff below in C-85-4885. 
Other parties. Electro Technical Corporation ("Electro 
Tech") was the Defendant below in C-85-1607 and C-85-4885. 
Electro Tech did not appeal. 
Edwards & Daniels Associates, Inc. ("Edwards & Daniels"): 
Defendant below in C-85-4885. Edwards & Daniels filed a Notice 
of Appeal on December 16, 1986. That appeal, No. 860669, was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court of Utah on June 8, 1987 due to 
Edwards & Daniels1 failure to prosecute the appeal. 
Masts are unaware of any other party having petitioned 
this Court for a writ of certiorari. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Is a "Trust Deed" omitting the amount of the loan, name 
of the trustee and terms of the secured loan enforceable as a 
legal mortgage as against third party mechanics1 lien holders? 
II. Is the court's finding that the Trust Deed was signed 
in the presence of the notary against the great weight of the 
evidence? 
III. Is a deed signed outside the presence of a notary but 
later "notarized" an acknowledged document, capable of being 
recorded? 
REPORTS OF OPINIONS 
Original affirmance of trial court. General Glass Corp. v. Mast 
Constr. Co.f 758 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Opinion withdrawn on rehearing. General Glass Corp. v. Mast 
Constr. Co., 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, P. 2d (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
New opinion, on rehearing, from which this petition is taken. 
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 
P.2d (Utah Ct. App. December 15, 1988). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Petition seeks review of the December 15, 1989 decision 
on rehearing of the Utah Court of Appeals. The original 
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decision was entered June 10 , 1988, withdrawn September 13, 
1988/ and a new opinion decision affirming on different grounds 
was entered December 15/ 1988. 
On January 17/ 1989 Justice Richard C. Howe granted an Order 
Extending Time to Petition for Certiorari through and including 
February 2, 1989. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 45 and 46/ R. 
Utah S. Ct.f and 78-2-2(5)/ Utah Code Annotated (1988). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The full text of the following code sections is included in 
the Appendix. 
38-1-1 to 26/ Utah Code Annotated (1974) 
38-1-5/ Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
38-1-10/ Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
38-1-26/ Utah Code Annotated (1953) 57-1-6/ Utah Code Annotated 
(1986) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent American Savings and Loan Association ("American 
Savings") brought this action seeking to recover sums due on 
construction loans by foreclosing an alleged trust deed covering 
real property located in Salt Lake County, claiming priority 
over the mechanics1 liens of Petitioners (Masts). Actions by 
various mechanics' lien holders were consolidated with American 
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Savings' lawsuit. This is an appeal from a judgment entered in 
favor of American Savings and against Masts in that consolidated 
actionf upholding the acknowledgment and form of American 
Savings1 trust deed and the priority of its trust deed over 
Masts' mechanics' liens. 
This is a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appealsf which affirmed the decisions on summary judgment and 
after trial of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. 
A. Parties. 
Mast Construction Company was substituted for Debenham 
Electric Supply Company and Ron Mast was substituted for 
Intermountain Glass and Paint, Inc., and Marathon Steel Company. 
(R-II-118)(R-III-1182). For all practical purposes in this 
petitionf American Savings is the Respondent in this matter, and 
Ron Mast and Mast Construction Company are the Petitioners. 
B. References. 
This matter consists of three (3) volumes of Record and six 
(6) volumes of Transcript and Judge's Ruling. Reference to the 
record will be made by (R) . Reference to the Transcript and 
Judge's Ruling will be made by (T) with a hyphen then a Roman 
Numeral (I, II, III, IV, V or VI) and then a page number to 
indicate the appropriate page and volume of the record, or 
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transcript and judge's ruling. For clarityf the date of the 
transcript will sometimes be used, 
C. Procedural History. 
In a pre-trial summary judgment hearing Judge Hanson held 
that American Savings' trust deed is effective even though it 
was incomplete when recordedf and subsequently twice amended and 
re-recorded. (T-I-3), (T-I-4) & (T-I-9). The Order reflecting 
this ruling was signed on June 19/ 1986. See (R-II-764 to 765), 
where Judge Hanson concisely states the issues of fact and law 
which remained for trial. 
At the conclusion of a two day court trial, Judge Hanson 
held that American Savings' trust deed was regular on its face 
and conforms to the format prescribed by statute (T-VI-21); that 
said trust deed was "executed completed/ delivered and recorded 
in conformance with the intent of the parties." (R-III-1Q14 
114) ; that at the time the trust deed was signed the persons 
signing the trust deed were not placed under oath (R-III-1-14 
113) and did not otherwise acknowledge their signatures to the 
notary; and that the deed was signed in the presence of the 
notary. Id. 
Judge Hanson held therefor that the notarization of the 
trust deed was a valid acknowledgment/ the trust deed was 
entitled to be recorded/ and adequately imparted notice from 
April 8/ 1983/ the date of its first recordation (T-VI-21)/ 
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(T-VI-28), (T-VI-29) & (R-III-1014 to 1015). The court also 
found that work did not begin on the site prior to April 8/ 
1983. (T-VI-25 to 26) & (R-III-1014 to 1015 13), (T-IV-1648). 
Masts and various other mechanics1 lien holders filed 
motions objecting to the Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Lawf moved for a new trial/ and to amend the 
judgment (R-II-831) , (R-II-845), (R-II-870), (R-III-985), 
(R-III-988), (R-III-1006) . The court denied the motions, 
entering its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 
27, 1986 (R-III-1G12) . Masts filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) 
Certification Re Judgment on Priority Issues, heard October 6, 
1986. In an Order for Entry of Final Judgment dated November 
18, 1986 R-III-1175) the district court held that the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were a final determination of the 
lien priority issues; that said issues would be appealable but 
for other issues remaining to be decided in the case; that there 
was no just reason for delaying the appeal of the lien priority 
claims; and that pursuant to Rule 54(b) URCP there existed no 
just reason for delaying the entry of final judgment on the 
claims of lien priority. 
The Court of Appeals in its first decision found that Ron 
Mast, one of the petitioners, had actual notice of the lien and 
that such notice automatically caused all the liens of 
petitioners to be subordinate to the deed of trust. General 
Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 758 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1988)(copy in appendix). 
Masts petitioned for rehearing on the basis that the 
Court of Appeals had misapprehended law and facts. Masts 
pointed out that they were holders of various mechanics1 liens, 
directly and as assignees, and that if actual notice had been 
fatal it would have affected the rights of other lien holders 
and the liens assigned to Masts after the occurrence of all 
operative facts in this case. Masts also argued that the effect 
of the Court of Appeals ruling was to emasculate the mechanics1 
lien statutes and would have serious effects on the economy. 
The decision had mistakenly found that if a party had actual 
notice there would eventually be a construction loan the court 
would not need to determine whether work commenced before a 
proper recording of the lender's deed of trust. 
The Court of Appeals granted Masts' petition for 
rehearing and withdrew its decision by order dated September 13, 
1988. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 91 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
On December 15, 1988 the Court of Appeals entered its 
opinion on rehearing, affirming the trial Court decision on 
different grounds. 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(copy in appendix) . The court found the document was not a 
valid trust deed but was a valid mortgage. 
On January 17, 1989 the Court granted Masts' ex parte 
motion for an extension of time to petition the Court for a Writ 
of Certiorari, allowing through and including to February 2, 
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1989 to file the petition (copy in appendix). 
D. Relevant Pacts 
On March 28, 1983 American Savings loaned $10.4 million to 
Oakhills, a Utah limited partnership, to finance condominium 
construction* Exhibit P-l (included in Appendix). A note for 
that amount was signed by Oakhills, and American Savings and 
Oakhills executed a document titled "Multifamily Deed of Trust, 
Assignment of Rents and Security Agreement." Exhibits P-l and 
P-4. The circumstances and questionable validity of the 
execution and subsequent recording of that document give rise to 
the appeal, which in turn gives rise to this Petition. The "Deed 
of Trust" will be referred to herein as Trust Deed, although its 
validity as such is not admitted. 
The Trust Deed was executed by Charles Akerlow and Richard 
Anderson, officers of the general partner of Oakhills. Exhibit 
P-l. When they signed the document, the amount of the loan, the 
date and description of the loan and the identity of the Trustee 
were left blank. Exhibit P-l; Brief of Respondent, p. 5. Some 
blanks were filled in sometime after recordation. The deed was 
prepared by a title company, agent for American Savings. 
The acknowledgment was filled in by Jeffrey Jensen, a notary 
public and officer of the title company. T-IV-3 to 6. Neither 
Anderson nor Akerlow took an oath. Finding of Fact # 3 . R. 
001014. The notary stated in the acknowledgment, however, that 
- 7 -
the two were "sworn by me. . . ." Exhibit P-l at p. 8. The 
court below also found they signed in the presence of the notary. 
Id. # 1; R. 001013. Masts believe this finding was against the 
great weight of the evidence. 
In addition to the acknowledgement's statement that Akerlow 
and Anderson "appeared before me", the only other evidence 
petitioner has been able to marshal on point is as follows: 
—Akerlow, called as a witness for American Savings, 
testified he and Anderson signed the trust deed in his own 
office, that no one else was present, and that the notary had 
never even been to his office. He denied having even attended 
the closing. T-II-1380 (Pages 74 through 81 and 95 through 96 of 
the June 1986 proceedings are attached in the Appendix for the 
Court's convenience). Judge Hanson disbelieved Akerlow. 
T-8-11-86 p. 8. 
—Akerlow signed an affidavit to the same effect/ but at a 
deposition stated he could not at that time recall whether he 
appeared before the notary. T-II-1383. Akerlow's explanation 
for his clearer memory at trial than at the earlier deposition 
was the realization the notary, whom he knew well, had never 
been to his office. He stated he was sure both men signed in his 
office, and therefor had recalled clearly that the notary could 
not have witnessed the signatures. T-ll-1386. 
—Stephen Emrick, who attended the closing on behalf of 
American Savings, testified that Anderson and Akerlow were 
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present, and that the notary was "there for time periods"/ and 
was "in and out" of the room. T-II-1340 to 1342. He could not 
recall any details of the execution of the note and trust deed. 
Id. He testified Mr. Stermer of American Savings attended the 
closing with him. Stermer was not called as a witness by any 
party. Emrick has attended about 50 closings involving over a 
million dollars each. He did say the closing lasted about two 
hours. T-6-25-86 p. 61. He also testified Ron Mast was present 
part of the time. T-12-1340 to 1342. 
—Ron Mast testified he has never been to Western Title, the 
site of the closing/ and had never met Mr. Emrick before trial. 
T-6-25-86 p. 126. 
—Anderson, the other signatory/ testified that hef Jensenf 
Akerlow and Emrick were present at the closing/ which he said 
lasted most of the day. Anderson Depo. at 15-16. He did not 
mention Ron Mast being present. He could not recall whether 
Jensen was in the room when the trust deed was signed. Anderson 
Depo. at 12/ 15-17/ 20. 
—Jensen/ the notary public/ could not recall Akerlow's and 
Anderson's execution of the trust deed/ T-VI-7/ 8/ 14, although 
he was well acquainted with both signatories. In fact/ asked if 
he recalled "any of the circumstances of that closing" he said/ 
"I have vague recollection of Mr. Emerick's name, and his 
involvement being in townf discussing some documents with himf 
but not a direct recollection of the closing ceremony, if there 
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one was itself (sic)." Partial Transcript of 6-25-86, p. 4. He 
continued/ "I don't have a direct recollection of seeing loan 
documents signed, no." Id. He did not recall at trial whether 
he was present or not. Id. at 6. When American Savings' counsel 
asked Jensen whether he had a custom or practice, he said: 
Yes. In by far the majority of cases — in all cases 
where it is possible, I am present when the people are 
signing documents. There are occasions when I may be 
out of the room getting a copy. I may be discussing 
something with someone out of the room. . . . 
Id. at 8. He also stated, "If I know that person, and I witness 
him signing documents, I don't check to see that he has signed 
every one while I'm present in the room." Id. 
On the date of the closing Jensen's Daytimer contained an 
entry "Akerlow, Thomas, Dyer." He explained, "that's what I know 
Akerlow's group by." Id. at 10. 
Jensen stated that since he was acquainted with Akerlow and 
knew his signature, he would have less hesitation to notarize his 
signature. Id. at 11. 
It is undisputed that work was commenced at the property 
sometime in April or May, although Judge Hanson found it did not 
commence before the April 8, 1983 recording date. Finding of 
Fact # 6 T-001014. The Court of Appeals upheld that finding. 
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 




The desirability of granting this Petition is underlined 
by the recent decision of this Court in Mickelsen v. Craigcoy 
Inc., 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; P.2d (Utah January 11, 
1989) . In that case the Court appears to have resolved, at 
least under the facts of that case, the question of whether an 
acknowledgment may suffice without an oral oath. However, it 
points out the area of law is still unclear, and seems to affirm 
the requirement that the affiant appear personally before the 
notary. 
I. Is a "Trust Deed" omitting the amount of the loan, 
name of the trustee and terms of the secured loan enforceable as 
a legal mortgage as against third party mechanics1 lien holders? 
The trust deed at issue recited it was between the 
"Trustor/Grantor" Oakhills, "(herein 
trustee)", and the "Beneficiary", State Savings (now American 
Savings) referred to as "Lender". Exhibit P-l. 
The next paragraph states that Borrower, in consideration 
of the "indebtedness herein recited and the trust herein 
created" grants, conveys and assigns to Trustee, with power of 
sale, "[the leasehold estate pursuant to a lease (herein 'ground 




in and to]" (sic) the property contained in the legal 
description which was attached as an exhibit, together with 
personal property listed. 
To Secure to Lender (a) the repayment of the 
indebtedness evidenced by Borrower's note dated 
(herein note) in the principal sum of 
Dollars, with interest 
thereon, with the balance of the indebtedness, if 
not sooner paid, due and payable on 
_ ^ ^ _ and . . . the performance of the covenants 
and agreements of Borrower contained in a 
Construction Loan Agreement between Lender and 
Borrower dated , 19 . . . . 
In each example above the blanks left are as they appeared in 
the original as recorded. Exhibit P-l. Nowhere is the amount 
of the debt or the identity of the trustee contained in the 
instrument. And the terms of the loan are also absent from 
this, the only document recorded. 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by correctly 
pointing out the distinction between a mortgage and a trust deed 
in a "lien theory" state like Utah. General Glass Corp. v. Mast 
Constr. Co., 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 55. The court found the 
document could not serve as a valid trust deed since it does not 
identify the trustee to whom it purports to convey title. Id. 
However, the court went on to agree with the trial 
court's alternative conclusion that the instrument recorded is 
operative as a mortgage despite the omissions. Id. This Masts 
believe was in error. 
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As the Court of appeals itself states/ a mortgage is not 
a title-conveying instrument. Id.; Bybee v. Stewart/ 112 Utah 
462/ 189 P.2d 118 (1948). The instrument at issue clearly 
intends to convey title in trust to a trustee. American Savings 
is merely and expressly the beneficiary. If title is conveyed 
to an unidentified person/ surely no interest is conveyed. The 
Court of Appeals has taken the mistake of American Savings/ and 
tried to remedy it by calling it something else. This would 
require the Court to ignore the language which is contained in 
the deed. 
As indicated by the above
 f as written and with the 
omissions much of the deed is nonsensically vague. 
While the provisions of § 57-1-14 (1986) are merely a 
suggestion of what a land mortgage might contain/ Utah's 
legislature must have included it to indicate some formality and 
some inclusion of basic terms is necessary. Surely a gross 
deviation containing almost none of the suggested elements 
cannot pass for a legal mortgage/ except perhaps between the 
parties. Here the Court of Appeals1 interpretation closes out 
innocent mechanics1 lien holders in favor of the draftsman of 
the defective instrument. 
w[T]he mechanic's lien law was enacted for the benefit of 
those who perform the labor and supply the materials and . . . 
the lien claimant's remedy should not be limited without a clear 
mandate from the legislature requiring such an effect." 
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Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; P.2d 
(Utah Jan. 11 1989) . In Mickelsen this Court found no clear 
legislative intent to support its cutting off of these lien 
holders. To protect mechanics1 lien holders, the courts should 
construe the statute creating mechanics1 liens broadly. Bailey 
v. Call, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 12 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 12, 
1989) . The Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of either 
Mickelsen or Bailey in rendering its decision. 
The Court of Appeals looks to the intention of the 
parties, but to the wrong end. 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 55. 
Indeed, the intent of the parties controls in deciding whether a 
document is a mortgage. Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 U.2d 111, 114; 
378 P.2d 355, 357 (1963). Here the intent was not just to 
create a security agreement. The obvious intent was to deed the 
property in trust. The lender having failed to accomplish this, 
no effective transaction was consumated. No particular form may 
be required for the mortgage, but the intent of the parties must 
be shown. Bybee v. Stewart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948). 
Here it is not. 
The Summary of Utah Real Property Law, BYU (197 8) Vol. I 
§ 9.55 recommends a mortgage might contain consideration (which 
this does not), description of property, habendum clause, the 
covenants, due on encumbrance clause, charges, insurance and 
taxes, and the mortgagee's right to possession. 
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Purported mortgages are construed strictly against the 
party responsible for the drafting (here American Savings). 
Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931). Here lack of 
a trustee is similar to lack of a payee, which would render a 
mortgage invalid. Summary of Utah Real Property Law, BYU (1978) 
Vol. I § 9.69, 9.72. Courts will not torture the meaning of a 
document to make construe it as a mortgage. Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 
U.2d 124, 270 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1954). 
II. Is the court's finding that the Trust Deed was 
signed in the presence of the notary against the great weight of 
the evidence? 
The Court of Appeals rejected Masts' argument that the 
deed was invalid because it was signed outside the presence of 
the notary, saying Mast failed to marshal the evidence and show 
the court's finding to the contrary was erroneous. The finding 
may be overturned if it is against the great weight of the 
evidence. Bailey v. Call, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 
Jan. 13, 1989 (dealing with mechanics' liens), quoting Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). Mast believes it did marshal the evidence in its 
briefs before the Court of Appeals (see, e.g., App. Brief pp. 6, 
7, 13, 14, 15, 26), but, sensitive to the criticism, this is 
done in the foregoing summary of facts. 
In sum, of five possible witnesses, one did not testify, 
one said no notary was present, and two, including the notary, 
did not recall. 
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The burden of proof is always upon the party who seeks to 
establish a fact. The burden of proving the validity of the 
notarization is, and always has been upon upon American Savings. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 301 deals with presumptions and is 
substantially identical Federal Rule of Evidence 301. FRE 301 
states that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof or 
the burden of persuasion on an issue. The burden always 
remains upon the party on whom it was originally cast. 12 Fed. 
Proc. L. Ed., §§33:67, 33: 69. 
Respondents are aided in this burden by the presumption 
that notaries have properly carried our the duties of their 
office, including the acknowledgment of documents. Farm Bureau 
Finance Co. Inc., v. Carney, 605 P.2d 509 (Idaho 1980). 
However, a presumption is not evidence, and it disappears 
entirely upon the introduction of any contradicting evidence. 
When such evidence is introduced the truthfulness of the 
presumed fact is determined exactly as if no presumption had 
existed. Bank of Washington v. Hilltop Shakemill, Inc., 614 
P.2d 1319 (Wash. App. 1980); Sheehan v. Pima County, 680 P.2d 
486 (Ariz. App. 1982) . 
Here the presumption that the notarial acts were validly 
accomplished was defeated by evidence and testimony to the 
contrary, shifting the burden to Respondents. This is 
especially true in light of the fact the acknowledgment perjures 
itself, stating falsely that the signatories were sworn under 
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oath. This falsity is undisputed. In the Farm Bureau case, 
since there was sufficient evidence to find that acknowledgment 
was false and not merely incomplete/ the presumption of 
regularity in performance of notarial acts was overcome. Farm 
Bureau Finance Co. Inc., v. Carney, 605 P.2d 509 (Idaho 1980). 
See also 12 Fed. Proc. L. Ed., §33:68. 
The presumed regularity of notarizations is overcome by 
evidence that the notary failed to require that the trust deed 
be signed in his presence and failed to require an oath or 
affirmation. See Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc., v. Carney, 605 
P.2d 509 (Idaho 1980) . 
Respondents have failed to prove the trust deed was 
properly acknowledged, despite their burden to do so. 12 Fed. 
Proc. L. Ed., §33:69. 
III. Is a deed signed outside the presence of a notary 
but later "notarized" an acknowledged document, capable of being 
recorded? 
The Mickelsen case, supra, found that no oral oath was 
necessary, so long as an oath was provided in the language to 
which the signatories signed their names. 99 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
22. In this case there was not such a "correct written oath or 
affirmation." Exhibit P-l pp. 7-8. So even under Mickelsen the 
failure to require an oath—oral or written—may invalidate the 
deed as against a third party mechanic's lien holder. 
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And Mickelsen pointed out that "it must be signed in the 
presence of a notary or other person authorized to take oaths"/ 
which it was not. Id. (emphasis added). 
That case expressly did not upset Helsten v. Schwendimany 
668 P.2d 509 (Utah 1986)/ requiring the affiant to appear 
personally in front of the notary. Id. at 22. 
CONCLUSION 
The deed as written is so incomplete as to be vague, and 
does not impart notice to third parties or rise to the level of 
a valid mortgage. Norf as the Court of Appeals concluded/ can 
it be a trust deed. 
Finding the deed was signed in the presence of the notary 
is against the great weight of the evidence. Because the notary 
did not actually see the singing/ and because there was no 
actual oath/ written or spokenf the deed could not be validly 
recorded and may not prevail over the liens of these mechanics 
and materialmen. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Petitioner requests a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and reversal of that court's decision. 
Respectfully so petitioned the second day of February/ 
1989. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX I 
TRUST DEED AS ORIGINALLY RECORDED 
EXHIBIT P-1 
WHIN U O O W D MAIL TO 
State Sawing and lorn kmadMlm 
y»3 Ea*t mn Stxvet 
Stockton, Cfclif. 95202 
3775692 SPACE ABOVE THIS UNE FOt tECOIDCft? USE 
MULTIFAMILY DEED OF TRUST, 
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AND SECURITY AGREEMENT 
(Security for Coastrwctloa LMI Afreraeat) 
THIS DEED OF TRUST (Herein -fnaimmenr) if made ffus 28th ^ y o f K|rch 
19 £3..., among the Truator/Grantor. .OAKHIILS..PAItni£RSHIP^A.ilUh..Li«lUd Jfcrtaerxiup 
«4UMKaddreu a C/Av£jrti!l& J l ^ ^ t y . 
(herein -Sorrower^) Ut*fe.~*Uai 
_ -~~ (herein -Trustee"), and 
the •enefiaary. iTAIL.5AVINfiS..AMa.<LQnii..ASSOClAIIOI1 
a ...corporation organized and earning under the law* of ...the. -StAttJOf..XiliforalA 
•lute address * .143..Ust.toin..Street^..Stocktoa9..UUfontU.^BS20l 
(herein -Lender"). 
•otnowER. in consideration of the indebtedness herein recited and the trust herein created, irrevocably trams, 
conveys and assigns to Trustee, in trust, wnh power of sale, (the leasehold estate pursuant to a lease (herein "ground 
lease") dated « between 
and „_.. . 
m and to* | the following described property located in 
thf...Cfluntv. Of ,S*U.l*k€ .... _ State of Utah: 
See Exhibit *A"f attached hereto and Incorporated herein by 
reference. 
Tocmttft with all buildings, improve menu and tenements now or hereafter erected on the property, and ail 
heretofore or hercarter vacated alley* And street* abutting toe property, and all easements, rights, appunenancei. rents 
(subject however to the assignment of rent* to Lender herein |, royalties, mineral, od and gat rights and profits, water, 
water nghtv and water stock appurtcnani to the property, and all natures, machinery, equipment, engine*, hotter*, 
incinerators, huilding material*, appliance* and good* of every nature whjiMtever mm or hereafser looted in. or on. 
or uted. or intended to he used in connection with the pmpeny. including, hut not limned 10. those for the purposes of 
supplying or distributing heating, outing, electricity, gat. water, air and light: and all elevators. and related machinery 
and equipment, lire prevention and eiunguithtng apparatus, security and access control apparatus, plumbing, hath 
tubs, water heaters, water closet*, sinks, ranges, stoves, refrigerator*, dishwasher*. dt*po*al*. washers, dryers, awnings, 
storm windows, storm doors, screens. Mind*. *hades. curiam* and curiam rod*, minors, cam nets, panelling, nigs, 
attached floor covering*, furniture, picture*, antenna*, tree* and plantv and ~ 
. ^ all of whsvh. including replacements and additsou* thereto, shall he deemed 
to he and remain a pan %%(the real pmpeny covered hy thi* Instrument: and all of the foregoing, together with said 
property (or the leasehold estate in the event this Instrument is om a leasehold I art herein referred so as the 
-Property"* 
To Sfrtat TO U M O M I <a| the repayment of the indebtedness evidenced hy Borrower'* note dated 
(herein "Note") in the principal sum of. —. . 
- . . Dollar*. 
•nth mierest thereon, with the balance of the indebtedness, if not sooner paid, due and payable on 
and all renewal*, eitensions and mudihcauoos thereof: (b»the repayment 
of any future advance*, with inirmu thereon, made hy Lender so Borrower pursuant to paragraph 31 hereof (hereto 
"Future Advance***): (c) the performance of the covenant jud agreements of Borrower contained in a Construction 
Loan Agreement between Lender and Borrower dated ' * ifnoy. as provided in 
paragraph 25 hereof. < d | the payment of all other sums. isrth interest thereon, advanced m accordance herewith to 
protect the security of this Instrument; and (e )the performance nf the covenants and agree menu of Borrower heron 
contained 
Borrower covenant* that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed mmd km the right to grant, 
convey and as*ign the Pmpeny I And, if this instrument t* on a leasehold, that the ground lease « in full fere* and 
effect without uuidiacation eicem at noted above and without default am the pan of either lessor or leaaae 
thereunder |. that the Pmpeny is unencumbered, and that Borrower wdl warrant and defend generally the wit to the 
Properly against all claim* and demand, subject to any easements and restneuons nued in a schedule ofeiripuuu* to 
coverage m any nth? insurance poucy msunng Lender *s interest m the Pioperty. _ 
U f l t f m C M M M H . Bofiwm md Uafer CDWMMN aa* t f tw « falling. 
t. fAVMtMT Of MIINCIF4L AMD PfTlinVT. laeanm aa f * M ^ pay *a*a aw * » awwawd at aa* « « 
W * M i d hy the *aw. aay pnpayaia nod aw cnncpr* praiaad a a * Mat aw* at aw* • asm anawad p» aw> tema 
1 f l W m r O t T A t l A f N 1 « l J t 4 i a r i A M O O T M f « O I 4 K a . I a *an»«fa*n* t» W a r « • • « * » « « » * ay I 
pay a Leader en rht day awawhty awanW**, of pfwanju) or awnaw mm paytai motor 0W haw tot aa onaawr day at 
r1. uoul the Mow n pad a full, a ova (herein "FuodO oaoaJ a aw to lira of u> dw 
• winch may he i w ^ M w t Ptupiny. I of the year^ gauaod man* o*aay. Ic» aw yearly • 
H aWUMMMMft M* mortgage IMOMnCt. if any. OMJ <«) O* IM b B M M • Ml • I 
l e a * . aU m » i w i w > ewimawd owoaMy * M J f rna a n * M» aaw ay L-endet aa aw aaa> of a 
Any « « m by Lender of a I H W I M M that Barron «i pay awa FawH May a t arvaaed ay Lender, a Lender'« taw daawwaa. at aay i 
aaact M wtuang •» aWiOM«i Lender May mooter Buriaact a pay a Leader, M advance, oar* onwr Fawn Car other w a n . cunrfev | 
The Fund* ifcall or htfcJ M ao teawwutusnui rat ttaom> or awaua* wt amah aaw award of g i n i n i i i by a Federal or aww i p i a i j 
(awiiiding Lender if Leader » swh aa lOMautmo I Lender thai! apary rat Fuaan w pay taw raan. araa>. uuwv • i m i i a i i n i i • M V O M M 
aad Other ImmtsMMM *» long a» Borrower n am M breach of aay M M aaw « a f m a w M of l u i m a n » on* l o a m n m Lcojler than1 ante aa 
charge far sn holding and applying the Fundt. analywng u d account or far uteWyag aad M o p i n g ant* l o m o i i u aad bdh. uahm Leader pay* 
•arrawtr awnnt . earnmgt «w pr«*ts no the Funds aad appiicaow l&m mrmm Ltmmrr w OMAC toed a durp t a w i o o n aad Leader awy a p n * m 
vnung 4* tar ttote of fwvwuw <*f eon lourooirai toat lowit u oa lor Food* «o«l! a t paM] to l o n w r t . aad) ooVu loco a f i—MtM m OMMW or 
oppocaMt la« fra.oar» M w m i . tarawff>.» | M H M , M> a t paat. Lradtf «*oM aa* a t wdMWd %j a«y iwwio<i aay owrvu . rarotof* or paaott oa aw 
Fwadi Leader khall gave to •rwrrmrf wolniot i -h»ft . aa aa*aal ioBDiaua| of tor Foodb M Leader * aanaai <ono«» M O T M * credm aad dearn to 
t F«ad» aad tat porpux for w o * * eatrA deoa in tar FoaoH « M awde Tar FwaaH are pwa:p^ a» adoMamai «*wwy M T aw M M owooid ay dam 
If tar tMaoot of tot F«ao\keAJ h> Leader at tmt aaw of toe oaaoal aowooaaag tAewof %ttmtt eaceed tAe i 
a> promde for tot pa^Meoi *>f »awr ami «rwer raie%. uar>. a*w»*WMt. aworaaig panaroa*. M M M «•« Oiaer l a 
cact«> «AalI be aediwd to lu r ro* t f »»• the a n t MnotM> MMallowot to iMiaHawMt «*f FoooS 4*t \( % 
Leader th«il ht W-«.» than the «M«H*O« deeated oeve%wr> o> Leoder u* pay • • w r aad wwer t*t\. u i r t . i iMiioiran M 
Other iMptMMMMu. i% iHey f*il due. Inrmver Uull pay o* Leader aay I O I I O H aecrt*ary a« aiaAe op Mot deaaeary «aAM tewty day* i 
from Leader to aorrwur reaorMuif payawot ttwrt«»f 
Uf tM oWnmrr» hre^-a *if aoy tmea<ioi *w 4freeateot *»f l i t m w r t M O W Iwwro—OI. Leader awy appry. « aoy a MOOT, t aad m aoy order aa 
Leoder vh»iS deterroioe in Leoder \ «i«* dmretuM. ^n> Ft*od« arid o> Leader at Vat uow of appo&auuo 11) to p«y rata, ttm* taatv omiiownii 
a*wraace prrroiwM* 40U Other Imnmitrnm »hnh 4rr m#m «M onli oereafter Ninow A t . or <
 u | a% • rreda agaaM loan tewred by tK» totfrvowm 
Upon payment M foil of 4ll M U M mitred by ihn loMrnowm. Leader <Aall pM4otat> refooaj m jueroort aay FoooH arid by Leader 
X A m j C A T f O * O r WAS AfrrVTS. ( nA>% ^ nptK^nw ( J » nr«mde% oroerortw. «rT nayowots i m w i l by Leoder frum oWrnwer ooder rot Mow 
mt tho laurvmeot Otail be jftalied b> Leoder to the i*4liM»Mg «irder «if pmtmy (11 I O M H I H rwyabw *» Leoder by A t w w n ooder paragraph 2 
hereof. 1 u 1 rnwmi fuy^ble ••*» the N*N<. I IN > nnoufui of the N*oe. I tv 1 one re M payjbtr <*o advaour* aude paoMiani K> nar^f raph I hrnvf. ( * I 
pnaapa) o( advam-rs made purMMfti w» naragr^oh « hrm.f. 1 vi 1 Mterta n«y«Mr » • aoy Fytore Ad*am.r. pnmded *rui if oturt than not Fotort 
Advance u .»wt<uanding. Lender m^> apply ru>mcm% tv\n*t%l aono^ tor aaowou «»f M W U M oay«ble no toe Fwore Ad«aMT% 10 un-h order at 
Lender. 10 Lender % MW> amretn*n. ma> determine. i «u i pnoorui ««f *n> Ftoore Advance. pn*nme4 tbat if r^we than uoe Fot^re A4»aoce a 
aaruaading. Lender m«> appt> payowntk reevrvrd aonMg the pnmtpal baiaoan nf the Fonw» Ad*a««t. M ^ oeb order a* Lender, m Lender * «ok 
ducretmn. ma> determine, and I v o i ao% .nhrr s«ms >nurrti by tbo. Inwrnawm m MKA
 IW9>r a« Lender, at Lender % not* <>. may determioe; 
artHideJ boworr thai Lender mat at Lender * timnm. apot> any %om% payahw ponoam s* paragraph * oerenf pnor m i a u n 1 on and anoupal 
of tot Nioe. hot M*n apr»'~-««»»« «hali M «Mner%ne arTni toe «*rder ««f pnom> nf app*a,ai»M ««eaoed m rh» paragraph ) 
4 CMAtCF.S: 1.IFNS. K*n>*+ti Oiail pay all «awr aod «r«er raan. rent* war* e%wwntm», premMjon. anm Other ImpoMnnm annAotabk tu 
tot Pnpen> ai Lrndci \ «»pti>«o in the manner pnmded under paragraph 2 hereof or. if m* pud 10 m i maoner. by o v r r a n maaiog payment, 
•men due. dtrecti) u» the payee thereof «* m unh ««tber manner 4% Lender May designate m »m*ng I n m ' t r sAail roomptty furonh m Lender all 
aouret nCamowm* dor under thn paragraph 4 and in tbr evrni Inrmwet <Aa!l maie payowot daretiy. tnentwer «Aaif promptly fomoA 10 Lendei 
recrtpu rvidcmmg wufi payment m»m>«er «Aa« pntmptry dmAarge any hen wb*n Aa%. nr O M « ha«c. prointy nver or eaualny o-n 1 the hen <U 
tow Instrument and litrrtmer Utaii f*4). •hem due the vlaim* «W all per«m« toppiymg lanar or otawrv'< u»«« m U M W H I M I woh ••»• Pfofrny 
Withoui Lender \ pr*>>r »mi rn f»rmo.»oHi. »»rri««er shall O N aPn« any hen mwmn u» thK loMraawnt n> he pertevwd agaioM the aumrrty 
1 H ALA I D I b i M B A N C F . tnm»«er shall ieer ibr imnit««ement« now eiwaag or oerc«fwt craned 00 thr Property wi ureal by earner*, at at 
ujnei katislMiitry u> Lender against h*»» by Art. KuAt4+ Muvtudrd vuhui the wrm "tawnded uneragr". rem los* aod vu«.-h «*her haiardk. catoaltun 
aabrlitwk aod contingent** a« Lender 1 and. if ton losituoteoi n no - wawhidd. aw gmond tr««e 1 *Aail require aod m * m * amooon and Uw m t 
penodi a» lender mail require All rnrmiwnHno MHoramr pt*har« *Aai» be pool at Lender»oemim. M thr Manner powoled under paragraph 1 
hereof or by •urrowet owAtng payownt nhen due. dare»ity n> the wamer. or m imn <nhet a>anori a* Leader may anognaw m wrawig 
Ail insurance pouoet and renemaK therenf shall he M a f«tfM aortfJiahw u> Leader •** JuU oniutw a siaodard oweigage ctaune M favor W 
and in form acceptable to Lender Lender shall have the nght m hnad the anAoev aod aVwnover shall pnunwly formsh ui Lender ail renewal 
aouon and all rrueipn nf paid premium* Ai teaw rhtrty «ays nrwr 10 the eipwaiuM Aaw 0 / a pnfavy. •orroun shall aelivvr to Lmder a w w i 
policy in (orm %au%faetory m Lender If this fnvrament n «m a leasehnoi. lorroner shall furooA Leader a duaimir of ail pnhvsn renroai oouce> 
renewal nohmrs aad njcvtpts «*f paid pnmiun» if. hy vutue ««f the grinrnd irate, the nrujioait rnttvof May on» he sutnahed by fairrooer a> Lender 
In the event of Iota. Borrower shall give imMediaw wojrwn oooce m the Msoraace carm 
empowen Lender •» aMumey«m>fast Asr Bortttwer u» asaae prruii of UM*. to adyu«i and .uMpnM 
aad pruwvow aoy acuon an%mg fnmi sosh tosoraocr pnmn>. u% udlrvr aod i m m u>soranrt M M I H 1 aod m deduct t he re fWHO Lender's eapenaei X ^ 
awemftrd or the wUect*** %tf<m& pmcewaV. fm*»MfW o n o r u i . oWc ouoAonx mar aim a4 m Wi» ooragrapA 1 sooA* na;uire Leader « mru^ aay rcarnor r^y 
or ia4r any •*!».•* hereunder Inrnvwer lunhrr autruwiar* Lender ai I ender\ nft*«o u ) tu Iwdd the boianie nf such pmuid i M he used » Q 
aumhurw •orrower lot the sirst t*t reMuwirnvtum m repuor of the rHnprrry or < h 1 m af fiy the haiame of «uvh pn^reds m the payment of the sum* __ 
wrured by tho Inurument whether ia am then due. m the neder of appMsawaa net lorrh m aofagfiph ) Iwraof \uanyect. houeur m the rajaw af i * 
nw WMOr ooder the grawnd urate if this owwwMent o> on a wauehooj I ""* 
If the aauraact ptuvwdi an heni hy Lender tn ryimhorw Boiiauii war aw aaw of nmorowao aad ofpaa of aw h a p n i ) . mm Piupi i i | onnfl M T ? " ^ 
awaonrd w the eanuvahrat of a» orygnui aaadimm or such onhrr awwaaaa at Lender aay i p p m M arniog Leader awy. at Leader 1 a a a w J j T 
awdi taa dMhurwawnt of ia«d prauedi aa Lender k *»•*** mt surh ptao* aad ip^iaiauua)i of ao awhawei laaafaeawy a Leader, aawarmnmt 1^ 
mm euMoawv arehNecti omiacawi. waevan of Wen*, •warn MOM menu of awchanan and MimrsaJoujn aod uath mher evownor of aaw. penwauje 
ooapwtoM uf oiniirwruoo apfhsauoo of paymeau. aad wwafacotia af uem a Lender awy n hry mojoou If the aiiiraaw aeoooon* are 
aaplwd a the paynwnt of the aam% ufcurtd ay ihn lauruowat. any uuch appheswon of piauua> a prwaawl ihaM o a eiwnd or pawgane aw due 
ooon of the owmthly a i t a l l a in t i u w i u d a a aorafraph* I aad 2 heeanf or canape the aanooaw of sorh uwaailnwnw If the rSaamy • aad 
panoaot a paragraph 27 hereof or if Lender a c a a m atw a the Pruamy Lender ihail hen* ad of the ngbt. a w ond awiew of t a t a o n a and a 
aay anuraaa aomws and uovaraed p w a i u a i iherooo amgmammmmu anwawdt rewuhag frwa aay d a a i f r a dw Piawi i j f a a i • a n a ant mt 
4 * l t K I V A T 1 0 N APIO MAlnf lXMANCT O f P w O T f l T Y ; I X A j n * O U M L 
wiwia iaa ia of aw rVaperry. 1 b > ahah a a aaaaaaa nw Piawret. U I aaaii a w n o 
Uatfara Co^ena«rt~MuJuf«wi)y~l/r?^RdMA/fHLMC Uaafaevi ' I I I M U H O I faaw j « / f a 
:cn 
t by a maaaronaJ twaee! praean] maaoprr taoafarmnj •• Undo? portnani to a mmtau uopaied by Irwnrr I 
•J l iwf i i i i ebatt W t w a i by Lender m wemn.. ( i ) abaM feneraoy opera* a i l maamnm tbr Pi,na») a a a 
aod <a>em* pm onunt m m a * m Lender of an*. Mam maorw** m r m ^ • oeom* hy Un«w. appoor m aam mmrod « 
. U t moeJ mmm*y WM 
faa prwaramanni oaai 
«»^we*mor poomnfUenlot MIMIMJI Iwiooti DOT aoy oroontotoaai par— 
no* n o M | or bamanai emnmd oo tfja Praowrry or aoy totort. tempo m. mmmmery «r 
rtmrMmn^narmnnooli i> I I . J a n n f H HiB «taipl. ornate pii of aaa o>—Jtt - t . C« yuflom • • 11 M I • >—• • • • • 
m Uoalrr o/aor oWaaai »y aiaaat aaMtor ta* fm>Di anar 
t—**—m~tt-i+Hl~—~*~-~.—.-—4*.T-st ^ t TT-^-TI—llfcaTal^TTtrrrfl V "—T 
Mn—«Af i«a i—— a •!••••• ••••• . i i u i ^ i i r , . . — ^ ^ jfT^n-nf t fM n u m m , , , , f M > nmeiiit momodiiiaj 
onne? ate pnood boat fry aoy pert) dawn* —d.ifreajmmd by Lender, uutf perm* Lender aa nortomrr » araernrymfari to tmmtoJ aod act *ar 
aWriooOT m aoy Mtcb rtmnotoJ prootew^ 
aod deliver ID Lender me mmor i oMopprt etrnoeatr m+mri tliwuaalti. rfaoy emrromet Wren* canmary tsamton mm aaaafm m Lrnnet m* 
tomtit of ail orenaam oantejnrd m tW p«md Irate, wtotbrt or am am* IM an r«t wo* im land, bm Leone? mmfl boor or. nemmry wo* 
among to am* oonammm oar any oabe? wmiwoam 000*00*0 m t 
ear and moiitu brrrm w > r y U oor omimaej or a v l UM> p/naiii eraar m t wad aataar 
and m m * * , and •ortower tbail DM. oemow rbr n a m i m a * eooerot of Lcnoer aner or amend ioaf troond team ooriooot ore**o» and 
tCTOM taw tbeee t*aM OOI to • earrier of tbr enaond team, or of tbe maarboid n u t croon* ttoreoy. we* tbr fa* etia* oaverod ay tto ejoood 
mem by reaaon of Mod kaotboM cauat nr tmd far earner, or aoy pan of citber. ermmc NMD a^mmom ownmlirp «oim Lroalrr «4olt oaoaaw at 
vtaBM ie aorii aarrfrr. if l a i n i i mail oapmrr aa**far cauar. par* taai laawwoaiai Uail H I h n i i i h aoji i nam (wr+m mcmm m aparaal «a 
mar ooaoaat a otooo toco far onaar 
r W I O H l O f l l T Y . Uaamiomaaa^liTapaAacaaAil^waaMaMUaaBrrlua^ 
dat oar for vfadi ail or aoy port of ta« rVooot^ • » io«fo«^ at ta« M W ate laarr«aar« « M rMcwt^ lo i iu t t moM oaa aaaaaar or aco.—na aia 
a of ia* FiupaiU • " • * • ! Ltooora praar r n o n ooaorM 
& f l O T T C n O N O f lXNDCt«SS£ClitlTY. " f — fn' r prrmai ifci io laiao la j iijii iaiin loniiniii n wm lamaaww • if ia t 
oBaaworpiiMUwif»oamwaHaBro:wiMrt>afcmtr^ oari^iot. ooi aaa baawrd aa, rwiaiat 
ooouaa. loaoiTT) oaok roforotowwi. or arraaajroaratt or piomo<ria> anoiwof a oooiropi or oawateoc rtwn Uoocr at Uoato't opajoo oiay 
•Mat todi appraranon. oaowv uaen MMM aoal uac Midi •atom u Um4tr oorou ojonaary. a o toat amcnwt* w mtvma U«o«r'« a m u i , 
aidoaliof. out aot kmm* to. (»» O^Mtnewww of aoorory•» fan. (wlra«o opoo liar Property a> «w4r rrpaan. ( o i pna^towiM of lamfacaary 
avoraooi at proviood HI poragrapr> « bcrrof aad < IT > if to* I w m o m ooo a teaariio«. ennoa of aoy opuoo to aroror or eaawol ior frooawJ 
hoar oa Ptfcaif of lumiou aoo4 to* conog of aoy orfa«r( of lena i i i M du amoa aoal oBOjaauaoa of dv froooal Icaar 
11, wo* aMrmi laaroom. i*all aaoaow liiionoai wiraaio'orii of I 
aorooro by tliu Inatmawm Uoam l o f w w aaal UoaWr affmomorr arrmtof pay orot. todi aoaowm thall be lotowmaarty oor aoo payabk aoa) 
•sail bear onrms from tb* 4JMT of dubwtrwum at t>r raar «avd m iter Ham — Irw oallonioo frooi Borrow• of otrtni ai aarlt roar uialii be 
OBOtrary to appjiniraba? la«. a araarii w o tocb aanwou tboll bear oavrni at tbt ajfferu rate wbicn raay be aallcaod fraea too rt oooor 
ippiicabfc U» lomwti brrrby covcoar u aod agrm ibat Lrotkr Hull be lobrotaatd to tbr i*o of aoy toorttatv or oBbrr bm ojadurtrd ia 
«*aar or to pan. by nor ioalcbar4aru •mm*' barrby Nxtbaai mrmojj m Urn paragrapb I abali rcqour LroPer to aarw aoy aaproar or tair aoy 
i waaooabai taaiau opoo ooi aajajanaaa* of oar fmporty 
ML BOOKS ANO ttCOtOS. lormtw «Juil korp aod rooaaiaiw at ail oom at iorrooart tddtru UM*4 braaw. or toe* otbrr piaor at trader 
oj«y approve m vmute^ uaawpbjai aod aerwate booa* of acraoau aod rooardft lorqmtr to rvAen oarrrnly ibc retoki of ra* operotioo of toe 
yiupeiit aod oopan of aU taniani cDOirarn. kaan aod otber oiMnraaroa veacb aovet ibr Properry Socb boot*, rooorov oomracu. anan aod outer 
aMtnirorou abaiJ be mbjtn u> eaaawaauoo aod onprcuoo at aoy rraaooabk oto* by Lrodrr Upoo Unaorr't roowru- lorrooer tbail foroab to 
Lrodcr ambM ooe bvorfrvd aoal rveoty oayt after toe rod of eocb iacai year of lowootr. a baiaoce abort a Maaroteot of aaoaaar aod eipeoon of 
ajar Property aod a statement of diaoget m aoaooai pouuoo racb MI reaaooabk detad aod orruaed by lorrooer aod if Lrodrr wfcail upaare. by ao 
Midi prodmi omtoed pvblir aeatoniaof tonooxr uaali foreaab. lopiibii mxrb ibe rorrfmot aoaoaal «aano«o«> aod at aoy orber raoe opoo 
Lender t rrowe«. a rem •rbePoie for tbe Property, mmiia by •umiam. ibanag tbr oaear of cacb anaaot. aod far cacb aroaoi tbe «po»« oorMpard. 
bar onar caparaooo date, tbr rew payaMe aod tbe rem poad 
I I . CONDEMNATION larmorr %k»U prwoptly ooofy Uoder of aoy «aa> or proorra1a>g reiauof « 
wtanhar data or todtm-i. of tbr Proprny. ur pan tberrof. aod lonooti tbalt appear m aod prooicoai aoy MM* I 
Qainar duecwd by Under MI vmwg lurruan awtbonan lender, M Lender % opvoo. aa anontey*w>fac« for lorrower. to twnmencr appear m 
mm* proarorte. io Lender > or lurro«<H name any oruoo or fiaaidMMJ rrUuog to aoy oandetnnoMon or otbrr lotto* of tbe Property, n-betber 
direct or MMltrea. and io amk or eaoiprooioa aoy CUMH m geanrtnua * n * tocb oonormnaupa or otber ia4in| TW procredt of aot award. 
payoteat or daim far daoufev dtreci or oaoMqoeauai ro oannrroi a w«H> any naodeoiaiioia or tnbet uaing. wbrtber nven or moarcn of tbe 
Property, or pan thrrcof. or far oonvryanon ts lo^o/uiod'morajaB, art berrby iiwaraid to ano aboii be paai M> Lender laajrri. o'enn tmrmnwai 
• on a aiaaehoid. io tbe n§bo oi leiaor onner tbe enaond «oar 
lumiaii •otbonaei Lender to appty MM* awannv payoointt. aroeaidi or daoaapnu aner tbr dedonia of Lender'» empenan oenrrod m tbe 
OTJlrruoo of aocb M O M U . at Leno>r'» opoon m reaaarauoo or repeat of tbr Property or to payoarw of tbe UMM nK»red by tbn lonromeoi. 
wneine? or not titers 4m. m tbr order of appbeauoo art farm m poraajapb 1 nmw/ wnb tbe bilaoea. d my. m lorrower Uanm oWrower aoo 
Lender otbrrwoje agree MI wnuof. aoy appwratton of piowidi » pwojmil tnall ua* eaarnd or puiipnai tbe doe daar of tbe eaontbly mtnilaarnn 
i poraerapbe I aod 2 bereof ot rnange tbe aotoont of ancb iniiaMaaroia oorwer acrwn a> eaeevte MM* fonber evnaroor of 
peaem of toy awarda. piwiotdi. damaprt or deann r^ nant w oaonrciaM w«b m 
I I tOfttOWOt AMD UEPI MOT MtULASOy f*m oinr m wme. Unoer may, at Leno>rtopaaaa. aiibaai gmnf oonar n> 
ornarm of avrrower. torrower't aaavraaart or aaaigao or of any jooaar aawmnnrr or fnaraoaon. OMOOOI babnoy an Lraafar't nan and 
pjoinMbatandMtt awrrower't baracb of aoy aannaoi or afrerrnrni of lowuon m tee* Inatroment nmod ear near far paymrm of *OMJ indebtedniM 
or aoy nan ibaiwf. rewuor tbe paymewn rtMrton retcaar anyone kabat oa any of aaal indrntednrn> aaorpt a rmrwal neat or onnntbrrefar. omdtfy 
am trmu and am of payment of aaaf MMatbtedoaia. iterant from tf» nrn of out ioatniment aoy part of oat Ptoprrry. taic or nnraar eanet or 
additMBil aa. nry. ftanwvey aoy pan of tbe Ptoearny. ommrw eaany maporpiaaof tbe Property, ueoam m tbe franonf of any eantnarnt. mm m 
any ewroaeao or tabordmaona ajueoaint. and M^w » • " • * ^»*> normwtr to omnafy tbr ran? of mmroti or prwod of aaaornaanoo of tbr Note 
or ennftft tnr aomwrn of tbr eaaotbjy mnaMmrao payable ibarrannti Aoy armtna uaem by Lender nomooot to tbr tetma of ram nara^apb 12 
aJmil not aJba tbr obiujatovo of owiiooei or onrrnwer't i iwiiini or a m * * w pay tbr n « arenrrn by tarn laotromeoi and to owarrre tbe 
mi • i r i e i i i i n i maniaag bettaa. aball — ofew am fnnranty of aoy puma, oarporatioo. portoertinp or oaber eearty far payment of tbe g 
Mjfitir f tir a; r r n • " " " ) J - " m— ^-' \
 r - # . — ^ .^^.m. f ^ t p a u ^ , ma« pay Lrnort a reaoanabw nrmot cS 
pyoeu far any MM* arama rf toaen m^A 
1% +>*MAMA*ClWlJMtKm*OT IWaJVtML Any forwjaiinm by Lrnmn m tttrrn t t any rajnt or reoardy I _ 
aafcrak * by tnpUabar taw. abai ant be a wermofor pimlam tbe eaarore of aoy na*i or remedy TW aonrpunar by Lanmrr of pnynarnt of aoy _ 
onn m^orrd by mm fanroomm anet me omt dote of mm* payaami tnnU nm be a wanwr of Lender'• rtfbt m enber rrnwrr prompt peymem wnen f 
mm nf ail otber aama to utawtt or to aamaw a defawa far faekrr m auae prnmp payment TW prntaeimam of —nrrnre or aot payment of taaea — 




I I IMIfOSM COMMOirUL COOT «CV1IT> HGMWMMMm. Tim I unna a « N M m he a 
Uaamem Com mama* Cade tor any of the nvma aproned above a* pan of nm Priam ny whath onder aambcoanr mw soy (at a 
• M i ponwan* a» ant Unmnna Cmmmmmaot Code, and Banian hereby era MM Leader a aecMnry • 
Uamer may lat thai fwirvweiu, or a iipindattma tba roof «the rr*i eaten? ramanJa or earn* aaaawarwtt mmn, a* a I 
abed above at pan of am Ptngani A»y wpw<»nai of ana 11 Mamma at ee of any ether meanry ewe 
i aa a laanong namenjm la a 
rwab and amcadmcnu anrrnaf. and repawawtamm aw* nan I 
i ornh m a m at aaai iar«M Buivovtr abet! pay art anas of hang web aa 
i nmwaf. aad dull pay aft renwatnte amm aa* npaaaai of any i 
m ennae uanaiai of Under. I M W M I abaft nm avast or eater to i t canned a i m w m am Ua 
J Code any other arcanry IMWM aa aaai nams. mrladiag watt in nana and aaaaeene lhamw Up— aanatii i ec«arbe/ae*y anw 
• of Barron ti ccaaanaed aa thai latimment. nariedtng Uat enveett.ni to pay when dne ail a 
i of a teraree party aader Oat Unafarm Cum mental Cad? Mai. at trader's 
para«npr4 ;7#fi>iiil»j^4wr«i MMMM^ianm I o n in awn —T*«—< rememet Ladder may pawned . f a — we name of real aroptrti —4 
any arms of personal property sfejctled abave at pen of me Proper!) amaraatfy or laetilm and m any order wham 
•ft CIIIH «•» •eeafrnsbty of Unmet t ramadan nnatat way Umfarm Cammcn. J Conk or of aw n 
M LUJCS Of TMt P t O f f 1TY. Aa need aa ana paragraph 14. the me • -Jroaf- wall Mann -laiaiaai" a* mat l a a w m i . ^ a * 
mwnrwerUull comply wnh anal OOMPH Borrowertohbgauont aalandwrd nader eM mean r* the Prune, nj « any pan thtrtof Bmianti wdlaet 
boat nay portion of the Properly for nun retnawHiil ete eaeem warn the pnor wrtnea approval of Under aerrwwer. at Under t annul, ahalt 
raTmah Under wain caerawd eepart of all ieetet now eaawng or hereener mane of eN or any pan of aar Pmnrny. anal all art** now or (atntoftrr 
••naval anas will be m form and luniuncr toowci «n ine approval of Under All atann of OM Pmemii) «aali aptvrncnUy pn**«« inoi wen lenan 
i inia iMinuncm. tnai Hw amani anonM to Under. naeP a—noMBi in nr efacove opon Under % ttmmnum of one to nw 
tenant afrte% a» eacrnat ««cn fonntt evnjano>t of arnawmmni aa Under may fmm (MM a» naar reajmnt. that int awomnoini of int 
namant snail nm or irrmwiaaed by famrtOMire. and tbat Under may. at Under'% opmiii. anarpi or rayon wen aiwrnmanu iormnrr woil not. 
noabOM Under t wmten oanteni eaecwe. modify wrvendrr or ammnaar. enner orally or m «mta|. any »a%» no* eanmnf or neiearan ar jdr of all 
• t any pan of the Property provMhaj for a arrm of three ycar\ or more, permit an aaifnmeni or wMeaw of web a wane «**•«* Under t amrarn 
aamiau or reaMeu or oom«wi to the wlnwdinaamn nf any mm* of all ** any pan of the Ptorwny io any ben wbnrdmaie to ton Inurnment If 
lortooar bacome» r»arc thai any araant pronwe* to do m n dnwi|. any act or tbjnf whach may |tve w to any nfbi of nrt^ n* 4gamu rem. 
lomioer thalt (11 taae Mavb ueas at »Sall be reaMMaMy talmiaied in prevent the accroal of any right to a tn-n* *%u*u rem. t a I notify Under 
datraof and of the aHMjont of WMJ in-rf» and i w I «nhin ten d*>» after web aucraai. reimbnrm the tenant «hn Uuii h««t atajooed wvb nfht to 
an-of or taae' wrh other wrpk at wall effrrttvety dnvnarfe web tei-off and aa %kaU an are ibat rent* thereafarr doe wall conamoe to be payabar 
wawoMi att<o# or dedoruon 
Upon U s e r ' s raoont. lorrpwrr tball atMgn to Under by mnmrn matramem iauwacioiy m Under all nr^et nm* eaananf <v nareafatr made 
of all or any pan of the Property and all tenmry depowt* nwdc by tenants m umnaeawn ««b web brain <>f i .* Pruprrty Upnn aiinxnnwni Sy 
lononti to Under of any Warn o( the Prnpen> Under wail have all of the nghn and pnmen po»nrwid b, imnwrr pnor n* web a<minmeni 
and Under snail nave the nght so modify eaarnd or sermuiate wrh caiwmf brase% and to eaecwe new k#*e\ m Under s war nWretwn 
IT tCMCDICS CUMULATIVE, ba.-b remedy pnwuded M that Inummem at dnamn and cnmnlanve •» jll uiner nftm or remedw% mwer tba 
lamrumeni or afforded by Uv or eqtuiy. and may be eaervned coocvrremly. mdeprndemly. or wcifwivvfy m on* order wnataiwer 
laV ACCCLFIATION IN CASE OF tOt f tOWFI^ INSOLVFNTY If borrower snail voanaunly Me a prtrunn irncer rne Federal aUa«rvptry 
Act. at web Art may from time n> tunc he ame*ided m onder any wanlar or wceeasm ttdertf uatwte rriaonf to brfakrvpKy mMdvency. 
•ffrangemet.(s or reorfaruutinm or under an^ state haaarvptty or imolvency on. or far an anawet m an mvnfwrtart p» needmc adnneunt 
anaorvency or tnabiiity to pay debts, or if borrower \h <il Uil n> obtain • vac-4iiO^ or stay of mvoionury pnx»-diof* hrunght Uw the reorf^ nwutKMt 
daiarWniion or iM)«ndauon of Borrower. «r if iorrower Oiall he adiodfrd a honirnpt. or if a tnmtee or rcorner «JuH U jpnooMed A* narrower m 
lorrobtr * property, or if the Property shall l«eome whfevt so the )nnad*-uon of a Federal bankruptcy com or simdar staar enmn or if amnvwer 
•bail n»akc an asaignment Aw the henrnt tt( lorrower s vrednon. or if there n an anaebmem eserouon or other iwirnal teuore of any poraon ot 
•orrowcr't asseu and web seuwre o not druharted wnhin sen days then Under may. at Under's option. decUre all of the won «evurr*i by this 
laotrnmeni so be unnardiately dor and payabar without pmtr onwee so Borroner. and Under nuy mvwie any remedars parmnird by paragraph 2? 
of thu Inatrumefii Any attorney i fees and other espemeA incorred by Under m oonnttuun wnb iorrower v bankropacy or any of the other 
aaseesajd evenu sb.1! be additmnai indehsednes* of narrower secwed by ram Iniirnmeai ponnam to paragraph I hereof 
If. TaUNSFEIS OF TNF PWOPTtTV O t t F N F n n A L INTFIF.STS IN tOMOWFR; / SSI MPTrON. On war or tranOrr of (i) alt or 
any pan of the Property, or any intern* therein or ( M I hcncoual mterests in lurrower (if borrower t s t m natni J perwo or per*tns N m 
csrporaoon pannenhtp tmst or <nher legal emtty \ Under may ai Under's apaon deviare all of the w * s wntred hy rro> InMtwmeni to he 
aamcdiatety dve and payabar. and Under may tnvnic any reaaedaes prrmnsed by paragraph 27 of tbas In wameni Tm» tnmun sbail nut apply in 
(a I transfers by devtae or dexeni or by operatmn of law upon the death of a smnt tenant or a panr,rr. 
(bI wars or transfers when the transferee * credwwonhmess and managemem abdrty an sawiat*«y to Under and the iranaferae hat 
eiecvted pnor so the sale or transfer, a wmten aswmptaon agree mem uiniaming web terms as Under may reqnsre. inctwdmg. if renwwrd 
by Under, an mcrea«e m the rase of loarreu payable onder the Note. 
(c) the grant of a leaaehoid mstreii m a pan of the Ptopeny of three yean or ana (or web hanger aranr arrm as Under mas pa row by pnor 
wnrarn approval > not containing an option to pnrcbase <racept any mwresi m the ground arose, u* tbas Inmrvmem a m i kanrboid) 
< 4) sales or transfers of nenencul mierests m borrower pnmded that web sates or trantierv aagcther wnb any pnor wan or transfers ot 
henencuJ interetti m iommer bot eadodrng saan or trans/en onder subparagraphs (a I and < b | above, do am retob m mure than <•* 
of the benenetal mserrsu m lorrowti having been sotd or vansftrrnrd wwr oommenamem of tmnniinma of the Note and 
( t ) wan or traaoten of natwres or any ptiwnal piuptrn ponnam n d e i n i paragraph of pnrngrapa a hereof 
m MOTfCL Eacept for any noamr renwree onder apphtabh? law 
Imummew or ui the Note snail be given by madmg web now* by 
anca other address as Borrower may designast by nonce so Under at pruvoitd herem. and I b» any 
mail, aawrn racespt loawtttd. as Under i addreu staard herem 
pm ilntbereia Any noma? pimamd far m ana) Inatmmem or m me Now abatf be awrmed m Uwo 
mdar manw 
It . aTJCCtSSOftS AND AttlCNS tOUbJO. JOINT ANO mtVQAL LIABILITY; AGENTS; CAPTIONS. 
I band, and rbe ngbtt ainaadrr abaM aanre n>. ant mpotun i i and aaaajaa of Unmrr and Bonunai aobatci tv me j -
i at*paragraph It nernef All aimnnms and agreemems of Bnnai'ii tbail be mmt and teveral m eaeromng any fbjnat tinnaaii mZ> 
m. Under may act ibaangb aa ensaaoveev am an or mdtpi 'abint an—ncaan as aonhneaard by Under Tba 
i of tae annwrapbs nf tnm l i i w i m am fae aanieamnm onfy and am a t m be aand a> mmipiai m denne ant pewvamaaptdb 
of 
tt. UbJlPOtM bMJLTirAbtlLV P^fTBUhtCNT; COVWNINC U « ; mTVfJLAaWLrTY Tam I 
nantorm nawaaaai tor aanoaai oat and amvonawrm aawenanta anm bn 
n Inrami la the event thot any pia nma of ana Iminiamai or the Norn nannana warn •pptarabar i 
» of aba (mi • • • ! or tba Nam wbaeb mm be fmea ofaa wmww dm mnwaeamg pan m m . and m mm and tba pnrommaa of mm 
ramavJe/famnr*/ 
I »* K aamuajrf foam fcifiooai » — f w w i » that ay u u f f r proveaed fa* m >«>« leotnircni or m the mm* mmttrnt m>*mmm* 
ft* ium%*it m+<»mii+m^**m4mm*mim*wn+«mimmn,m*m»md«m Ham vmiatrt twt* la* aod o n m i . t% ce*m*.d *> the 
« of aach iao e m * cborg* * t w « H avoWd *» tbe eaetot neemnery *> cfawanaai aarh iwdaian T V M M * m o if any » H oni l i pani a* 
Lramrr m n a m of ate a n t e * * * pa?ahar a» Under pt»e»*o* w> a m * charge* aa .rooard MaM be appbed by Lroder hi motor the anmipat <* to* 
ejcfconsditfm cmdioaed by the Now rot th* parpmc «.f droimmtng whether aoy «pga laaii l a * liaMamg the M H M M of marre* * r aeher ii-ar*r» 
r eabaiod from B>i«o«w*r ta t bee* •mamed a3 mana jdnr * objrb n mrwed by t h * l a i i ramni or evvarwa.* by h* NAOJ mi 
• mer.vtt •% weM w ail other t * o t g c « * * * * * * mmmnm* wo* tosh taJehtednem wharh cortawoie »aarmi thaii be O M M J V h* 
laar fapreaddwert teoaar t 'ermof ibeNm* \ ' a i m art I W m manned by aamt*abar law to t * «Uoca*im t a . t p r e r - . ^ Uiail he ewacard 
ee aa** a oeooer ma tb* roar of l a i i m i oaai r e d tberrjy * aaafaroi taawoghoat to* «*ao*d rnrrn of tb* Note 
n W A I V E . OF f T A T I ' t T OT I J M I T A I A J P * aoewoni haerhy wamet *h* rtfbt aa amen aay t ia tut ot L^tauom « a bar m the 
co^raemro of liar bra of t b * l*ar*aen« or aa aoy eroon beam** » en'oror tb* Haw or aoy other «**#atmo W*WJ*«I by <b» intarwmrn* 
M . W A I V E ! O f M A O S M A U J f t H * hjevoemauaeoig tba eaaMcocp of aoy other oxoroy aaan nat m th* Proper^ hrid by Uode? m to. aoy um.t 
pony Lewder thai* have tb* rigor w a w i f M w th* order m obach any or all of the Ptupaity tlteil bt tohareted u» the rvmrdan pi<~**4 bama 
Laoakr ibafl ba«r iba nfbi to omraiiaa tb* oraJrr M aybjcb aay a» ab powwaj of aba woabaida»ia w r w r a brrrby are vM»brd iroaa tbc p,mm4% 
mmmi M O M (be tatauaa of tba * t * a 4 a n onmor^ barcin torrowat aoy oarry vbo oaoioou to i n * Inuntmmt *m4 sity oany »b-> a r « or 
• r v t A r r aa****? aacomy HMMVM » t b c > - « r . n ao j » b r baa anoai or o a a m M K amass bcf**»f l« 'rby •«•««- any «ntf aii r^bi M taajmat aba 
i arwb tm tataewa of a»» of tba faaaaoaai aan—art by looiKaNr l a * or ptonOrd > 
3 . C X J W S T l U r n O N U U M • • O V t M O N S . mfnmn »mm m a w o y w«b ib* owooaon * ^ oioaUi«>o% of tbc ^oatfrwetaa* Loaa 
bfraaaMin if aay a/bicb i> bwrby Maaoffaaraard by « * b f r a a w i ^ awaaV i w ^ i O t taajmaaaw< AM ««-«.itcT> « « b *y Uoocr r w v t M i «a th« 
t a a a w m m Loat. A f ivraarm UuH b* oWtbiadaaat of •owoam aaiaatal by «ba> l a n m o w i aaa tocb ad««»*» « * y N. obbgafc -y a* orov«a>o w 
C!ar Ctaatnamoa Lc»e Aa/Kftnaot All U W M aiioowai by U o o r r fina* to pjwaicMoa of tb* mioaaoaaanw *o fmmxn the «cnimy «if rba> lajaamaarM 
v ta -b* fnaaipi l amoooi of tb* Waar tbaft b* tiraaf* a* onOomawatt oanataM to tb* Cooatmciaoa U a n Agrramcnt All %w.b t«r . t d u l l bear 
a-tnav from aba tfaar of a n b o m r o o t at tb* • « uaaro u» tb* Note ao i tu oalwcwoa fiooi •urroocr of OMCTCU at \mh rate « * « M b* omirar- to 
aoob i i l l i l a * m wbtcb p a w tort* aaJtouott tbaii ocar tttannt at tba b i f b m rata vbacb tmam m colkciea1 froaa lormo^i aoorr apoJimbar l a * and 
abaii b* oayaMc opaa aatietr r m a Lrodct to •omjaur tiajaaitirt payaarot abcirfor 
Ffos»aao* u» OOJC aa Leader 4etm* oronaary to protect trader v w r m u . l o c w t i %b«ll aptw PPHVTM ot UmJcr eaavote aod deltwr to 
Laadot aa uasb form aa Lco^er ihaH dtrvrt »mt*i~"m of aoy aod all nfbtt or darait *bm-b iriatc H. tb* vuoMr^t^n «»ib* Property *nd vtacH 
l o w o i t oiay ba«e afaaau aty Parry topptytftf or • *>« aappbed tabor ajMHcrulaor arrvMCt m aoroei5«i«t witb omunKtM » <»i \\ t *mp*> in 
C*<« of baeacb by lor ro*< i of tb* cowtuint aod uaodit aa of tb* CooMmcuoa -^aa Atreeme-. Lraorr at Lroder»••rtuott »nb or wtibout .•aary 
• p u t tbc Pfopcny ( i \ ouy mmke aoy of tb* ngbu ut r*«aedo> provtocd to tbc Coourttcupo Loan Agree neat \ a ) m*v aodrwrate tbc w » > 
o j r u t d by tb« ldau#otrot aod otvobc tbow reaaadvk providea w parafrarb 2? hereof or (u i ) eaay do both If «fter tr«e coour> jatmc of 
aiooruuaoo of tbc Now tbc Now aod t b * auntment «ic told by Lender froot aod after vavb * * k tb* Coo^rycu MI Loan Af revment Uult veaac 
aa be a port of U*» Inurjmem aod oor / • *» tAati not ^taert aoy ngbt or* art<orT uowoarrdatoi or otber c Mtn m detente *n*u+ not of or to 
O M 4 « W I with tbc rnoumcvoa Loao AtrreraciM aiaMtai to* obbcauooa of tb* Note aod t b * Inkimment 
H ASSICNMCVT OF t C K T S . APPOINTMENT OF I t C E I V f l L E N D M t 1*4 PO^SCSSUON A^ pan o< '*« uMMdarauon Irr tb* 
aideba»docu cwdeacrd by tbc Note lorro*er bereby jKotoarty aod aooBadiuunai y aaMfnt ^od traoaarn to Lender all the renu ao«i rrveoon of 
tbc Ptupcny aadodiot (bote no* dot p»»i due ot to becom < by victor of aoy «aMt»»» other agfceaaroi UM tbc i«u.-upafKy or mm ot aii or «oy 
pan of Ha> Propcrry reaarJieu of to vbont *hc rent* uA revc^jn of the Property are pawMe Borrower hereby -«Mbitrue» Lender or Lrndrr % 
i f t a o to oollect the af »cvaid ren» aod rev*noe« aod berrby daracu cacb anuat of tb* Property to pay u»cb renu a* Lrndrr or i^roakr v afeota. 
pojiiidld however Uut prior to written aotaar f i*en by Lendei to aWniwer of bar becaefc by •orrow«r of any %o%etM it i»r jfrretnem of aWrower 
aa tba inaawjaarat •ort^wet du l l oaiteci aod m e m *H renn aod r rvmwn of tb* Property a» tnot-e <or tbc benrbi «*f Lender *ml owrowti to 
appry tb* rroo aod ir*rotan aa eoibxard to tbv toon *Kmtr-l >y t b * loMnrmcw ut tbc order provided to parafriprt J bc.'of with tbc HsUmx %n 
wa% aa oo wach b «acb kat ocrorred to the jcwaoi of Botrowif it brmf toarnocd by Burro we i and Lender ^at t b * amfitnient of r r o * c3om*tt«tn 
« • abaoiaac aaaifnnient aod not an awtfoment (o jdditir*nai trcunty «*J* Vr* debwry of wmaro noajur by Lrndrr n. *»m»wrr «»f tb* otr+.h by 
Borrower of any oowetunt or aftecment of Borrower in tbii loumajirr? aod owi oo* tb* nruriaMy of Lender eoamo| wpoo aod u k i * f «nd 
^ n r * i n r r t (u I oomroi of the Proprrry ir pervwt oy agent nr by a coo* •ppeanatw receiver Lrndrr tball Momaiuaariy he entitled m puur»«*Ht.»! 
ail *eai' aod u •avca o Kc Proorrry as »rmincd m t b * parair^pb H u tbc wuo* baenrne doc and \. «>4b*e uadodu>{ but not iiooird to renu tb n 
4*t and oopaaa aod all tweb mta tball uBmrdutcty opon delivery of u*cn aomar be held by aV»rrowrr aa tnaMee for the neneH of Lroder out 
p*ovic#d howrvet *ha. tbc emtteo m>uur by Lender to Borrower of ib* bceacb by Borrower »b4'l ronuin a uatemrni thai Lm^rr caermrk tu 
Ogbu tu a*sb rrnt Borrower afreet thai oaoimrocinf upon d>bv*ry of toJt wetuen nouue of Borrower s hrr^A hy Lender to Borrower ea^b 
hems rt of tb* P»*>p»ny Uuil mabc Mrb rrnti payable in and pay t jrb reon to Lender or Lender t a f rnn on Lender» written demand w> tack tenjnt 
aarnefor deii n*4 m each m u n i prraonaiiy by m«ti 01 *y oewvenna t*xb mmmd 10 ca*.h reouii ut* wttbu>«< any tuhdHy *m the nan of w.»d 
amaoi to inajoare fyrtber at aa abc eaawencc ot a defawit by Borrower 
Borrower b c o y oawenantt that Borrower bat not eircmed aey prior a»Mf «me it of uud rrott rbot B o r w e t bat out performed and %•#! n»* 
parfnim .ay acu or baa not enecwatd and will not caccwat anv iriun*oarni wlwcb would prevent Lender from eterounc iu right nndei bo 
poragrapb ^e aod that at the urn* of eareiMion of t b * inummrm there ha* been no aauuparion c* prrpayoieni of any of the renn o the Property 
tm more than iwe oaonrbt p-ior » tbc dot date* of tovb reru Borrower oovtrnanu that Borrower wdl not hereafter oottrci or oavpt payment of 
toy renu of the Property more than two aaoatbt pnor 10 tr-e dwe doict of twrb renu Bunooci fortbrr «cvenantt that Borrower wdi emev-we ami 
dab>n aa Ltodcr tucb fonbat aatignmenu of renu ad revenoet of wc Property at Lewder may from tauie *o uaac reoortt 
Upoo Borrower % breach of any oawnam ot areetnewi of Bonoocr m mm Inacnmrm Ltodcr may m p m o n by ageor t* by a ooort-
amaomard raoyrver mfardam of tbc adaooacy of Under % tommy eaarr opon aod ube aod moNMaan full osntml of tb Pn«p*-<) to oroer to 
prrfona aii gem oaoiatory cod appeopnaar for tbc oprrauon aor* maaaaracorr tbereo' mdwdtac hoi not UmNed to th r«rvwaon .aoceilaoon ot 
ojonjnranna r f waact tbe aoifccjon of all renu aoo rrvmwn of the Piopery tbc ou>aa«f of repaan ic the Proper*? aod tbc ea*\ww*c or 
aommaima of aoouom provtdmg for tb* n^a^gemrnt or matoaroaoar of tb* Proprm ail on tovb tern* *% an deemed bett to prowxi tbe tromry 
of t b * lotamn--wi la tb* event Lrndrr earn to « e i tb- appototmrnt of a reenvrr for tbc Property opon Borrower 1 breatb of aoy oaveoam or 
ag/ltaMOi ot Borroocr m t b * Inatfi'met' lorrower bereby etpreatly una* no IM U.* app'imamot of totb reccrver Leader or toe receiver J u l l be 
Osmond aa I O O J I U a maaonibk me for *» manifing tbc Propcrry 
ABitomaa*1mvmoa»ioyHacatdiMba*o^ oWiooer of aoy covemam «w 
* of Borrower » t b * laam»mrm aball b* app -d bna aa tb* ootu if aoy of taaaog umrm m aod m.nagtog the Propeny and oamrvuaf tb* 
. o«r not banted aa attorney . feet receiver % fon premmmt wo reuener i boor«t oaa* »»f repam u tb* Pioperry ptimiami on 
m ail 111 mi an and otbrr cbarget oo tbc Property aod tb* * oat tif do*ba~**4 ««y obitgaiion or babtbty of Borrower at ^ 
amtor ot ^awdlord of tb* Property aod the* te tbc t*ma aacwed by t b * laowomem Lewder or tlu r e e f e r tbaM bav* aoaeia to tb* b>omt aod f ^ 
aaaord. oaad 10 tbc eparauon aod mtiotmaoie of tb* Propeny aod tbail be babar * • aatmot woiy fnr tbow rent* mtwallr reomed Lroder s**M • « * 
Br Labor « Borrower anyone datourf joder or tbeoagh Bortuoai or anyone bavtog an orirreti m tb* Pruperry by reaaon of an»bang d>m* or leA T ^ 
aoaVMe by Learner acme? t b * paragraph 2a & 
tf tbc reo* of tbe Propeny are not iwmeatot to meet tb* oaao, d*aoy of taaaog amtrvi of and managing the Paopeny aod urdbreoa; tbe reoat ^ 
toy roaoa eapradtrf by Learner for taxb porpoart tbail beaome maabardnni of loraower 10 Uoder «ceored by t b * Inummen. ponataot 10 ' . 
f«««rna)b I hereof Uoieat Lender aod Bononci agree u wmm* to other arrm» of payment m*+ ammaait tbail be payable agon 00001 from T 
Uooer » Borrower roawrtiaM ^yawnt tberenf aod tbail brar m n w from the daar of m t t n r o t r ' at -be rate uated m tbc Not* oairtt poymeot 
of man mi a« aacb rear oooid be aootrary 10 ipmajaabar l a * m obacb event ^arb aaaowou t*«U bear matrett at tbc bajbett ram obawb may b*#JO> 
aaaiacaad from Boreaur wader uppln atb law TZ 
•on 
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a Utah Limited Partnership 
8*; Pacific Western JiidustrifJuJLnc.-... 
a Utah Corporation 
General Partner 
/^CMOJU4»A^-
cya Pacific Western industries lac— 
c8 South Mam btreet. Suite 




Sraft o» UTAH, .. . Corny at. 
On thai day of It ....„ personally i 
. _ ^ the signer of the foregoing ttummcst, who, being by mm duly sworn, dad say, 
that he • the '. 
of . . . a corporation, and that the foregoing instrument was signed m 
behalf of said corporation by authority of tu Board of Directors. *md acknowledged to me that uud corporation ciccuted the same 
Notary Public Rending at: 
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
Stan Of UTAH, County is 
On this . ... day of , 19 — personally appeared before me 
.• the ttgnerts) of the foregoing muniment who. 
being duly sworn acknowledged to me that ..he .. executed the same 
My commotion expires 
Notary Public Rending at 
INDIVIDUAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STAT* Of UTAH - County ss 
On this day of 19 , personally appeared before me . ... 
~ .the signer< s) of the foregoing instrument who 
bong by me duty sworn, did u> that he general pannen s) of 
_ , a limited partnership, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said limited partnership, and 
acknowledged to me that said limited partnership executed the same 
My commission expires 
Notary Public Residing at 
CORPORATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATI or UTAH. -3f£* aPdS^ aT County ss 
On this Z y * day of /ft&C<>f'
 % l 9 J? personally appeared before me &"*&* " ^ 
smaTttiA/p<^^*v^^/^^*>fRe9\igncf»of the foregoing instrument who being by me duly sworn, did say, thatmar* ihe 
dS+x**m*SS&2'*m*'r of /^^/Vc **.^;
€
&V*****fses. /s*c .. a corporation general 
partner of ^ ^ *&**** /*5+Gr<*4ff^?*Ce^Q . * limited partnership, and that said instrument was 
signed tn behalf of said limited partnership by authority flfch* Board of Directors of said general partner, and acknowledged to me 
that said limited partnership executed the same jd^\\ j 
My commission expires ^-f—JL^ ff<*. / \ V > J/^ 
YNOTATiYVi < f ^ ^ , - . . 
DTTET I P l 5 Notary P&blic Residing at («a*aW<J &&*<*** 
IE&IEST FOIC^£CONVEYANCE 
To TIUSTU 
The undersigned is the holder of the note or notes secured by this Instrument Said note or notes, together with a A other 
mdehtedneu vetured by tht» Instrument have been paid in full You are hereby directed to cancel said note or notes ;nd »his 
Instr ment which Art delivered hereby and to reoonvey. without warranty, all the esutc now held by you under this Instrument to 
one person or persons legally entitled thereto 
Date 
UTAH-MnJufimiJ>-l/77-rNMA/VHLMC Uniform laatrwaacwt Cnnwf «ff a 
Isbibit A 
letiaaia* at tbt o»st Southerly corner of a 12.00 foot right of *ey (Idvards aad 
DaaitU)» aaid coraar being North 0*14* 34" last a loot tba quartet aectioa line 
569.46 faat aad last 494.97 foot froo tbo coat or of Soctioa U , Township 1 South, 
loots 1 la t t . Salt Lake laao aad Mendiaa, aad ruaaiat tboace lortb 26*09* last 
aloft* tbo Soutbeettarly lima of said ri$bt of way 12.00 foot; tbomco lortb 63*51* 
Host 10.04 foot to a poiat oa a 74.5 foot radiua curve to tbo loit tbo coatcr of 
vbich boari lortb 6*17'21* Voat; tboaco aortheeaterly aloat tbo arc of said curve 
69.56 foot to a poiat of taatoacy; tboaco lortb 30*13* last 184**2 foot to a poiat 
of a 29.28 foot radiaa carve to tbo right; tboaco Northeasterly aloat tbo arc of 
aaid carve 23.00 foot to a poiat of a 39.0 foot radius reverse carta to tbo l t f t , 
tbo coattr of which'bears lortb 14*47* Voat; tbaoct Northeasterly aloat tbo arc of 
aaid curve 49.66 foot; tboaco lortb 48*00' laat 44.63 foot; tbomco South 89*54* last 
127.08 foot; tboaco South 0*06* Vast 114.45 foot; tboaca South 52*45' Voat 0.75 foot 
to a poiat oa tbo Northwesterly liaa of Keaaedy Drive, said poiat alto beiag oa a 
curve ta tba le f t , the coattr of which boara South 12*39' Hoot 50.00 foot; tboaco 
Soutbwoaterly aloat taid Northwesterly liao aad aloat tbo arc of aaid curve 104.41 
foot to a poiat of a reverse carve to tbo right, the castor of which heart South 73* 
Vest 35.36 ' tot ; theace Southerly aloat the arc of taid curve 27.77 feet to a poiat 
of taatoacy; theace South 28* Vest 27.27 foot to a poiat of a 1675.00 foot radiut 
carve to the left ; tboace Southwesterly aloat the arc of taid curve 160.79 feet to a 
poiat of taa«eacy; tboaca South 22*30' Vett 16.43 feet; tboaca lortb 63*51' vett 
225.65 foot to tbo poiat of betinnmg. 
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June 10, 1988 Court of Appeals Decision 
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GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION, a 
Colorado corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, Ron Mast as assignee 
of the rights of Intermountain Glass 
and Paint Company, a Utah corpora-
tion, United Pacific Reliance Insurance 
Company, a Washington corporation, 
and Oakhills Condominium Limited 
Partnership, a Utah limited partner-
ship, Defendants and Appellants. 
Ron MAST as assignee of the rights of 
Intermountain Glass and Paint Compa-
ny, a Utah corporation, Crossclaim 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, United Pacific Re-
liance Insurance Company, a Washing-
ton corporation, and Oakhills Condo-
minium Limited Partnership, a Utah 
limited partnership, Crossclaim De-
fendants and Appellant. 
Ron MAST as assignee of the rights of 
Intermountain Glass and Paint Compa-
ny, a Utah corporation, Third-party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION; Utah State Tax Commission; 
Robert P. Hansen; Capitol Glass & 
Aluminum; Ron Mast as assignee of 
the rights of Debenham Electrical Sup-
ply Co.; Electro Tech Corporation; 
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of 
Marathon Steel Company; Edwards & 
Daniels Associates; and John Brown & 
Associates; and John and Jane Does 1 
thru 100, Third-party Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Ron MAST as assignee of the rights of 
Marathon Steel Company, an Arizona 
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; Oakhills Condomin-
ium Limited Partnership, a Utah limit-
ed partnership; and United Pacific Re-
liance Insurance Company, a Washing-
ton corporation. Defendants and Appel-
lant. 
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, Third-part) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
y. 
PACIFIC WESTERN INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, Oakhills Condo-
minium Limited Partnership, a Utah 
limited partnership, and Edwards & 
Daniels Associates, Inc., Third-party 
Defendants. 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSO-
CIATION, a California corporation, 
formerly State Saving* and Loan Asso-
ciation, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
OAKHILLS PARTNERSHIP, a Utah lira-
ited partnership; Pacific Western of 
Utah, Inc., a Utah corporation, former-
ly Pacific Western Industries, Inc., a 
Utah corporation; Charles Wr. Akerlow; 
Richard J. Anderson: State Tax Com-
mission of Utah, Robert P. Hansen; 
Capital Glass and Aluminum Corpora-
tion, a Utah corporation; Ron Mast as 
assignee of the rights of Debenham 
Electric Supph Company, Inc., an 
Alaska corporation; Electro Technical 
Corp., a Utah corporation; Ron Mast as 
assignee of the rights of Intermountain 
Glass & Paint Co., a Utah corporation; 
General Glass Corp., a Colorado corpo-
ration; Ron Mast as assignee of the 
rights of Marathon Steel Co., an Arizo-
na corporation; Edwards & Daniels As-
sociates, Inc., a Utah corporation; Og-
den's Carpet Outlet, a Utah corpora-
tion; Mast Construction Co., a Utah 
corporation; Mildred S. Freymuller; 
and John Does 1 thru 30, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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No. 860355-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 10, 198S. 
Lawsuits were brought to establish 
priority of liens in connection with condo-
minium construction project. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy 
Hansen, J., entered judgment declaring 
lender's deed of trust to be valid hen and to 
have priority over all other hens, and gen-
eral contractor and contractor's president 
appealed The Court of Appeals, Davidson, 
J., held that as a consequence of actual 
notice of deed of trust to general contrac-
tor's president, deed of trust was valid and 
bmdmg lien as to contractor and president 
Affirmed. 
Jackson, J., concurred in result only 
and filed opinion. 
Condominium ^ 5 
Deed of trust securing loan funding 
construction of condominium project was 
valid and binding hen as to general contrac-
tor and general contractor's president as 
consequence of president's actual notice of 
deed of trust; subordination agreement ex-
ecuted on general contractor's behalf m 
favor of lender was dated day of closing, 
signed by general contractor's president 
and contained legal description the same as 
that depicted on deed of trust, and lender's 
representative testified that subordination 
agreement had been executed by time of 
closing. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-6 (Repealed). 
Ronald C Barker (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for appellants, Mast & Mast Const 
Warren Patten, W. Cullen Battle (ar-
gued). Douglas B Cannon, Salt Lake City, 
for respondents, American Sa\. & Loan 
Assoc. 
Jeffery B Brown, Salt Lake Cit>, for 
Electrical Technical Corp & Capita) Glass 
& Aluminum 
R Stephen Marshall, Salt Lake City, for 
Edwards & Daniels 
Paul R Howell, Salt Lake City, for Unit-
ed Pacific Ins 
John C. Green, III 
Electro Technical 
Sail Lake City, for 
Lake Leland S. McCullough, Jr., Salt 
City, for Mildred Freymuller. 
James E Boevers, Salt Lake City, for 
Western State Title 
David Black, Stephen Marshall, Salt 
Lake City, Van Cott, Bagle\, Cornwall & 
McCarthy for Edwards & Daniels 




American Savings and Loan Association 
(American) loaned funds to the Oakhills 
Partnership (Oakhills) for the construction 
of Oakhills Condominiums. Oakhiils a 
Utah limited partnership, had Pacific West-
ern Industries, Inc (Pacific Western), a 
Utah corporation, as the general partner 
Charles W Akerlow (Akerlov.) and Richard 
J. Anderson (Anderson) were respectively, 
chairman of the board and president of 
Pacific Western 
The March 2b, 1983, loan from American 
to Oakhills was secured by a promisson 
note and a deed of trust Akerlow and 
Anderson signed the deed of trust but the 
loan amount, date of the note, identin of 
the trustee, and the seal of Pacific Western 
were omitted The deed of trust was re-
corded with the Salt Lake County Recorder 
on April 8, 1983 It was rerecorded oi> 
April 20, 1983 The date and the amount 
of the note were added at that time An 
"X" was placed over the initial recording 
with a line-out placed on the book and pag* 
numbers of that recording On April 26, 
1983, Western State? Tule Compam (West 
em States) was added to the deed of trust 
as trustee and the April 20th recording was 
crossed out in the same manner At trial, 
Akerlow testifier! the deed of trust, "as 
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completely filled in," conformed to "the 
terms of [the] deal" with American. 
Jeffrey J. Jensen (Jensen), vice president 
of Western States, acknowledged the deed 
of trust in his capacity as a notary public. 
He testified that he could not "remember 
specifically" whether Akerlow and 
Anderson were present when he acknowl-
edged their signatures. Neither could Jen-
sen state whether the two officers of Pacif-
ic Western were placed under oath "as to 
their corporate authority1." Jensen did tes-
tify that it was his "customary practice" to 
have the parties sign documents "at the 
time of closing" and he would acknowledge 
them. It wras not his practice to place them 
under oath. Additionally, Jensen testified 
to his personal knowledge of Akerlow and 
Anderson. 
A representative of American testified 
that Jensen, Akerlow, and Anderson were 
present at the closing. He also testified 
Ronald E. Mast, president of Mast Con-
struction Company, the general contractor, 
wras present for a portion of the closing. 
The representative could not remember ex-
actly how the closing was conducted. Ron 
Mast denied he was present at the closing, 
that he had ever seen American's repre-
sentative prior to the trial, and that he had 
ever been "to the business" of Wrestem 
States. 
Ron Mast claimed work began on Oak-
hills Condominiums prior to April 8, 1983, 
the date of the initial recording of the deed 
of trust by American. However, the notice 
of lien recorded by Mast Construction Com-
pany indicated April 28, 1983, as the date 
the "first labor, material and equipment 
was performed." In an answer to an inter-
rogatory, Ron Mast listed April 18, 1983, as 
the date on which "work was commenced, 
or materials were furnished on the ground 
for the structure, or improvement con-
structed on the property." Roger J. Mast, 
vice president of Mast Construction Compa-
ny, was questioned at trial about his depo-
sition. There, he answered that he "start-
ed the job" on April 18, 1983. 
1. Other lien claimants have assigned theii 
claims to Ron Mast resulting in his being an 
appellant personally as well as president of 
W. David Hammons (Hammons), presi-
dent of Electro Technical Corporation (Elec-
tro Tech) and a subcontractor on Oakhills 
Condominiums, filed a notice of lien which 
indicated May 6, 1983, as the date Electro 
Tech commenced work. However, Ham-
rnons testified at trial a temporary power 
panel and pole, a coil of wrire, and some 
conduit were placed at the building site on 
April 6, 1983. Mast Construction Company 
relies on Electro Tech's placement of elec-
trical equipment at the site to establish the 
priority of its lien over American's deed of 
trust. 
Another lienholder filed a complaint on 
March 14, 1985, to foreclose its lien on 
Oakhills Condominiums. Other similar ac-
tions were consolidated with the result that 
Mast Construction Company and Ron Mast 
are appellants and American the respon-
dent.^ On June 19, 198G, the trial court 
granted American partial summary judg-
ment which stated the deed of trust at 
issue, as recorded on April 8, 1983, was 
operative as either a deed of trust or mort-
gage. The court reserved the propriety of 
the signatures' acknowledgment and the 
date work commenced on Oakhills Condo-
miniums for the bench trial which was held 
on July 25 and 26, 1986. An order for 
entry of final judgment was filed on No-
vember 18, 1986, whicii ^declared Ameri-
can's deed of trust was a valid lien against 
Oakhills Condominiums and had priority 
over all other liens against that project. 
The trial court directed the entry of judg-
ment as final pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 
54(b). 
Appellants present twro issues for review; 
(1) was the recording of the deed of trust 
as it appeared on April 8, 1983, effective in 
view of the omissions thereon and that the 
signators were not placed under oath; and 
(2) did the placement of the electrical equip-
ment at the building site of Oakhills Condo-
miniums on April 6, 1983, constitute com-
mencement to do work for purposes of 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1974)° 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a) requires that find-
ings of fact "shall not be set aside unless 
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clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
However, we accord the trial court's con-
clusions of law no particular deference, but 
review them for correctness. Scharf u 
BUG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985). 
THE DEED OF TRUST 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986) states: 
Every conveyance of real estate, and 
every instrument of writing setting forth 
an agreement to convey any real estate 
or wrhereby any real estate may be af-
fected, to operate as notice to third per-
sons shall be proved or acknowledged 
and certified in the manner prescribed by 
this title and recorded in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which such real 
estate is situated, but shall be valid and 
binding between the parties thereto with-
out such proofs, acknowledgment, certifi-
cation or record, and as to all other 
persons who have had actual notice 
(emphasis added). 
The "actual notice" exception to the re-
quirement that a conveyance or instrument 
be validly recorded to impart notice to third 
persons is discussed in Johnson v. Bell, 666 
P.2d 308 (Utah 1983). There the Utah Su-
preme Court stated actual notice was a 
question of fact. The Court wrote: 
This statute was under examination by 
this Court in Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 
392, 24 P. 190 (1890), where we held that 
the "actual notice" required by § 57-1-6 
wras satisfied if a party dealing with the 
land had information of facts which 
would put a prudent man upon inquiry 
and which, if pursued, would lead to ac-
tual knowledge as to the state of the 
title. See a similar expression in McGar-
ry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 
288 (1948). 
Id. at 310. Accord Stumph v. Church, 740 
P.2d 820 (Utah App.1987). 
In the instant case it is not necessary to 
address the "duty to inquire" prong of 
actual notice. The record on appeal con-
tains numerous exhibits. American's ex-
hibit 32, received by the trial court, is a 
v. MAST CONST. CO. Utah 441 
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letter written on March 24, 1983. In it, 
American's representative at the closing 
sent Jensen a list of conditions to be ful-
filled prior to closing. Condition number 6 
requires, "You must have in your posses-
sion the Subordination Agreement signed 
by Mast Construction Co. Inc." Ameri-
can's exhibit 33, also received, is that 
agreement in which Mast Construction 
Company subordinated to American a spe-
cific sum until the occurrence of certain 
events set forth in the document. The 
agreement was dated March 28, 1983, the 
day of closing, and was signed by Ameri-
can's representative and by Ron Mast in 
his capacity as president of Mast Construc-
tion Company. The legal description of the 
property on the exhibit attached to the 
subordination agreement is the same as 
that depicted on the exhibit to the deed of 
trust. At trial, American's representative 
testified the subordination agreement had 
been executed by the time of closing be-
cause of a notation on exhibit 32 followed 
by his initials. 
In view of the above, we find that Ron 
Mast had actual notice of the deed of trust 
at issue prior to April 6, 1983, the date on 
which he relies to establish the priority of 
his lien. As a consequence of his actual 
notice, the deed of trust is valid and bind-
ing as to Ron Mast and Mast Construction 
Company. 
Because of the above, it is unnecessary 
to analyze whether Hammons' placement 
of electrical equipment at the building site 
constituted commencement to do work for 
the purpose of satisfying the mechanics' 
lien statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to 
-26 (1974). The validity of the April 6, 
1983 lien date is immaterial once the priori-
ty of American's deed of trust is estab-
lished as to appellants. 
The judgment of the court below that 
American's deed of trust was valid and had 
priority over all other liens is affirmed. 
Costs against appellants. 
BENCH, J., concurs. 
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JACKSON, Judge (concurring in 
result only): 
Without addressing whether the April 8 
trust deed from Oakhills' general partner 
to American was legally effective to create 
a lien, the majority has determined that it 
was "valid and binding" on Ron Mast and 
his company. The majority examines the 
record evidence and makes a factual find-
ing that was not made by the trial court, 
namely, that Mast had actual notice of the 
April 8 trust deed. This actual notice 
arises solely from the fact that, on March 
28, Mast signed a subordination agreement 
that clearly informed him that American 
was loaning money to Oakhills for the con-
dominium construction project on which 
Mast Construction Company and other lien 
claimants eventually worked. That agree-
ment, however, does not mention anything 
about an existing or planned trust deed on 
the project site from Oakhills to American 
as security for the construction loan. I fail 
to see how it proves that Mast had actual 
notice of a deed of trust that was not even 
executed until after the subordination 
agreement was signed. 
I am concerned that, under the majority's 
reasoning, no person who supplies material 
or labor on a construction job bigger than a 
child's sandbox will ever be able to achieve 
lien priority over an entity that loans mon-
ey on the project. Every materialman on 
any job big enough to look like it requires 
financing will be charged with knowing or 
having reason to know that, at some un-
known future time, the lender will require 
the borrower to execute a deed of trust to 
secure a loan. This result undermines the 
purpose of the mechanics' lien statute, 
which is "to protect those who have added 
directly to the value of property by per-
forming labor or furnishing materials upon 
it." Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 
2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959) (quot-
ed with approval in First of Denver Mortg. 
Inv v. CN. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 
521, 524-25 (1979)). The majority's deci-
sion requires the materialman to become a 
fortune teller, thereby opening Pandora's 
box in cases where predictability is needed. 
Furthermore, I do not believe that a third 
party's "actual notice" can turn an invalid 
legal instrument into one that creates a 
valid lien superior to the mechanic's lien of 
the third party. In other words, if an J 
instrument of conveyance is defective in 
some material way, such that it is ineffec-
tive to create an encumbrance on the sub-
ject property notwithstanding its recording, 
how can it be legally effective as a superior 
lien as against a supplier of materials or 
labor, even one who knows (or could guess) 
that it is in existence? Significantly, the 
statute relied upon by the majority, Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), makes an in-
strument valid and binding against a third 
party with actual notice even though it is 
"without such acknowledgment, certifica-
tion or recording]" as the statutes require. 
The statute does not make an instrument 
with other material defects, such as those 
alleged in this case, valid and binding 
against either a part}' to the legally defec-
tive instrument or a third party with actual 
notice of it. 
Like the trial court, I believe the relevant 
issues are: (1) was the trust deed, as re-
corded on April 8, legally effective to cre-
ate a lien, with the result that its recording 
on April 8 gave constructive notice to the 
world of American's lien from that date? 
and (2) if so, did work commence on the 
site, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 
(1988), prior to April 8? 
I agree with the trial court that the al-
leged defects and omissions in the April 8 
trust deed did not deprive it of legal validi-
ty or recordability and that one lien claim-
ant's placement of a temporary power pan-
el and coil of wire at the project construc-
tion site on April 6, on the ground next to a 
pile of trash, would not impart sufficient 
notice that the materialman's work had 
commenced. See Western Mortg. Loan 
Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 
2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967); Tripp v. 
Vaughn, 141 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah App. 
1987). I therefore join in the affirmance of 
the judgment of the trial court. 
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result only): 
Without addressing whether the April 8 
trust deed from Oakhills' general partner 
to American was legally effective to create 
a lien, the majority has determined that it 
was "valid and binding" on Ron Mast and 
his company. The majority examines the 
record evidence and makes a factual find-
ing that was not made by the trial court, 
namely, that Mast had actual notice of the 
April 8 trust deed. This actual notice 
arises solely from the fact that, on March 
28, Mast signed a subordination agreement 
that clearly informed him that American 
was loaning money to Oakhills for the con-
dominium construction project on which 
Mast Construction Company and other lien 
claimants eventually worked. That agree-
ment, however, does not mention anything 
about an existing or planned trust deed on 
the project site from Oakhills to American 
as security for the construction loan. I fail 
to see how it proves that Mast had actual 
notice of a deed of trust that was not even 
executed until after the subordination 
agreement was signed. 
I am concerned that, under the majority's 
reasoning, no person who supplies material 
or labor on a construction job bigger than a 
child's sandbox will ever be able to achieve 
lien priority over an entity that loans mon-
ey on the project. Every materialman on 
any job big enough to look like it requires 
financing will be charged with knowing or 
having reason to know that, at some un-
known future time, the lender will require 
the borrower to execute a deed of trust to 
sec^Te a \oan. This result undermines the 
purpose of the mechanics' lien statute, 
which is "to protect those who have added 
directly to the value of property by per-
forming labor or furnishing materials upon 
it." Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 
2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959) (quot-
ed with approval in First of Denver Mortg. 
Inv. v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 
521, 524-25 (1979)). The majority's deci-
sion requires the materialman to become a 
fortune teller, thereby opening Pandora's 
box in cases where predictability is needed. 
Furthermore, 1 do not believe that a third 
party's "actual notice" can turn an invalid 
legal instrument into one that creates a 
valid lien superior to the mechanic's lien of 
the third party. In other words, if an 
instrument of conveyance is defective in 
Borne material way, such that it is ineffec-
tive to create an encumbrance on the sub-
ject property notwithstanding its recording, 
how can it be legally effective as a superior 
lien as against a supplier of materials or 
labor, even one who knows (or could guess) 
that it is in existence? Significantly, the 
statute relied upon by the majority, Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), makes an in-
strument valid and binding against a third 
party with actual notice even though it is 
"without such acknowledgment, certifica-
tion or recording]" as the statutes require. 
The statute does not make an instrument 
with other material defects, such as those 
alleged in this case, valid and binding 
against either a party to the legally defec-
tive instrument or a third party with actual 
notice of it. 
Like the trial court, I believe the relevant 
issues are: (1) was the trust deed, as re-
corded on April 8, legally effective to cre-
ate a lien, with the result that its recording 
on April 8 gave constructive notice to the 
world of American's lien from that date? 
and (2) if so, did work commence on the 
site, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 
(1988), prior to April 8? 
I agree with the trial court that the al-
leged defects and omissions in the April 8 
trust deed did not deprive it of legal validi-
ty or recordability and that one lien claim-
ant's placement of a temporary power pan-
el and coil of wire at the project construc-
tion site on April 6, on the ground next to a 
pile of trash, would not impart sufficient 
notice that the materialman's work had 
commenced. See Western Mortg. Loan 
Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 
2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967); Tripp v. 
Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah App. 
1987). 1 therefore join in the affirmance of 
the judgment of the trial court. 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION, a 
Colorado corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; Ron Mast, as assignee of 
the rights of Intermountain Glass and Paint 
Company, a Utah corporation; United Pacific 
Reliance Insurance Company, a Washington 
corporation; and Oak-hills Condominium 
Limited Partnership, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of 
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company, a 
Utah corporation, 
Cross-claim Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mast Construction Company, a Utah 
corporation; United Pacific Reliance Insurance 
Company, a Washington corporation; and 
Oakhills Condominium Limited Partnership, a 
Utah limited partnership, 
Cross-claim Defendants and Appellant. 
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of 
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
State Savings & Loan Association; Utah State 
Tax Commission; Robert P. Hansen; Capitol 
Glass & Aluminum; Ron Mast, as assignee of 
the rights of Debenham Electrical Supply Co.; 
Electro Technical Corp.; Ron Mast, as 
assignee of the rights of Marathon Steel 
Company; Edwards & Daniels Associates, 
Inc.; John Brown & Associates; and John and 
Jane Does 1 thru 100, 
Third-party Defendants and Appellants. 
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of 
Marathon Steel Company, an Arizona 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mast Construction Company, a Utah 
corporation; Oakhills Condominium Limited 
Partnership, a Utah limited partnership; and 
United Pacific Reliance Insurance Company, a 
Washington corporation. 
Defendants and Appellant. 
Mast Construction Company, a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Pacific Western Industries, Inc., a Utah 
corporation; Oakhills Condominium Limited 
Partnership, a Utah limited partnership: and 
Edwards & Daniels Associates, Inc., 
Third-party Defendants. 
American Savings & Loan Association, a 
California corporation, formerly State Savings 
& Loan Association, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Oakhills Partnership, a Utah limited 
partnership; Pacific Western of Utah, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, formerly Pacific Western 
Industries, Inc., a Utah corporation; Charles 
W. Akerlow; Richard J. Anderson; State Tax 
Commission of Utah; Robert P. Hansen; 
Capitol Glass and Aluminum Corporation, a 
Utah corporation; Ron Mast, as assignee of 
the rights of Debenham Electric Supply 
Company, Inc., an Alaska corporation; 
Electro Technical Corp., a Utah corporation; 
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of 
Intermountain Glass & Paint Co., a Utah 
corporation; General Glass Corp., a Colorado 
corporation; Ron Mast, as assignee of tin* 
rights of Marathon Steel Co., an Arizona 
corporation; Edwards & Daniels Associates, 
Inc., a Utah corporation; Ogden's Carpel 
Outlet, a Utah corporation; Mast Construction 
Co., a Utah corporation; Mildred S. 
Freymuller; and John Does 1 thru 30, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of 
Debenham Electric Supply Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Electro Technical Corporation; Mast 
Construction Company; the Oakhills 
Partnership; and United Pacific Insurance 
Company, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jackson. 
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OPINION ON REHEARING 
JACKSON, Judge: 
These consolidated actions were brought to 
establish priority of the parties' interests in 
real property that was the site of the Oakhills 
Condominium project. Due to various assig-
nments and substitutions, Ron Mast and Mast 
Construction Company (referred to collectively 
as "Mast" are the appellants and American 
Savings & Loan Association ("American") is 
the respondent. Mast appeals from the judg-
ment below that American's deed of trust 
constitutes a valid lien against the Oakhills 
Condominiums property, with priority over 
Mast's mechanics' liens. We affirm.1 
On March 28, 1983, Oakhills Partnership 
("Oakhills") executed a promissory note to 
State Savings & Loan Association (the former 
name of respondent American) for 
$10,400,000, the sum loaned for construction 
of the Oakhills Condominium project, with 
interest payable monthly from April 1, 1983, 
and the principal due on May 1, 1985. On 
April 8, 1983, a document entitled 
"Multifamily Deed of Trust, Assignment of 
Rents and Security Agreement (Security for 
Construction Loan Agreement)" and dated 
March 28, 1983, was filed for recording in Salt 
Lake County. The document showed Oakhills, 
a Utah limited partnership, as "Trustor/ 
Grantor" and "Borrower" and State Savings <& 
Loan Association as "Beneficiary" and 
"Lender." The recitals state that Borrower, in 
consideration of the indebtedness recited and 
the trust created, grants, conveys and assigns 
to Trustee, in trust and with power of sale, the 
described Oakhills Condominium project 
property. The document recites that it is exe-
cuted for the purposes of, among other things, 
repayment of the indebtedness evidenced by 
Borrower's note and performance of the 
covenants and agreements of Borrower cont-
ained in a Construction Loan Agreement, 
incorporated by reference. However, blanks in 
the deed of trust form for the trustee's name 
and for the date, amount, and due date of the 
note were not filled in; the space for the date 
of the Construction Loan Agreement was also 
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left blank. The trust deed was executed by the 
Oakhills Partnership and signed by Charles 
Ackerlow and Richard Anderson on behalf of 
its general partner. 
These competing actions were commenced 
after default on the note. On motions for 
summary judgment, the trial court ruled that 
the trust deed, as recorded on April 8, 1983, 
was operative as either a trust deed or mort-
gage, even though it contained the aforemen-
tioned blanks. The court reserved the follo-
wing issues for trial: (1) whether the execution 
of the instrument was acknowledged before a 
notary public and, if not, what effect failure 
to acknowledge would have; (2) whether work 
commenced prior to April 8, 1983; and (3) 
whether the claimed activities of the subcont-
ractor, Electro Technical Corporation, could 
constitute commencement of work under the 
mechanics' lien statute, Utah Code Ann. §38-
1-5(1988). 
At trial, Mast Construction Company, the 
general contractor, claimed work on the 
project began under the mechanics' lien stat-
utes prior to April 8, 1983. Relying on the 
trial testimony of David Hammons, president 
of Electro Technical Corporation, that he 
placed certain electrical materials at the 
project site on April 6, 1983, appellants asse-
rted their mechanics' liens should relate back 
to Hammons's date and take priority over 
American's deed of trust. 
The trial court found: the trust deed was 
signed by duly authorized officers of the. 
general partner in the presence of a notary 
public, who completed the certificate of ack-
nowledgment but did not place the signatories 
under oath as stated in the certificate; and the 
notary public was personally acquainted with 
the signers and familiar with their respective 
authorizations from and business relationships 
with Oakhills and its general partner. In add-
ition, the trial court specifically found no 
work commenced and no materials were fur-
nished at the Oakhills Condominiums site 
prior to April 8, 1983. 
Based on these findings, the court concl-
uded: (1) the trust deed acknowledgment was 
regular on its face and conformed to the sta-
tutory format; (2) the trust deed was entitled 
to be recorded and imparted constructive 
notice to all parties of American's lien; and 
(3) American's lien had priority over all other 
subsequent liens against the Oakhills Condo-
miniums property. 
On appeal, we must determine whether 
alleged defects and omissions in American's 
deed of trust, as recorded on April 8, 1983, 
were fatal to the creation of a lien or encum-
brance on the property or to the recordability 
of the instrument. If not, we must then decide 
whether the court clearly erred in finding that, 
for purposes of applying Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-5 (1988), no materials were furni-
shed and no work commenced on the project 
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prior to recordation of American's deed of 
trust. 
First, we examine the purpose and hybrid 
nature of a trust deed under Utah statutes. 
"'Trust deed' means a deed executed in con-
formity with this act and conveying real pro-
perty to a trustee in trust to secure the perfo-
rmance of an obligation of the grantor or 
other person named in the deed to a benefic-
iary/ Utah Code Ann. §57-1-19(3) (1986). 
Although a trust deed, like a mortgage, is 
given as security for the performance of some 
obligation, it is nevertheless a conveyance by 
which title to the trust property passes to the 
trustee. See Utah Code Ann. §57-1-19(4) 
(1986) ("trustee" is person to whom title to 
real property is conveyed by trust deed); see 
also Utah Code Ann. §57-1-28 (1986). 
As a general rule, an instrument purporting 
to be a deed and in which a blank has been 
left for the name of the grantee is no deed and 
is inoperative as a conveyance of legal title as 
long as the blank remains. Burnham v. 
Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P.2d 96 (1949). 
Thus, the document recorded by American on 
April 8, 1983, is ineffective as a title-
conveying instrument because it does not ide-
ntify or name the trustee, who is the grantee 
under the deed.2 We nonetheless agree with 
the trial court's alternative conclusion that the 
instrument recorded is operative as a mortgage 
despite this omission. 
Unlike a trust deed, a mortgage in Utah is 
not a title-conveying instrument. The mort-
gagor retains legal title, and the mortgagee's 
interest is a lien on the property to secure 
payment of a debt. State Bank of Lehi v. 
Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977). See Utah 
Code Ann. §78-40-8 (1987); Bybee v. 
Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948). In 
order to establish a valid mortgage (or trust 
deed), there must be in existence a legal debt 
or obligation with a specific amount owing, 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 
1983), but there is nothing in our statutes 
which requires an instrument to specify the 
amount of indebtedness in order to be valid as 
a legal mortgage. Although Utah Code Ann. 
§57-1-14 (1986) sets forth a land mortgage 
form that may be used which includes spaces 
for insertion of the amount and terms of the 
debt, no particular form is necessary as long 
as the writing shows the intention of the 
parties to create a valid legal mortgage. See 
Bybee, 189 P.2d at 122. The instrument need 
not show the amount of indebtedness as long 
as it sufficiently discloses the sources from 
which the specific amount may be ascertained. 
Hampshire Nat'l Bank v. Calkins, 3 Mass. 
App. Ct. 697, 339 N.E.2d 244 (1975); Sease v. 
John Smith Grain Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 223, 
479 N.E.2d 284, 290 (1984). See Commercial 
Factors of Denver v. Clarke & Waggcner, 684 
P.2d 261 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). 
Here, the clear intention of the parties that 
American be given an interest in the described 
project property to secure repayment of its 
loan to Oakhills appears repeatedly on the 
face of the document. The parties are identi-
fied and repeatedly referred to as "borrower" 
and "lender." Notwithstanding the omission of 
the amount and terms of the underlying note, 
the instrument recites numerous times that it is 
being executed precisely to secure repayment 
of Oakhills's indebtedness to American for a 
specific construction loan, evidenced by a 
promissory note. The instrument is thus a 
valid legal mortgage giving American a lien 
against the project property as security for 
repayment of the construction loan. 
Mast next contends American's instrument 
was not entitled to be recorded under Utah 
C o d e A n n . § 5 7 - 3 - 1 (1986)3 b e c a u s e 
"acknowledgment" of the instrument, required 
by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986),' nec-
essitates a statement by the signers under oath. 
As an unrecordable instrument, Mast maint-
ains, it could not impart the notice to third 
parties provided for in section 57-1-6 and 
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-2 (1986)5 even 
though it was, in fact, recorded. See Norton v. 
Fuller, 68 Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926) (actual 
recording of purported mortgage of no legal 
effect where acknowledgment of execution 
improperly taken by mortgagee as notary). 
Appellants' principal arguments are: (1) 
Ackerlow and Anderson did not sign the ins-
trument in front of the notary public; and (2) 
the acknowledgment by the signers is defective 
because, as the trial court found, they were 
not placed under oath by the notary. 
Mast overlooks the specific finding of the 
trial court that the instrument was signed in 
the notary's presence, choosing instead to 
reargue the contradictory testimony on this 
point in the light most favorable to appell-
ants' position. We must begin our analysis, 
however, with the trial court's findings, not 
with appellants' view of what facts should 
have been found. As/iron v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
147, 150 (Utah 1987). As we have said on 
numerous occasions, in order to challenge a 
finding of fact, it is an appellant's burden to 
marshall all the evidence that supports the 
court's finding and then demonstrate why, 
even viewing it in the light most favorable to 
the court below, it is insufficient to support 
the finding made. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Critchf-
ield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Harker v. Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(following Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). Only then can we 
consider whether those findings are "clearly 
erroneous" under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Ashton, 733 P.2d at 150. 
In light of Mast's failure to carry this burden 
on appeal, we will not disturb the trial court's 
finding. See id.; Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276,1278 (Utah 1987). 
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Mast also claims the instrument was not 
properly acknowledged because the notary 
public did not require the signers "to take an 
oath, affirm or swear in connection with the 
signing" of it. Mast incorrectly cites "R. S. 
McKnight v. State Land Board0 and asserts 
that case "sets forth the four requirements 
need [sic] for a valid notarization: (1) an oath 
or solemn declaration; (2) a manifestation of 
an intent to be bound by a statement or act, 
but something more than just signing the 
document; (3) the signature; and (4) an ackn-
owledgment by an authorized person that the 
oath was taken." (Emphasis added.) Mast then 
argues that the acknowledgment on Amer-
ican's instrument is invalid because require-
ments (1) and (2) were not satisfied. Mast has, 
however, grossly mischaracterized the facts 
and holding in McKnight in order to make it 
appear controlling in this case. 
McKnight involved the filing of applications 
for oil and gas leases under statutes that req-
uired applicants to be citizens or corporations 
of the United States and stated lease applica-
tions must be accompanied by a "statement 
under oath over applicant's signature of his 
qualifications ...." McKnight v. State Land 
Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d 726, 730 
(1963). Plaintiff argued another's application 
must lose priority because it omitted an oath 
of citizenship when filed. After discussing 
several types of oaths and their purposes,6 the 
court stated, "The essentials of an oath are: 1. 
A solemn declaration. 2. Manifestation of an 
intent to be bound by the statement. 3. Sign-
ature of declarer. 4. Acknowledgment by an 
authorized person that oath was taken." 
McK/2ig/2f,381P.2dat734. 
In contrast to the statute in McKnight, the 
acknowledgement statutes governing convey-
ances of interests in land in the spring of 1983 
did not require any statement under oath by 
the representatives of Oakhills Partnership 
about their execution of the instrument we 
have determined is a legal mortgage.7 Conve-
yances in writing were to be "acknowledged or 
proved" and certified in the manner provided 
by the statutes. Utah Code Ann. §57-2-1 
(1986). See also Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 
(1986) (in order to operate as notice to third 
parties, instrument "shall be proved or ackn-
owledged and certified . . . .") . 
A person acknowledging the execution of an 
instrument appears before an authorized 
officer and in some manner admits the fact of 
execution, with a view to giving the instrument 
authenticity. See 1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledg-
ments §29 (1962). Under our statutes, the 
acknowledgment or proof could be taken by 
one of several officers, including a notary 
public, Utah Code Ann. §57-2-2 (1986), 
who was then required to make a certificate 
thereof and endorse it on or annex it to the 
instrument of conveyance. Utah Code Ann. 
§57-2-5 (1986). Where the person making 
the acknowledgment was personally known to 
the officer to be the person whose name was 
subscribed to the conveyance, no sworn oath 
or affirmation of a third party regarding the 
identity of the acknowledging person was 
necessary. See Utah Code Ann. §§57-2-6,-
8 (1986). In such a case, the officer's certifi-
cate of acknowledgment was permitted to be 
in substantially the following form: 
State of Utah, County of 
On the day of , 19 , person-
ally appeared before me , the 
signer of the above instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-2-7 (1986).* The 
statutory' form does not require the certificate 
to state affirmatively that the person making 
the acknowledgment is personally known to 
the officer. Cf. In re New Concept Realty & 
Dev.t Inc., 107 Idaho 711, 692 P.2d '355 
(1984). 
The trial court found that the signers and 
their relationships to Oakhills and its general 
partner were personally known to the notary 
public, who had taken their acknowledgments 
many times. The notary's certificate of ack-
nowledgment recites that the two named 
signers appeared before him and stated their 
positions in Oakhills Partnership's general 
partner, their authority to sign the document 
on behalf of the limited partnership and for 
the general partner, and the fact that they 
acknowledged the execution of the instrument 
by the limited partnership. 
The certificate thus complies with the stat 
utory requirements and wras sufficient tc 
require acceptance of the instrument for rec 
ording under Utah Code Ann. §57-3-
(1986). As a properly acknowledged and rec 
orded mortgage, the instrument imparte< 
notice of its contents to third parties as of th 
recording date, April 8, 1983.9 See Utah Cod 
Ann. §57-1-6 (1986); Utah Code Ann 
§57-3-2(1986). 
We now examine the issue of priorit 
between Mast's mechanics' liens and Amei 
ican's mortgage lien. Utah Code Ann. §3$ 
1-3 (1988) specifies the circumstances i 
which those persons rendering services, per 
orming labor, or furnishing materials i 
certain construction projects are given mecl 
anics' liens on the construction property. ] 
determining the priority among competir 
liens against the same property, anoth 
section of the statute makes clear that the da 
of recording a notice of a mechanics' lie 
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. §38-1 
(1988), is not conclusive. Instead, the mech 
nics' liens 
shall relate back to, and take effect 
as of, the time of the commence-
ment to do work or furnish mater-
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or improvement, and shall have 
priority over any lien, mortgage or 
other encumbrance which may have 
attached subsequently to the time 
when the building, improvement or 
structure was commenced, work 
begun, or first material furnished 
on the ground; also over any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance of 
which the lien holder had no notice 
and which was unrecorded at the 
time the building, structure or 
improvement was commenced, work 
begun, or first material furnished 
on the ground. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-5 (1988). Under 
this provision, a properly recorded mortgage 
has priority over a mechanics' lien arising 
from the furnishing of labor or materials that 
commenced after the mortgage recordation. See 
Utah Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 
12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598, 602 (1961). 
Mast asserted at trial that work commenced 
on the Oakhills Condominium project on 
April 6, 1983, two days before the recording 
of American's instrument. Hammons, presi-
dent of Electro Technical Corporation, testi-
fied he placed a temporary power panel and 
pole, a coil of electrical wire, and some 
conduit at the building site on April 6. Ron 
Mast and Roger Mast claimed to have seen 
these materials when visiting the project site 
on or about April 8, 1983. The trial court, 
however, obviously disbelieved the witnesses' 
testimony, entering a specific finding that 
"[n]o work commenced and no materials were 
furnished at the Oakhills site prior to April 8, 
1983/ 
Once again, appellants are attempting to 
challenge this finding by rearguing the evid-
ence. See Ashton, 733 P.2d at 150. Under the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review, we 
must give due regard to the trial court's 
opportunity to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). We cannot 
set aside a trial court's finding of fact unless 
it is against the clear weight of the evidence or 
we otherwise reach a definite and firm convi-
ction that a mistake has been made. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 
(Utah 1987). Mast has not demonstrated either 
to us. 
Hammons testified he placed the temporary 
power panel at the top of the project site 
behind a pile of debris. Roger Mast, however, 
testified the panel was in a clear spot-not 
near any debris-considerably to the left of 
where Hammons said he placed it. Hammons 
filed a notice of lien stating Electro Technical 
Corporation's work on the project began May 
6, 1983, which is the same date its written 
subcontract with Mast Construction Company 
was signed. Electro Technical Corporation's 
first application for payment identified May 9, 
1983, as the first day of the project work 
period. Mast Construction Company filed a 
notice of lien signed by its president, Ron 
Mast, giving April 28, 1983, as the date work 
commenced on the project. In its April 1986 
response to interrogatories, Mast Construction 
Company identified April 18, 1983, as the date 
work commenced, and described that work as 
clearing the site, with no mention of any 
temporary power equipment being left there 
earlier. Finally, photographs of the work site 
taken during the second half of April 1983 
revealed no panel. Commenting on the inco-
nsistent evidence, the trial court observed: 
I also note with some interest that 
this power pole seems to evade 
having its picture taken, and it 
always seems to be just outside the 
range of the photographs. There is 
some substantial confusion on the 
part of the lien claimants as to 
where this power pole was placed. 
If it was placed as Mr. Hammons 
said, it's to the left side of the pile 
of [refuse]. And Mr. Mast as I 
recall testified it was on the right-
hand side. And that's all shown in 
the grading plan that was marked as 
an exhibit and received. I'm surp-
rised it didn't get photographed one 
way or another. 
The lower court thus questioned the credi-
bility of the mechanics' lien claimants' self-
serving testimony and weighed it against their 
prior inconsistent actions and written statem-
ents. It is not our function to second-guess 
the trial court as factfinder where there is a 
dispute in the evidence. The finding that no 
work was begun on or materials furnished to 
the project before the recording of American's 
mortgage on April 8, 1983, is not clearly err-
oneous.10 The trial court correctly concluded 
that American's lien took priority over all 
other liens subsequent to that date. 
We have considered the other issues raised 
by appellants and find them equally meritless. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. We previously issued an opinion in this case aff-
irming the judgment of the trial court on a different 
basis. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 758 
P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Mast's subsequent 
petition for rehearing was granted and the case was 
resubmitted for decision. The prior opinion was 
withdrawn by order of this court dated September 
13, 1988. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 
91 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Ct. App. 1988). 
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2. In addition, Utah Code Ann. §57-3-10(2) 
(1986) rendered the document unentitled to recor-
ding as a trust deed because it omits the name and 
address of the trustee/grantee. 
3. 
A certificate of the acknowledgment 
of any conveyance, or of the proof of 
the execution thereof as provided in this 
title, signed and certified by the officer 
taking the same as provided in this title, 
shall entitle such conveyance, with the 
certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be 
recorded in the office of the recorder of 
the county in which the real estate is 
situated. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-1 (1986). The term 
•conveyance" as used in Title 57 embraced "ever)' 
instrument in writing by which any real estate, or 
interest in real estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged, 
encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for 
a term not exceeding one year." Utah Code Ann. 
§57-1-1 (1986). 
4. 
Every conveyance of real estate, and 
every instrument of writing setting forth 
an agreement to convey any real estate 
or whereby any real estate may be aff-
ected, to operate as notice to third 
persons shall be proved or acknowledged 
and certified in the manner prescribed 
by this title and recorded in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which such 
real estate is situated .... 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986) (repealed by 
Utah Laws 1988, ch. 155, §24; now see Utah Code 
Ann. §57-3-2 (1988)). 
5. 
(1) Every conveyance, or instrument in 
writing affecting real estate, executed, 
acknowledged, or proved, and certified, 
in the manner prescribed by this title ... 
shall, from the time of filing the same 
with the recorder for record, impart 
notice to all persons of their content. 
Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and 
lien holders are deemed to purchase and 
take with notice.. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-2(1) (1986) (1985 amen-
dments were stylistic only). 
6. 
The purpose of an oath is to avoid a 
violation of a pledge or promise. It is to 
become secure against profanation or 
corruption, or breach. In its broadest 
form the term "oath" is used to include 
all forms of attestation by which one 
signifies that he is bound in good faith 
to perform what is demanded by the 
oath faithfully and truly. It does not 
include those forms of the attestation 
which are not accompanied by an imp-
recation. 
Mcknight, 381 P.2d at 733-34. 
7. The instrument in this case was executed by a 
partnership. The certificate of acknowledgment of 
an instrument executed by a corporation, however, 
was required to be substantially in the statutory 
form found in the second part of Utah Code Ann. 
§57-2-7 (1986), which specifically refers to the 
person executing the document as swearing or affi-
rming to his or her corporate officer or agent status 
and to the source of authorization to sign the inst-
rument on the corporation's behalf. The acknowl-
edgment statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§57-2-1 
through-9 (1986) were recently repealed by Utah 
Laws 1988, ch. 155, §24 (effective July 1, 1988). 
The current comparable provisions can be found at 
Utah Code Ann. §§57*2a-l through-7 (1988). 
8. The substance of what it means to acknowledge 
execution of a document before a notary or othei 
authorized officer in particular circumstances, sucb 
as on behalf of a partnership or corporation, is no\* 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §57-2a-2(l) (1988). 
9. We reject appellants' assertion, supported onlj 
by superficial legal analysis, that omission of thi 
amount and date of the note rendered the instru 
ment recorded "void" because it could not impar 
constructive notice of American's mortgage liei 
under Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986) and Utal 
Code Ann. §57-3-2 (1986). The clear reference 
in the mortgage to the separate note and construe 
tion loan agreement, along with the names an 
addresses of Oakhills and American, were adequat 
to put prudent subsequent lienors on inquiry notic 
which, if pursued, would lead to actual notice of th 
amount and terms of the indebtedness. See Johnsc 
v. Bell 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983). See also Comn 
ercial Factors of Denver v. Clarke & Waggcner, 61 
P.2d 261, 263 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Air Flo 
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Baker, V* 
So.2d 449, 451 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976), cert, deme 
341 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1976). 
10. In light of this determination, we do not rea< 
the issues of whether placement of this tempora 
power equipment at the project site would be lie 
able work under section 38-1-3 and, if s 
whether it would have provided sufficient notice 
constitute the "commencement of work" und 
section 38-1-5. 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
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INC., a Utah corporation, 
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Defendants and Appellants, 
and Petitioners for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
ORDER EXTENDING 
TIME TO PETITION 
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DOCKET NUMBER 
Court of Appeals Docket No. 
860355-CA 
The Court having considered the foregoing ex parte 
motion, and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that Ron Mast and Mast Construction Company 
shall have through February 2, 1989 within which to petition 
this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
in this matter. 
So ordered this seventeenth day of January, 1989. 































adverse party. We have sued him. 
MR. STRONG: Theyfve also called him as their 
witness. 
THE COURT: That doesn't solve the problem. He's 
an adverse party. He may lead. Objection overruled. 
MR. BARKER: I object that it asks for a 
conclusion of the witness. If he wants to ask about a 
specific affidavit, or a specific transaction, or event, he 
should do so. 
MR. PATTEN: I asked about the closing. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
THE WITNESS: No. I don't think that!s fair. I 
have some very specific recollections of what took place on 
March 28th when we were asked to sign documents by American 
Savings. 
Q (By Mr. Patten) And your memory is what, sir? 
A My memory is that the— 
MR. STRONG: Excuse me, Your Honor. I'm going to 
object to the form of that question. I don't think he 
specifically asked about his memory. 
MR. PATTEN: I'll rephrase it, sir. 
MR. BARKER: I suggest we have a foundation. 
THE COURT: That's what he's going to do. 
Q (By Mr. Patten) Where do you recall signing 
Exhibit P-l, sir? 
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M A In my office. 
2 Q In whose presence? 
3 A In the presence of Mr. Anderson. 
4
 Q Do you recall whether or not Mr. Anderson signed 
5 the document at the same time in your office? 
6 A It's my recollection that he did. 
7 Q Do you recall attending a closing at the office of 
8 Western States SAvings—Western States Title? 
9 A Not on this transaction, no. 
10 Q Is it that you have no memory either way, or that 
n you have a memory that in fact you did not? 
12 A My memory is that on this closing, we did not go 
13 to Western Title. We went to one a few months later. 
n Q Do you recall, sir, whether you ever appeared 
15 before Mr. Jensen to acknowledge to him, or tell him that 
16 you in fact had signed Exhibit P-l? 
17 A No. I did not do that. 
18
 MR. PATTEN: Your Honor, if it hasn't been done 
19 before, I move that the deposition of Mr. Akerlow taken on 
20 May 1, 1986 be published at this time. 
21 MR. BARKER: No objection. 
22 THE COURT: Any objection to publishing the* 
23 deposition of Mr. Akerlow? 
24 MR. STRONG: No, Your Honor. 
25 J MR. GREEN: No objection. 
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THE WITNESS: This would be my second deposition, 
MR. PATTEN: I believe thatfs correct. 
MR. STRONG: The third, I think, actually. 
THE COURT: This is the deposition taken on 
May 1st, '86. Is this the one you'd like to have 
published? 
MR. PATTEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
3 I THE COURT: There being no objection, the Court 
9
 will publish the deposition of Mr. AJcerlow of that date. 
0 MR. PATTEN: Your Honor, I would like to read, 
1 beginning on page 10, line 25. 
2 THE COURT: Let me hand this to Mr. Akerlow so he 
3 can follow along. The record will show that Mr. Akerlow 
4
 has signed that. 
5
 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6
 J Q (By Mr. Patten) "Question: Did you ever appear 
before Jeff Jensen and swear that this was, in fact, your 
8
 I signature on page 8 of this Trust Deed? 
9
 I "Answer: I donft recall whether I did or not. 
"Question: You have no specific recollection? 
1
 I "Answer: No." 
2 {
 That was indeed your testimony at that time, was 
3 I it not? 
4
 A Yes. 
5
 j MR. PATTEN: I have nothing further at this time, 
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o 
1 Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Let's break for the noon recess, 
3 gentlemen. We'll continue with Mr. Akerlow. We'll be in 
4
 recess until 2:00 p.m., and hopefully at that point in time 
5 I'll have sufficient accommodation for all of you. We'll 
6 be in recess until two. 
7 (The noon recess was taken.) 
6 THE COURT: The record will show we continue in 
9 Debenham versus Electro Technical and others. It appears 
10 that all parties are present. All counsel are present. , 
11 Mr. Strong? 
12 MR- STRONG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. STRONG: 
15 Q Mr. Akerlow, do you remember who gave you the 
16 Trust Deed that's been marked P-l for you to sign? 
17 A Not specifically, no. Someone from American 
18 Savings. 
19 Q Do you remember in relationship to the day you 
20 signed the deed what day that would have been? 
21 A It was Monday the 28th of March. 
22 Q When you received Exhibit P-l, were all of the 
23 spaces completed in that document? 
24 A No f they were not. 
25 J Q So there were blanks, then? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Who was it that asked you to sign the Exhibit P-l, 
3 even though there were blanks in it? 
4
 A I think it was the representative from American 
5 savings who came over to my office. We were trying to get 
6 this loan closed by the end of the month, and not all the 
7 documentation was done. And in fact, I hadn't even 
8 received a copy of the commitments from American Savings on 
9 this particular loan. 
10 They brought those with them on the 28th. It was 
n i the first time I fd even seen any loan commitments. So we 
12 l had to have a discussion on that. 
13 The fellow I'd been dealing with was Jack Stermer. 
14 i recall it was him. I wouldn't swear to it, but I think 
15 J it was he and I that visited about that on the 28th. 
16 Q That would have been in your office? 
17 A Yes. 
*8 Q You were present in the courtroom this morning; is 
19 that correct? 
20 A Yes. 
2i Q And you saw a man who identified himself as 
22 Stephen Emrick testify; is that correct? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Have you ever seen Stephen Emrick before today? 
25
 A No. I don't believe so. 
1 Q Now f again, when you actually signed Exhibit P-l, 
2 who else was present in your office? 
3 A As I recall, Richard Anderson was there. 
4
 Q Was there a notary present? 
5 A No. 
6 J Q Did anyone place you under oath before signing 
7 that document? 
8 ! A No. 
9 Q At any other time, did you ever appear in front of 
10 a notary public to acknowledge that you had signed that? 
11 A No. I don't believe so. 
12 Q Now, before we took a break for lunch, Mr. Patten 
13 asked you that question, and then called to your attention 
14 the deposition that you had given some time a g o — I guess 
15 mayb€» on May 1 s t — w h e r e your answer seemed to be a little 
16 different. Are you able to explain the difference in the 
17 testimony today as opposed to the deposition testimony? 
18 A Well, subsequent to the deposition, the thought 
19 occurred to me that in all the years I've been in the 
20 development business, I do not recall a time that Jeff 
21 Jensen has ever been in my office. The nature ofthe 
22 business is I would always go to his office if I needed to 
23 go anywhere, and I remember we once met at lunch. But he'd 
24 never been in my office. And so I guess that's why I 
25 answered maybe a little more strongly today than I did in 
i the deposition, because I know I signed that document in my 
2 office. And I really don't believe Jeff has ever been in 
3 my office. So I don't think I could have signed it in 
4
 front of him. 
5 Q Now, Mr. Anderson has testified in his deposition, 
6 which has now been introduced into court, that he signed 
7 the Exhibit P-l at Western States Title. Mr. Emrick 
8 testified this morning that he also appeared at Western 
9 States Title, and that Ron Mast was briefly at the closing. 
10 Can you recall any other closing that you'd been involved 
11 in with similar circumstances? 
12 A We had a closing within a few months after this on 
13 another building, an office building downtown, that we did 
14 close at Western States Title. And Richard and I were the 
15 signatories on that loan as well. And at that particular 
16 closing, Ron Mast did have to come to the closing, as I 
n recall, because there was some documents for him to sign. 
18
 MR. PATTEN: Well, Your Honor, I move to strike 
19 the question and answer. It hasn't been related at all to 
20 American Savings & Loan. Apparently some other totally 
21 unrelated deal had nothing to do with American Savings. 
22 MR. STRONG: I believe my question asked whether 
23 there was another closing where Mr. Mast was there, 
24 Mr. Anderson was there, and I believe American Savings. I 
25 believe I added they were there at another closing, and I 
1 think the question has been answered. 
2 THE COURT: I don't think you included American 
3 Savings in your question. Do you want to reask it? 
4 MR. STRONG: All right. 
5 Q (By Mr. Strong) Well, I'll really just ask a 
6 subsequent question. You fve already told us that you 
7 remember a time when Mr. Anderson, yourself, Mr. Jensen, 
8 and briefly Mr. Mast were all present. Do you remember a 
9 closing where in addition to those four entities, or 
10 parties, that American Savings was also present? 
11 A No. No. They were not at that closing. 
12 I Q Thank you. Now, on March 28th, Mr. Anderson 
13 actually executed Exhibit P-l? 
14 A Well, I thought I did. 
15 Q And what's your best recollection as to that? 
16 A My best recollection is that in the morning we met 
17 with, I believe it was Jack Stermer, to go over the deal, 
18 which until that time we hadn't seen. Until that time we 
19 had not seen the commitment letter on either the 
20 construction loan, or the permanent financing. 
2i We generally knew the terms, but the fine print, 
22 we hadn't seen. And there was a lot of fine print in there 
23 that had not been discussed in all of the communications 
24 between us. 
25 We knew our loan had been approved, but we didn't 
1 signed? 
2 A We gave it all back to American Savings, or State 
3 Savings, and understood that they would take it from there 
4
 to get recorded and funded. 
5 Q Did you ever resign that document? 
6 A No. 
7 Q Did you ever take an oath in connection with 
8 signing Exhibit 1? 
9 A I don't know what you mean by take an oath. 
10 Q Did someone swear you to tell the truth? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Did someone ask you if you acknowledged that the 
13 contents were true? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Did someone verify that the contents were true? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Calling your attention to Exhibit 36, when did you 
18 first see that document? 
19 MR. BARKER: That's the opinion letter, Your 
20 Honor. 
21 THE WITNESS: I don't remember when I first saw 
22 it. 
23 Q (By Mr. Barker) Do you recall having seen it in 
24 the proximity of April, 1983, or was it y o u r — a year or two 
25 later? 
M A Oh, no. No. No. I saw it at that t i m e — a t the 
2 time of the closing, because it was our responsibility to 
3
 get an opinion letter over there. I just don't remember 
4
 the exact date I saw it. 
5 Q I see. Now, you indicated that you were on the 
6
 site with the Masts, and you were concerned about non-
7
 receipt of footing drawings. You mentioned that in 
8 response to a prior question. 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q When was that? 
11 A It would have been 1 5 — 1 6 April, somewhere in 
12 there, f83. 
13 Q Were you on the site earlier than that in April? 
H A I don't recall. 
15 MR. BARKER: May I have a moment with my client? 
16 THE COURT: Certainly. 
17 MR. BARKER: No further questions. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Green? 
19 MR. GREEN: I have no questions. 
20 MR. MARSHALL: I have no questions. 
21 THE COURT: Now that I've got you folks a spot, I 
22 hope you feel like you 1re part of it. 
23 MR. MARSHALL: Appreciate it. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Patten? 
25 
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ever, appellants contend, as I understand by the fact that they fixed the damages to 
their position, that in a case such as this, 
the jury should have pointed out to them, 
by instruction from the court, the various 
elements to be considered in determining 
the depreciation. Appellants went so far 
in this case as to submit a request for in-
struction embodying their theory, and ask-
ing separate damages for claimed injuries 
to each separate part of the land. Not on-
ly did the court not err in refusing this re-
quest, but it would have committed error if 
it had granted it. The request was a com-
plete departure from the well settled rule 
that damages are given for depreciation in 
the fair market value of the land as a 
whole. 
The state put on two real estate experts, 
who testified that the depreciation in market 
value of the remaining land was $1500 or 
$1800. Both of these experts were sub-
jected to searching cross-examinations, and 
the exact bases of their opinions were clear-
ly shown to the jury, both as to factors 
considered by them in making their esti-
mates, and as to factors unknown to or 
ignored by them. 
As pointed out in the prevailing opinion, 
restoration costs may, in some cases, be an 
accurate measure of damages, i. e. of the 
depreciation in market value. In other 
cases restoration costs may bear no rela-
tion to the depreciation in market value. 
Market value is the price at which a will-
ing vendor would sell, and at which a will-
ing buyer would purchase in a free and 
open market. Fair market value is ordin-
arily proved by the testimony of experts, 
who may be fully examined and cross-ex-
amined as to the factors considered by 
them, and the bases upon which they de-
termined their appraisals. 
As heretofore stated, the state put on two 
real estate experts. Appellants called none. 
Appellants put on evidence of the value of 
the basement home, replacement cost, cost 
of destroying the old home, value of trees, 
shrubs, fruit plants, etc. All of these 
factors were prominently before the jury. 
That the jury was fully aware of all these 
factors and that they took them into ac-
count in reaching their verdict is evidenced 
the remaining property at $3,000, or about 
twice the amount fixed by the experts as 
the depreciation value. The appellants 
have shown no prejudicial error. For these 
reasons, I concur. 
BYBEE et al. v. STUART. 
No. 6981. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 29, 1948. 
1. Appeal and error <§=>987(3) 
On appeal from judgment for plaintiff 
in equity action to compel conveyance of 
lands to him and quiet his title thereto, 
Supreme Court may review facts as well as 
law. 
2. Mortgages <3=>33(3) 
A warranty deed, absolute in form, 
was not absolute conveyance of land to 
grantee, but a "mortgage," in view of par-
ties' contemporaneous written agreement, 
providing that conveyance was made to 
enable grantee to obtain loan on premises 
for sum to be used in paying mortgage 
thereon and that, if grantor desired to sell 
land, grantee would convey title to pur-
chaser on payment to grantee of such 
amount. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Mortgage". 
3. Mortgages <S=>33(I), 36 
A warranty deed, absolute in form, is 
presumed to convey fee-simple title or at 
least whatever title grantor has to land de-
scribed, but, where contemporaneous writ-
ten agreement between parties shows that 
deed was given for security purposes, court 
will look to real transaction and treat it as 
mortgage.1 
4. Mortgages <§=?42 
An instrument need not follow statu-
tory form to be a real estate mortgage, and 
l Brown v. Skeen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P.2d 24. 
no particular 
P'U ties' intuil 
i'>u, r s ~ i - i 
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* particular form is necessary so long as JO. Mortgages <3=*I37 
fOes' intention is shown, 
^ 78—1—13. 
Utah Code In ''"title theory" or "common law" 
states, mortgage deed conveys legal title 
to mortgagee, subject to mortgagor's equity 
of redemption, but in "equitable" or "lien 
theory" states, including Utah, legal title 
f , , remains in mortgagor subject to lien in 
* warranty deed and separate written
 m o r t , s f a v o n U t a h C o d e 1 9 4 3 1 0 4__ 
Mortgages <S=>33(I) 
A real estate mortgage need not be 
"ruined in one writing, but may consist 
•xtract.1 
i Mortgages <§=>37(2) 
In equity, a deed absolute on its face 
7























treat it ** 
low state-
•tgage, ao4 
. Mortgages @=M37 
The code section providing that mort-
^ g i v e n for security purposes only, and, S a 2 e o £ l a n d s h a I 1 h a v e e f f e c t o f convey-
* such showing, equity will give effect a n c e t h e r e o f t 0 mortgagee as security for 
s parties' intention payment of indebtedness set forth therein 
is not necessarily inconsistent with section 
'. Mortgages <S=»27 providing that real property mortgage shall 
Deeds given for security purposes only,
 n o t be deemed a conveyance, whatever its 
*amg requisites of formal mortgages, are terms, in view of section defining "convcy-
^nned "equitable mortgages".2 ance" as embracing every written instru-
See Words and Phrases, Permanent ment by which any real estate or interest 
therein is created, aliened, mortgaged, en-
cumbered, or assigned. Utah Code 1943, 
78—1—1, 78—1—13, 101—57—7. 
Edition, for all other definitions 
"Equitable Mortgage". 
of 
I Mortgages <S=>33(3) 
A warranty deed and parties' contem-
poraneous written contract, reciting con-
vince of land to enable grantee to obtain 
«n thereon for specified sum to be used 
s paying mortgage against land, with un-
arstanding that grantee would reconvey 
demises to grantor on repayment to gran-
's* of amount of mortgage, constituted, not 
12. Deeds €=>3 
At common law, term "conveyance" 
meant transfer of title to or estate in land 
or the instrument by which such transfer 
was accomplished, but definition thereof 
was broadened by statute to include also 
mortgages, encumbrances, etc., and as used 
^ d y ^ q u k a b l V m o r ^ i n s t a t u t e respecting land mortgages, cov-
- parol and cognizable only in equity, but e r * transactions not involving transters of 
r^mal "mortgage" cognizable in court of * t I c . t 0 o r e s t a t e s i n l a n d ' b u t m e r c I y e f " 
*. and grantee did not acquire title to f e r c t l ^ " ° * ™ f ° r " *?"%* J ^ 6
 of. Utah Code 1943, 78—1—1, 78—1—13. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Conveyance". 
*?A, but was merely mortgagee. 
*- Frauds, statute of <®=a€3(5) 
Grantor's oral surrender to grantee 
: any interest of grantor in land con-
ned as security for repayment of amount 13. Mortgages C=I34, 137 
arrowed by grantee to pay mortgage A mortgagor retains title to mortgaged 
hereon was unenforceable as written stat- lands, and mortgage creates in mortgagee's 
£* of frauds. Utah Code 1943, 33—5—1, favor only a lien or right to resort to land 
3-5—3. to satisfy mortgage debt.4 
1 Brown v. Skoen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P. 
2d 24. 
* Wasatch Min. Co. v. Jennings, 5 Utah 
243, 251, 15 P. 63; Duerden v. Solomon, 
33 Utah 468, 94 P. 978; Uess v. Anger, 
53 Utah ISO, 177 P. 2^2. 
* Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 
48 P. 477; Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah 
231, 49 P. 779; Azzalia v. St. Claire, 23 
Utah 401, 64 P. 1106; Carlquist v. Col-
tharp, 67 Utah 511, 248 P. 4S1, 47 A. 
L.H. 765; In re Reynolds' Estate, 90 
Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270. 
4 In re Reynolds' Estate, 90 Utah 415, 
62 P.2d 270. 
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14. Frauds, statute of <3=>63(5) 
One conveying land by warranty deed 
as security for repayment of sum loaned 
to grantee for payment of mortgage o;i 
land held title thereto in fee, subject to 
mortgage lien in grantee's favor, and 
hence had such estate or interest in land 
as could be conveyed only by written in-
strument. Code Utah 1943, 33—5—1. 
15. Mortgages <§=>608»/2 
In judgment ordering grantee of land 
to reconvey it to grantor as mortgagor 
and quieting grantor's title thereto, court 
properly ordered payment to grantee of so 
much of amount paid into court by gran-
tor in repayment of sums advanced by 
grantee to preserve mortgaged property as 
was advanced by grantee for water stock 
assessments and general taxes thereon, 
mortgage payments, etc., and remission of 
balance to grantor. 
Appeal from District Court, Second Dis-
trict, Weber County; Charles G. Cowley, 
Judge. 
Action by Byron L. Bybce, Sr., and an-
other against Claude E. Stuart to compel 
conveyance of certain lands to plaintiffs by 
defendant, who filed a counterclaim against 
plaintiffs and a cross-claim against Oni 
Douglas Stuart and another, interpleaded 
as plaintiffs and cross-defendants, to quiet 
title to. the lands in defendant. From a 
judgment ordering defendant to convey the 
lands to plaintiffs and quieting plaintiffs' 
title thereto, defendant appeals. 
Affirmed. 
David J. Wilson, of Ogden, for defend-
ant and appellant. 
Thatcher & Young, of Ogden, for plain-
tiffs and respondents. 
Thatcher & Young, of Ogden, for inter-
pleaded plaintiffs, cross-defendants and re-
spondents 
WOLFE, Justice. 
Appeal by the defendant from a judg-
ment and decree of the second district 
court, ordering defendant to execute a 
conveyance of certain lands to plaintiffs, 
and quieting plaintiffs' title thereto. 
The facts out of which this case arises 
are these: 
In 1936 the wife of cross-defendant Oni 
Douglas Stuart died, and defendant 
(Claude Stuart) took Oni's son, David, to 
live with him and his family. Oni and 
Claude were brothers. Tt is fairly infer-
able from the record that defendant took 
the boy, David, as an acknowledged fam-
ily obligation, and without expectation of 
recompense. There was no contract be-
tween the brothers that defendant should 
receive any pay or other consideration for 
performance of this duty. Oni, at all times, 
paid for his son's clothing, schooling, and 
other expenses. The boy, David, assisted 
with the household chores around defend-
ant's place, and apparently was treated very 
much the same as defendant's own sons. 
The trial court found the facts substan-
tially as follows: 
On May 11, 1942, and for a long tiin--
prior thereto, Oni Stuart owned a tract of 
land in Weber County. The land was 
heavily mortgaged, and the mortgages were 
then in the process of foreclosure. Oni 
was in straitened financial circumstances 
and was about to lose his land. Oni be-
ing unable to get credit from outside 
sources, his brother, the defendant, agreed 
to advance the money necessary to pay off 
the mortgages in order that he would not 
lose his land. As security for the money 
advanced, Oni executed to defendant a 
warranty deed, absolute in form, to his 
land. Contemporaneous with the deed, and 
as part of the same transaction, the par-
ties also had drawn the following agree-
ment : 
"Statement 
"This Memorandum of Agreement wit-
nesseth: 
"That Oni Douglas Stuart has this day 
conveyed by warranty deed to the under-
signed, Claude E. Stuart, the following de-
scribed real property * * * [descrip-
tion omitted] 
' T h e conveyance of said property was 
made to enable the undersigned, Claude E. 
Stuart, to obtain a loan on said premises 
for eleven hundred ($1100.00) Dollars, to 
be used in paying an existing mortgage 
against said property, together with de-
linquent taxes ; 
curred in connei 
closure proceedii 
property amount 
imately eleven h 
'Tt is understo 
of the said Clai 
reconvey said ] 
Stuart upon the 
amount of mortg 
against said prei 
terest and other 
that said Claude 
curred or may 
mortgage execut 
and any other 
the same, said p; 
years fron 
"It is further 
said Claude E. 
Douglas Stuart c 
that he, the sai 
convey to such
 i 
property upon ti 
amount hereinbe] 
"This agreeme 
be binding upon 
assigns of the p; 
"This, the l i t ! 
"(Sigi 
During June, 
in the hospital, 
to leave the hoa 
ant's home to sta; 
Defendant testifi 
er Oni left the 
had a conversatic 
"A. We were 
and Oni turned 
have been might 
come and live h 
until I get over 
'That is perfecth 
have been good t 
and have given t 
will just let the 
and leave the ti 
can have the u 
title will be you 
We will let the 
the present time 
180 P ?M-
BYBEF, v. STUART 



































"Q. Was anything said about the care 
of the boy? A. Yes. 
"Q. What? A. Hi? said; !If you con-
tinue to take care of the boy and give him 
a good home until he gets of age, why, 
"It is understood and agreed on the part you have the land/ 
linquent taxes and certain expenses in-
curred in connection with adjusting fore-
closure proceedings instituted against said 
property amounting1 to the .sum of approx-
imately eleven hundred ($1100.00) Dollars. 
of the said Claude E. Stuart that he will 
rcconvey said premises to Oni Douglas 
Stuart upon the repayment to him of the 
amount of mortgage which he has executed 
against said premises, together with all in-
terest and other expenses, including taxes, 
that said Claude E. Stuart may have in-
curred or may incur in paying off the 
mortgage executed against said premises, 
and any other expenses connected with 
the same, said payment to be made within 
years from this date. 
"It is further agreed on the part of the 
aid Claude E. Stuart that should Oni 
Douglas Stuart desire to sell this property, 
that he, the said Claude E. Stuart, will 
convey to such purchaser the title to said 
property upon the payment to him of the 
amount hereinbefore provided. 
'This agreement or understanding is to 
be binding upon the heirs, successors, and 
assigns of the parties hereto. 
"This, the 11th day of May, A. D., 1942. 
"(Signed) Claude E. Stuart" 
(Italics added) 
During June, 1942, Oni Stuart was ill 
in the hospital. When he was well enough 
to leave the hospital, he went to defend-
ant's home to stay during his convalescence. 
Defendant testified that about a week aft-
er Oni left the hospital, the two brothers 
had a conversation as follows: 
"A. We were sitting in the living room 
and Oni turned to me and he said: 'You 
have been mighty nice to me. Have me 
ame and live here. I want to stay here 
intil I get over my illness I got.' I said: 
That is perfectly alright/ He said: 'You 
;ave been good to me and good to the boy, 
»nd have given the boy a good home. We 
nil just let the title stay in your name, 
«nd leave the title just as it is, and you 
can have the use of the land, and the 
atle will be yours, and the land is yours. 
j>Ve will let the title stay just as it is at 
|ae present time.' 
18DP.2d—8^ 
"Q. Alright, what did you say? A. I 
told him: I said, 'That is perfectly alright 
with me. When the time came when the 
boy was of age, if he wants the land then 
I will give him title to the land in reim-
bursement of v/hat I got in the land myself, 
without interest/ 
"Q. Was anything further said by your 
brother Oni? A. Oni said: 'That is al-
right. We will let the matter stand as it 
is. " 
Defendant's wife, who was present at the 
time the conversation was supposed to have 
taken place, was called to corroborate de-
fendant's testimony but was unable to do so. 
Oni categorically denied that any such con-
versation ever took place. 
On July 13, 1942, about two weeks after 
the purported conversation above quoted, 
Oni listed the land for sale with cross-de-
fendant Cook, a real estate broker. In 
September, 1944, plaintiffs contracted to 
purchase the land from Oni, and he ex-
ecuted a deed to them in October, 1944. 
When defendant learned of the deal be-
tween plaintiffs and Oni, he called upon 
Cook, and claimed to be owner of the prem-
ises. 
Plaintiffs commenced this action against 
defendant to compel him to execute and 
deliver to them a conveyance to the prem-
ises, upon receiving the amount expended 
by defendant in preserving the property. 
Defendant answered, and by way of coun-
terclaim against plaintiffs and cross-claim 
against Cook and Oni Stuart who were 
interpleaded as "cross-defendants," assert-
ed title in himself and prayed that title 
be quieted in him. 
The trial court concluded from the facts 
as outlined above that plaintiffs were the 
owners of the premises and entitled to im-
mediate possession of the premises, and 
rendered judgment accordingly. From that 
judgment defendant prosecutes this appeal. 
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[1] Defendant has assigned numerous 
errors, all of which go to the correctness 
of the court's construction of the original 
transaction between Oni and defendant, 
and the effect, if any, upon this transac-
tion, of the subsequent oral conversation 
between the two brothers. This being an 
equity case, we may review the facts as 
well as the law. 
[2,3] The first question presented for 
our determination is as to the nature of the 
original transaction between the brothers 
Stuart. Although it is not clear in the 
briefs, it appears to be defendant's con-
tention that the original transaction was 
an absolute conveyance of the land in ques-
tion to defendant. This position is without 
support in fact or law. I t is true, of 
course, that a warranty deed, absolute in 
form, is presumed to convey a fee simple 
title, or at least whatever title the grantor 
has. But where, as here, there is a written 
agreement between the parties, contem-
poraneous with the deed, which shows the 
deed to have been given for security pur-
poses, the court will look to the real trans-
action, and treat it as a mortgage. Brown 
v. Skeen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P.2d 24. The 
fact that by the terms of the contract, 
Oni Stuart had the right to sell the land 
to a third person, clearly indicates the in-
tention of the parties that title should not 
pass to the defendant. 
[4-7] Our statute (Sec. 78—1—13 U. 
C. A. 1943) furnishes a form for real es-
tate mortgages. However, it is not neces-
sary that an instrument follow the statutory 
form to be a mortgage. No particular 
form is necessary so long as the intention 
of the parties is shown. Nor is it neces-
sary that the mortgage be contained in one 
writing—it may consist of a warranty deed 
and a separate contract in writing. Brown 
v. Skeen, supra. See also 1 Jones on 
Mortgages, 8th Edition, Chapter 2. And 
in equity a deed absolute upon its face may 
be shown by parol evidence to have been 
given for security purposes only, and when 
such a showing has been made, equity will 
give effect to the intention of the parties. 
Such security transactions, lacking the re-
quisites of a formal mortgage, are termed 
equitable mortgages. 1 Jones on Mortgag-
es, Chapter 5; Wasatch Min. Co. v. Jen-
nings, 5 Utah 243, 251, 15 P. 65; Duerden 
v. Solomon, 33 Utah 468, 94 P. 978; 
Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P. 232. 
See also 3 Jones, Commentaries on Evi-
dence, 2d Edition, page 2793, Section 1531. 
[8] The deed and contract here show 
all the requisites of a formal mortgage—a 
conveyance of particular land as security 
for a debt with the necessary defeasance 
clause. This was not merely an equitable 
mortgage—a security transaction resting 
partially in parol and cognizable only in 
equity. The two instruments, taken to-
gether, constitute a formal mortgage, cog-
nizable in a court of law. Defendant did 
not acquire the title to the lands under the 
warranty deed. He was merely a mort-
gagee. 
[9] This brings us to the second ques-
tion: 
As we have heretofore noted, defend-
ant testified to a conversation between him-
self and his brother Oni, by which it is 
claimed Oni orally surrendered to defend-
ant any interest he had in the property. 
The court found that such a conversation 
did take place, and his finding is cross-
assigned as error by the appellees. How-
ever, the court found that this purported 
surrender was ineffectual under the Stat-
ute of Frauds—Sees. 33—5—1 and 33— 
5—3, U.C.A.1943. Defendant contends that 
Oni Stuart's oral surrender of his interest 
in the premises was valid. 
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon 
appellees' cross-assignment of error, since 
we are of the opinion that even if such 
conversation took place as was testified to 
by defendant, it was within the Statute of 
Frauds and therefore unenforceable. 
[10] There are two rather well defined 
views of mortgages in the United States. 
In the so-called "title-theory" or "common 
law" states, it is held that a mortgage deed 
conveys to the mortgagee the legal title, 
subject to the mortgagor's equity of re-
demption. In the "equitable" or "lien-the-
ory" states, it is held that the legal title 
remains in the mortgagor subject to a lien 
in favor of the mortgagee. 1 Jones on 
Mortgages, Sections 12, 15-16, 18 and 67. 
Utah, along with most of the other west-
ern states, has long been recognized as a 
"lien theory" st 
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Actions 60, 67, 68. This court has re-
putedly said that a mortgage in this state 
xs not vest title in the mortgagee, but 
-•erely creates a lien in his favor. Thomp-
son v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477; 
Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49 P. 
- 9 ; Azzalia v. St. Claire, 23 Utah 401, 64 
?. 1106; Carlquist v. Coltharp, 67 Utah 
::4, 248 P. 481, 47 A.L.R. 765; In re Rey-
^Ids' Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270. 
-iese cases* are based largely on a statu-
tory provision which appears in our 1943 
Code as Sec. 104—57—7 and is as follows: 
"A mortgage of real property shall not 
• deemed a conveyance, whatever its 
trms, so as to enable the owner of the 
-engage to recover possession of the real 
;*operty without a foreclosure and sale." 
[11] We note here a seeming contradic-
tor! in our statutes. Sec. 78—1—13, U.C. 
U943, after setting forth the statutory 
• >rm for a mortgage of land, provides as 
allows: 
"Such mortgage when executed as re-
hired by law shall Jtave the effect of a con-
'tyance of the land therein described, to-
other with all the rights, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the 
mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal rep-
resentatives, as security for the payment of 
** indebtedness thereon set forth, with 
tenants from the mortgagor of general 
warranty of title, and that all taxes and 
^essments levied and assessed upon the 
tad described, during the continuance of 
^ mortgage, will be paid previous to the 
iy appointed for the sale of such lands for 
ixes; and may be foreclosed as provided 
y law upon any default being made in any 
•i the conditions thereof as to payment of 
-her principal, interest, taxes or assess-
ments." (Italics supplied.) 
At first blush this section would appear 
•i be in direct conflict with Sec. 104—57— 
• Apparently one section provides that a 
mortgage "shall not be deemed a convey-
^ce, whatever its terms," while the other 
Provides that a mortgage in the statutory 
arm '"shall have the effect of a convey-
<ace of the land." However, Sec. 78—1— 
\X when construed in the light of Sec. 
$~-i—1. is not necessarily inconsistent 
STlTAKT Utah 1<v> 
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with Sec. 104—57—7. Sec. 78—1—1 is as 
follows: 
"The term 'conveyance* as used in this 
title shall be construed to embrace every 
instrument in writing by which any real 
estate, or interest in real estate, is creat-
ed, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or as-
signed, except wills, and leases for a term 
not exceeding one year." (Italics sup-
plied). 
[12] At common law the term "convey-
ance" meant a transfer of title or of an es-
tate in land, or the instrument by which 
such transfer was accomplished. By the 
terms of Sec. 78—1—1, the definition is 
broadened to include not only the transfers 
of estates or interests in land, hut also 
mortgages, incumbrances, etc. As used in 
Sec. 78—1—13, the term "conveyance" cov-
ers transactions not involving a transfer of 
title or of an estate in land, but merely 
an effective mortgage or incumbrance of 
the land. However, as used in 104—57—7, 
"conveyance" is used in its common law 
sense—a transfer of title or an estate in the 
land. 
[13] We adhere to the now well estab-
lished doctrine that the mortgagor retains 
title to the mortgaged lands, and all that is 
created in favor of the mortgagee is a lien 
—a right to resort to the land to satisfy 
the mortgage debt. In re Reynolds' Es-
tate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270. 
[14] Oni Stuart therefore, as mort-
gagor, held the title to the premises in fee, 
subject to a mortgage lien in favor of de-
fendant, and therefore he had such an es-
tate or interest in the land as could be 
conveyed only by a written instrument un-
der Sec. 33—5—1, U.C.A. 1943, which pro-
vides as follows: 
"No estate or interest in real property, 
other than leases for a term not exceeding 
one year * * *, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, 
or by deed or conveyance in writing sub-
scribed by the party creating, granting, as-
signing, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunder au-
thorized by writing." (Italics supplied.) 
See annotation commencing at page 777 
of 65 A.L.R. 
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[15] Prior to the trial of this case, $882 
was paid into court for the benefit of de-
fendant, as repayment of the sums ad-
vanced by him to preserve the property 
This tender was refused. The court found 
that the total money advanced by defend-
ant was $875 20 for water stock assess-
ments, general taxes, mortgage payments, 
etc, and ordered that $875 20 of the money 
paid into court be paid to defendant, and 
the balance remitted to Om Stuart. There 
was no efror in this. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Respondents to have their costs. 
MCDONOUGH, C. J , and PRATT, 
WADE, and LATIMER, JJ., concur. 
3. Workmen's compensation €=>I54! 
Evidence justified denial of do ith bene-
fits to widow of employee who died as re-
sult of injury arising out of and in the 
course of employment, causing lecurrenec 
of old hernia which was repaired by oper 
ation, on ground that death caused by in 
jury did not occur within three years of 
injury as required by compensation act 
Utah Code 1943, 42—1—64 
4. Workmen's compensation <3=>602 
Workmen's Compensation Act, author 
lzing recovery for death of workman only 
if death occurs within three years of injur) 
causing it, is unambiguous and hence not 
subject to interpietdtion Utah Code 1943, 
42—1—64 « 
O I KCV NUMBER SYSTEM> 
EDWARDS v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
et al. 
No. 7089. 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
Feb 4, 1948. 
1. Workmen's compensation <§=>1794 
When an aggrieved party has been 
granted a rehearing, receives an adverse 
decision thereon by Industrial Commission, 
and files subsequent application for further 
rehearing timely, commission has jurisdic-
tion to entertain second application and may 
grant or deny second application. Utah 
Code 1943, 42—1—76, 42—1—77.1 
2. Workmen's compensation €=1864 
Aggrieved party who has been granted 
a rehearing by Industrial Commission need 
not file a second application for rehearing 
as condition precedent to petitioning Su-
preme Court for writ of certiorari, when 
decision on rehearing in substance is the 
same as the order made on original hear-
ing Utah Code 1943, 42—1—76, 42—1— 
77 
Original certiorari proceeding under 
Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary F 
Edwards, widow of Samuel Ldwards, de 
ceased, opposed by the Industrial Commis 
sion of Utah, Tintic Standard Mining Com 
pany, employer, and Continental Casualty 
Company, insurance carrier, to review a de-
cision of the Industrial Commission den\-
mg claimant's application for compensation 
for death of her husband and for benefits 
allegedly owing to him prior to death 
Decision of the Industrial Commission 
affirmed. 
Willard Y Morns, of Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff 
Shirley P Tones, of Salt Lake City, and 
Grover A Giles, Atty Gen , for defendants 
PER CURIAM 
On writ of certiorari, plaintiff, widow of 
Samuel Edwards, seeks to have this court 
determine the lawfulness of the decision of 
the Industrial Commission denying her ap 
plication for compensation for the death of 
her husband and for benefits allegedly ow-
ing to him prior to death 
Defendants moved to quash the writ and 
to dismiss the petition for writ ot cutio 
ran on the giound that phintilf tailed to 
1 Carter v Industrial Commission, 76 
Utah 5JO, JOO P 770 
2 bait Lake City v IndustnaJ Conni, 
93 Utah 510, 74 P 2d 057, Hallstrom 
v Industrial Cuiiim 90 Utah 85, o> P 
M 7J0 distinguished 
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[all references are to Utah Code] 
17-21-6 (duties of county recorder) 
38-1-5 (priority of mechanics1 liens) 
38-1-9 (notice imparted by record) 
38-1-26 (assignment of lien) 
57-1-6 (recording necessary to impart notice) 
57-1-19 (trust deed definition) 
57-1-20 (transfers in trust of realty) 
57-2-1 (manner of acknowledging conveyances) 
2-5 (notary shall make certificate of aknowledgment) 
57-2-7 (form of certificate of acknowledgement) 
-3-1 (certificate of acknowledgement to be recorded) 
57-3-2 (record imparts notice) 
17-21-4 COUNTIES • 
17-21-4. Certified copies. 
The county recorder is authorized to make and furnish to interested persons 
certified photographic copies of any of the records in his office upon payment 
of fees and charges provided therefor. Certified copies of such records may be 
supplied to officers of the county for their official use without the payment of 
any fee. 
History: C.L. 1907, § 618x, added by L. 
1915, ch. 87, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 1577; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 19-18-4. 
17-21-5. Receipts for documents received for record. 
On the filing of any instrument in writing for record in the recorder's office 
the recorder shall when requested give to the person leaving the same to be 
recorded a receipt therefor. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 619; C.L. 
1917, § 1578; R.S. 1933 & C 1943, 19-18-5. 
17-21-6. General duties — Records and indexes. 
Every recorder must keep: 
(1) An entry record, in which the recorder shall immediately upon re-
ceipt of any instrument to be recorded, enter in the order of its reception 
or entry, as the case may be, the names of the parties thereto, its date, the 
hour, the day of the month and the year of filing any such statement and 
a brief description of the premises, endorsing upon each instrument a 
number corresponding with the number of such entry. 
(2) A grantors' index, in which shall be indexed all deeds and final 
judgments or decrees partitioning or affecting the title to or possession of 
real property, which shall show the number of the instrument, the name 
of each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of the grantee, date of 
instrument, time of filing, kind of instrument, consideration, the book 
and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief description 
of the premises. 
(3) A grantees' index, in which shall be indexed all deeds and final 
judgments or decrees partitioning or affecting the title to or possession of 
real property, which shall show the number of the instrument, the name 
of each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the grantor, date of the 
instrument, time of filing, kind of instrument, consideration, the book 
and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief description 
of the premises. 
(4) A mortgagors' index, in which shall be entered all mortgages, deeds 
of trust, liens, and all other instruments in the nature of an encumbrance 
upon real estate, which shall show the number of the instrument, name of 
each mortgagor, debtor or person charged with the encumbrance in alpha-
betical order, the name of the mortgagee, lien holder, creditor or claim-
ant, date of instrument, time of filing, nature of instrument, consider-
ation, the book and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a 
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(5) A mortgagees' index, in which shall be entered all mortgages, deeds 
of trust, liens, and all other instruments in the nature of an encumbrance 
upon real estate, which shall show the number of the instrument, name of 
each mortgagee, lien holder, creditor or claimant, in alphabetical order, 
the name of the mortgagor or person charged with the encumbrance, date 
of instrument, time of filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the 
book and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief 
description of the property charged. 
(6) An abstract record, which shall show by tracts or parcels every 
conveyance or encumbrance, or other instrument recorded, the date and 
character of the instrument, time of filing the same, and the book and 
page and entry number where the same is recorded, which record shall be 
so kept as to show a true chain of title to each tract or parcel and the 
encumbrances thereon as shown by the records of the office. 
(7) An index to recorded maps, plats, and subdivisions. 
(8) An index of powers of attorney, labeled "powers of attorney/' each 
page divided into seven columns, namely: "date of filing," "book," "page," 
and "entry number," "from," "to," "revoked." 
(9) A miscellaneous index, in which shall be entered all instruments of 
a miscellaneous character not otherwise provided for in this section, each 
page divided into eight columns, namely: "date of filing," "book," "page," 
and "entry number," "instrument," "from," "to," "remarks." 
(10) An index of transcripts of judgments, labeled "transcripts of judg-
ments," each page divided into seven columnsheaded, respectively, "judg-
ment debtors," "judgment creditors," "amount of judgment," "where re-
covered," "when recovered," "when transcript filed," "when judgment sat-
isfied." 
(11) A general filing index in which shall be indexed all executions and 
writs of attachment, and any other instruments not required by law to be 
spread upon the records, and in separate columns he must enter the 
names of the plaintiffs in the execution, the defendants in the execution, 
the purchaser at the sale and the date of the sale, and the filing number of 
the documents. 
The indexes provided for in subdivisions (8) to (11) shall be alphabeti-
cally arranged, and in each case a reverse index shall be kept. 
(12) Nothing in this section shall preclude the use of a single name 
index by the recorder if such index includes and references all of the 
above indexes. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 620; L. 
1915, ch. 45, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 1579; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 19-18-6; L. 1955, ch. 29, § 1; 1973, 
ch. 24f § 1; 1980, ch. 20, § 2; 1983, ch. 69, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment inserted the references to parcels in Sub-
section (6); deleted a former Subsection (7) 
which read: "An index of chattel mortgages, 
labeled 'chattel mortgages,' each page divided 
into seven columns, namely 'date of filing/ 
'book,' 'page,' 'canceled,' 'from,' 'to,' and 're-
marks'"; redesignated the following subsec-
tions; substituted "8 to 11" m Subsection (11) 
for "7 and 9 to 12", and deleted "The indexes 
provided for in subdivisions 7 and 9 to 12 shall 
be alphabetically arranged, and m each case a 
reverse index shall be kept" at the end of the 
section 
Cross-References. — Condominium pro-
jects, duty to keep index, § 57-8-12 
Federal tax hens, § 38-6-1. 
Marketable record title, notice of claim of in-
terest, § 57-9-5 




erected without knowledge and consent of 
owner thereof, or mechanic's lien holders, does 
not relieve building in its new location from 
liability of a deficiency existing on the aale of 
the land on which the building was erected to 
•atisfy such liens Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 
379, 85 P. 363, 65 P. 1012 (1906). 
Scope and extent of lien generally. 
Necessary appurtenances, including ease-
ments which extend outside of boundaries of 
land upon which building is erected, is covered 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' terial for separate buildings of one owner, 15 
Liens § 39. A.L.R.3d 73. 
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 20. Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens *=> 22. 
A.L.R. — Mechanic'6 lien for work on or ma-
38-1-5. Priority — Over other encumbrances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as oi 
time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for 
the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage 
or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time 
when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or 
first material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was unre-
corded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, 
work begun, or first material furnished on the ground. 
Historv: R.S. 1898 &. C.L. 1907, §§ 1384, Cross-References. — Priority of lessors 
1835; C.L. 1917, £§ 3734, 3735; R.S. 1933 & C. lien, § 36 3-2. 
1943, 52-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Commencement and duration of lien. 
"Commencement to do work." 
Estoppel 
Extent of lien. 
Notice to lien holders. 
Priority over other liens and claims. 
Purchase money mortgage. 
Question? of law and fact. 
Real estate mortgage 




Commencement and duration of lien. 
This section expressly provides that liens 
shall attach at the time the performance of the 
contract commences; accordingly, claimant's 
lien attaches on the dale he commences the 
by provisions of this section Park City Meat 
Co. v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 
145, 103 P. 254 (1909). 
Waiver, loss or forfeiture of lien. 
Where there is substantial compliance with 
statute creating lien, and hen has in fact been 
established, lien so established cannot be de-
feated by technicalities nor by nice distinc-
tions. Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver 
Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 P. 254 U909>. 
work or furnishes the material, and 16 not post-
poned to the date of filing the notice for record. 
Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 Utah 7U, 33 
P. 238 (1893). 
Mechanic's lien takes effect as of the date of 
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Park City Meat 
ng Co., 36 Utah 
of lien. 
compliance with 
has in fact been 
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and is not post-
"°»ce for record 
9 Utah 70, 33 
''of the date of 
commencement of work and furnishing of ma-
terial, and is prior to intervening equities 
Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, B5 
P. 1012 (1906). 
When labor and materials are furnished to 
one not an owner, lien attaches to title instant 
title vests in owner so contracting for labor and 
materials furnished before he became the 
owner. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Midvale Home Fin Corp., 86 Utah 506. 44 
P.2d 1090, rehearing denied, 86 Utah 522, 46 
P.2d 672 (1935). 
Whether the subsequent furnishings of ma-
terials is part of one continuous transaction, in 
which case the priority date of the lien would 
relate back to the first delivery date, or 
whether such furnishings constitute separate 
contracts, in which case there would be no rela-
tion back, is a question of fact. Boise Cascade 
Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977). 
"Commencement to do work/* 
The phrase "commencement to do work," as 
used in this section, is construed in favor of 
lien claimants. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
Estoppel 
A person furnishing materials may be Es-
topped by his or its acts and conduct from en-
joying the priority accorded by this section. 
Spargo v. Nelson* 10 Utah 274, 37 P. 495 
(1894). 
Extent of ben. 
While mortgagee who advances money to 
mortgagor to construct a building has lien 
prior to that of a subcontractor performing 
labor and furnishing materials for such build-
ing, such lien extends only to amount actually 
advanced on mortgage. Culmer Paint &. Glass 
Co v. Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66 (1913). 
Notice to lien holders. 
This section requires other lien holders, by 
mortgage or otherwise, to take notice of the 
commencement of work on the building 
Teahen v. Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 P. 764 
(1890) 
Survey of property did not meet the notice 
standard contemplated by this section wh*re 
the survey stakes were not sufficiently notice-
able or related to actual construction to impart 
notice to a prudent lender. Tripp v. Vaughn, 
747 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Priority over other liens and claims. 
A deed of trust upon a canal to be con-
structed cannot take precedence over a me-
chanic's lien for work done and materials fur 
nished in building the canal, although trust 
deed antedates the doing of the work or fur-
nishing the materials Canal is not in existence 
until constructed Garland v. Bear Lake & 
River Waterworks & Irrigation Co , 9 Utah 
350. 34 P. 368 (1893), afTd, 164 U.S. 1,17 S. Ct. 
7, 4J L Ed. 327 (1896). 
Lien for all of materials furnished by iingle 
lien claimant on continuous, open, running ac-
count, for purpose of developing and operating 
mine, held prior to trust deed executed by min-
ing company and recorded between times when 
materials are first and last furnished Fields v. 
Daisy Gold Mining Co., 25 Utah 76, 69 P. 528 
(1902 >, Salt Lake Hdwe. Co v. Fields, 69 P. 
1134 (1902) (not officially reported) 
Where vendees of land contracts on property 
involved jointly assigned errors in mortgage 
foreclosure action on cross-appeal, their liens 
are postponed to date of last vendee's contract, 
and claims of lien claimants attach as of date 
when first materials are furnished and first 
labor performed; and claim of lien claimants is 
held superior to claim of 6uch vendees in fore-
closure action. United States Bldg. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Midvale Home Fin. Corp., 86 Utah 
506, 44 P.2d 1090, rehearing denied. 86 Utah 
522, 46 P.2d 672 (1935). 
Lien for labor and materials supplied pur-
chaser of lot for building constructed thereon is 
inferior to interest of vendor of the lot and his 
successor, where it is not shown that vendor or 
his successor consent to. ratify, or authorize 
the furnishing of the materials and labor. Bur-
ton Walker Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah 
92, 66 P.2d 134 (1937). 
In determining priorities between construc-
tion mortgagee and mechanic's lienors, mort-
gage for definite amount recorded pnor to at-
tachment of any lien takes priority up to the 
amount actually paid over any mechanic's 
liens attaching subsequent to recording of 
mortgage, although loan which mortgage is in-
tended to secure is paid over to borrower as 
needed arid never advanced in full. Western 
Mtg Loan Corp v. Cottonwood Constr Co., 18 
Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967). 
Purchase money mortgage. 
A mechanic's lien is superior even to a pur-
chare money mortgage given at time of pur-
chase of property in question where mortgagee, 
after materials are furnished, releases original 
mortgage and takes neu. mortgage, which 
transaction, however, is not in renewal of old 
mortgage, but is done to obtain increased secu-
rity on old debt. But after satisfaction of lien, 
mort/ra^ee is entitled to surplus Badger Coal 
& Lumber Co. v. Olsen. 50 Utah 307, 167 P. 
680 (1917). 
Purchase money mortgage had priority over 
a mechanics' lien where the mechanics lien did 
not attach until after the mortgage was re-
corded. Calder Bros Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 
922 (Utah 1982' 
Questions of law and fact. 
In action involving prioritv between mort-
gages and mechanic's lien, whether all mate-
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rial* furnished during certain period are fur-
nished under one contract or under different 
contract is question of fact Gwilham Lumber 
& Coal Co v El Monte Springs Corp , 87 Utah 
134, 48 P.2d 463 (1935) 
Real estate mortgage. 
A mortgagee who loan^ money to a mort-
gagor-borrower generalK is not only entitled 
but obliged to pay out the money in accordance 
with the direction? of the borrower, however if 
the mortgagee knows that the money is being 
borrowed for the purpose of creating improve-
ments and that materials are being furnished 
under such circumstances that the mortgagee 
should know that materialmen are relying on 
being paid from 6uch funds, and if the mort-
gagee knows that the mone> 16 being diverted 
into other purposes, then under such circum-
stances the mortgagee is not accorded priority 
as to those funds advanced after a material-
man starts delivering building supplies. Utah 
Sav & Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 11 Utah 2d 159, 
356 P.2d 281 (1960) 
A mortgagee may be estopped from claiming 
a priority over a mechanic's hen, however, in 
order to establish an estoppel, the hen claim-
ant must show some concealment, misrepre-
sentation, act, or declaration by the mortgagee 
upon which the lien holder properlv relies and 
by which he is induced to act differently than 
he would otherwise act Utah Sav & Loan 
Asc'n v Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P 2d 
598, 15 ALR3d 63 (1961) 
Recordation and notice. 
From the time the contractor begins to fur-
nish materials, it is notice to anyone thereafter 
contracting w jth the ow ner that the property is 
burdened uith a hen, and no previous notice is 
required and b> the tf>rm« of this section, the 
hen relates back to the time of furnishing the 
material^ Can-Lombard Lumber Co v 
Sheet- 10 Utah 322 37 P 572 il8c'^ 
Materialmen furnishing an occupung claim-
ant of real estate, material for improvements 
theron with record notice of a prior mortgage 
on the premises have no lien against the true 
owner thereof particularly where occupvmg 
claimant's claims to property are based upon 
fraud and lack of good faith Dovle v We^ t 
Temple Terrace Co , 47 Utah 238 *152 P 1180 
(1915) 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur 2d Mechanic*' 
Liens * 263 
C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens § 197 
A.L.R. — Mechanics hen based on contract 
Relation back. 
Mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing 
of materials and labor, both on the overall 44-
acre site and on individual condominium units 
within the development, related back to the 
initial work done on the project First of 
Denver Mtg Investor? v CN Zundel & 
Assocs, 600 P2d 521 (Utah 1979) 
The pnoritv of all mechanic's liens arising 
from a project is determined bv the date of com-
mencement of work on the project site or fur-
nishing materials on the 6ite and the release of 
his claims and hen* bv the hen holder who so 
commenced work or mitiallv furnished mate-
rials does not affect the pnoritv of other hens 
First of Denver Mtg Investors v C N Zundel 
& Assocs, 600 P2d 521 (Utah 1979) 
For one contractor s hen to relate back to the 
commencement of work or supplving of mate-
rials by another contractor, both contractors' 
projects must have been performed in connec-
tion with what is essentially a Bingle project 
performed under a common plan prosecuted 
with reasonable promptness and without mate-
rial abandonment however, ordinary mainte-
nance and cleanup work does not constitute a 
sufficient basis to permit "tacking" in order to 
fix an earlier hen date under this section for 
labor and materials supplied Calder Bros Co. 
v Anderson, 652 P 2d 922 (Utah 1982) 
The right to have a mechanic's hen relate 
back to the commencement of worV is not de-
feated merelv because the owners did not em-
plo> a general contractor but instead con-
tracted individuallv with various subcontrac-
tors Duckett v Olsen 699 P 2d 734 (Utah 
1985) 
Subdivision development 
Work of laving oui and developing subdivi-
sion including engineering installing water 
main* sewer ma.n- and laterals curbs and 
gutters surfacing street- and other off-site 
construction does not gi\e rise to mechanics 
hen attaching to particular home being con-
structed within subdiMSion Western Mtg 
Loan Corp v Cottonwood Con=tr Co . 18 Utah 
2d 409, 424 P 2d 437 (1967) 
Cited in Knight v Post 748 P 2d 1097 <Ct 
App 1988) 
with vendor pena.ng executory contract for 
sale of propern a« affecting purchasers inter-
est, 50 ALR3d 944 




erty, IE properly admitted in evidence Garner one piece of property belonging to the lame 
v. Van Patten, 20 Utah 342, 58 P. 684 (1899). owner without designating the amount due on 
Where labor is performed or materials fur- each building or improvement, he may enforce 
nished upon several buildings owned by the the lien against the owner; however, if there 
same person or persons, a claimant may in-
 ftre other lien claimants of the aame class, his 
elude in one claim all amounts due and the
 c l a i m i s 8UDOrdinate to their* if the claims of 
claim will not be defective if the amount due on
 t h e , a t t e r a r e a g r a i n s t o n h , o n e o f t h e b u i l d i n g s 
each separate building is not designateI. Utoh
 o r i f t h e v c o m p H e d w i t h th l g ^ ^ U t a h S a v 
Sev. & Loan Ass n v. Mecham. 12 Utah 2d 335, . .
 Q ' » . Y( \A~.U*T* I Q I W - U O ^ ^ URC 
366 P.2d 596. 15 A.L.R.3d 63 (1961). H?$f\l A L R 3d 63 Q ^ " 
If a claimant files a lien against more than 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' terial for separate buildings of one owner, 15 
Liens § 185. A.L.R.3d 73. 
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 134. Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens •» 
A.L.R. — Mechanic's lien for work on or ma- 130(1). 
38-1-9. Notice imparted by record. 
(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index maintained for that 
purpose. 
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all persons are considered to 
have notice of the claim. 
History-: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1389; tuted "the claim is filed" for "of the filing 
C.L. 1917, § 3739; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, thereof and "are considered to have notice of 
52-1-9; L. 1987, ch. 50, § 5. the claim" for "shall be deemed to have notice 
Amendment Notes. — The 1967 amend- thereof and made a capitalization and punctu-
ment divided this section into subsections; sub- ation change in Subsection (2). 
stituled "an index maintained for that pur- Cross-References. — Record as imparting 
pose" for "a book kept by him for that purpose, notice & 57-3-2 
and" at the end of Subsection (1); and substi-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' C.J.S. —57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 131. 
Liens § 186. Key Numbers. — Mechanics' L i e n s ^ 159. 
38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing 
regardless of time of filing. 
The liens for work and labor done or material furnished as provided in this 
chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice 
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of performing such work and labor 
or furnishing such material. 




waives, releases, and discharges any hen or v. Knudsen Bldrs. Supply Co., 14 Utah 2d 419, 
right to lien that materialman might have or 385 P.2d 982 (1963) 
thereafter acquire against real property; such Where claims of materialman for mechanics' 
provision does not apply to any future lien liens are valid, he is entitled to a reasonable 
right which materialman might acquire Such attorneys fee under § 36 1-18 where penaltv 
release relates only to the particular debt paid provided by this section for alleged failure of 
and receipted for in the particular transaction, materialman to release liens is sought b> 
Claims of materialman for mechanics' liens for builder who contends that the hens are invalid 
remainder due are valid entitling it to assert Brimwood Homes, lnc v. Knudsen Bldrs Sur>-
and foreclose such bens. Brimwood Homes, Inc. ply Co., 14 Utah 2d 419, 385 P.2d 982 (1963» 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 246 
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens «=» 242 
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty. 
Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for record a claim of lien 
against any property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due 
him, with the intent to cloud the title, or to exact from the owner or person 
liable by means of such excessive claim of lien more than is due him, or to 
procure any advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Historv: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, $ 1399; 
C.L. 1917, § 3749; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
521-25. 
38-1-26. Assignment of lien. 
All liens under this chapter shall be assignable as other choses in action, 
and the assignee may commence and prosecute actions thereon in his own 
name in the manner herein provided. 
Historv: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1396; 
C.L. 1917, § 3746; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-1-26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Right to perfect lien. assignable Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 
Under this section, right to perfect a hen is 125 P 412. 1915C Ann Cas 1113 «1912» 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur. 2d Mechanics' C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S Mechanics' Liens * 216 et 
Liens § 284. seq 
Ke> Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens t= 202 
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ing to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest is 
retained by the grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use 
of such words as herein provided In all cases the interest of joint tenants must 
be equal and undivided. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CL 1907, § 1973; C.L. Crosg-References. — Inheritance tax on 
1917, * 4873; R.S 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-5; L. jointl> held propeny. § 59-12-5 
1953, ch. 93, ft 1. Interparty agreements, I 15-3-1 et aeq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint tenancies 
—Alienation and execution. 
—Judicial sales 
—Severance by conveyance or sale. 
Preference for tenancy in common. 
Joint tenancies. of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to 
-.Alienation and execution. £ f o r £ e £ " f l t 0 ? f *!* f * ™ " " *>lley v. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has Corr>'« 6 7 1 p - 2 d 1 3 9 ( b t a h 1 9 8 3 > 
said that it would assume that ''Utah accepts S e v e r a n c e bv conveyance or sale. 
the general common-law rules relating to joint
 T h e ^ t h f l t a t u l s ^ ^ b 
tenancies, including the rules permuting
 Qne ^ ^ c o n n c e h e s n o t o n l v to * 
alienation of the interest of a joint tenant and . * , . , -
making its proper* subject io execution and u n t a r y conveyances, but also to involuntary 
separate sale " Mangus v Miller, 317 U S 176, C°n^nce^To^°^"*?*}<£** J o I l e y 
63 S Ct 182, 87 L Ed . 169, rehearing denied^ v Corr>> 6 < ] P 2 d 1 3 9 ( L t a h 1983> 
317 US 712, 63 S Ct 432, 87 L Ed 567 Preference for tenancy in common. 
1*943) This section expresses the trend awa\ from 
—Judicial sales. the English joint tenanc\ and in favor of ten-
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obhga- anc\ m common Neiil \ Royce 101 Utah 181. 
tion to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase 120 P 2d 327 0941) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Cotenano tenanc> b\ conve>ance of divided interest di« 
and Joint Ownership $ 27 rectiy to self 7 A L R 4th 1268 
C.J.S. — 86 C J S Tenanc> in Common * 7 Key Numbers. — Tenancy in Common *» 3 
A.L.R. — Severance or termination of joint 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice — Operation 
and effect — Interest of person not named in in-
strument. 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting 
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may 
be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowl-
edged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county m which such real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, 
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have 




cy by use 
nts must 
ice tax on 
et seq 
provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in 
guch instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise 
purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms 
of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of the inter-
est of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or 
grantors, but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was 
conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed 
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting 
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and de-
























History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, * 1975; 
C.L. 1917, t 4875; R.S. 1933 * C. 1943, 
78-1-6; L. 1945, ch. 106, i 1; 1947, ch. 97,§ 1. 
Cross-Rcferences. — Acknowledgments 
generally, § 57-2-1 et seq 
Certified copies of record of conveyance, ad-
mission in evidence, § 78-25-13 
County recorder. § 17-21-1 et seq 
Fees of recorder, § 21-2-3 
Judgments, record of as imparting notice, 
§ 17-21-11 
Recording generally. § 57-3-1 et seq 
Transmitting documents by telegraph or 
telephone, § 69-1-2 





—Dut\ to inquire. 
—Execution sales 
—Occupancy and possession 
—Trusts 
Delivery of deed 
Effect of failure to record 
Equitable rights 




Recital of consideration 





A deed as between the parties and those hav-
ing notice thereof is good without any acknowl-
edgment, and actual possession constitutes no-
tice Jordan v Utah R R , 47 Utah 519, 156 P 
939 (1916' 
A deed need not be acknowledged to be valid 
between the parties thereto Mitchell v 
Palmer, 121 Utah 245, 240 P 2d 970 (1952) 
Acknowledgment taken by mortgagee him-
self as notary public is void, thus, a mortgage, 
acknowledged by the mortgagee, though re-
corded, is ineffective for purpose of notice, since 
^ ib not legallv recordable Norton v Fuller, 68 
Utah 524 251 P 29(1926) See § 57-2-1 et seq 
Actual notice. 
—Assignments. 
Attaching creditors who had actual notice of 
assignment for benefit of creditors were not in 
position to object that statutory notice of as-
signment was not given Snyder v Murdock. 
20 Utah 407, 59 P 86 (1899' 
—Duty to inquire. 
The demands of this section are answered if 
a party dealing with the land has information 
of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry and would, if pursued, lead to ar 
tual knowledge of the state of the title, this is 
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actual notice Toland v Corev, 6 Utah 392, 24 
P 190 (189(0 afTd 154 US 499. 14 S Ct 
1144 38 L Ed 1062 (1894). distinguished 
Shaftr \ Killpack, 53 Utah 468 173 P 948 
11918' 
The "actual notice" required by this aection 
IF satisfied if a part\ dealing with the land had 
information of facts which would put a prudent 
man upon inquiry and which, if pursued, would 
lead to actual knowledge as to the atate of the 
title, actual notice is a question of fact John 
son \ Bell, 666 P 2d 308 (Utah 1983 • 
—Execution sales. 
Where vendee purchased realtv from one 
who had bought it at an execution sale and the 
record shows the consideration given at the 
sale was grosslv inadequate, the levy excessive 
and no return made b> the sheriff of an> at-
tempt to levy on personal property, the vendee 
would not be justified in failing to make a rea-
sonable inquiry into the vahditv of the sale 
and if he did not make such inquiry, he would 
not be a bona fide purchaser for value Pender 
v Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P2d 644, 42 
ALR2d 1078 (19541 
—Occupancy and possession. 
Even though auditor's tax deed and county 
tax deed were not acknowledged title techni-
cal^ need not pass to protect a tax title claim-
ant, and also the deed is binding as to defen-
dant who had actual notice because of the 
claimant's occupancv of the propertv Peterson 
v Calhster, 6 Utah 2d 359. 313 P.2d 814 
(1957), affd 8 Utah 2d 348, 334 P 2d 759 
(1959) 
Actual occupancy is enough to put parties 
dealing with the premises upon inqum 
Toland v Corev, 6 Utah 392, 24 P 190 »1S90) 
aflTa 154 US 499 14 S Ct 1144 38 L Ed 
1062'lh94 distinguished Shafer \ Killpack 
53 Utah 46S 173 P 94b U91S» 
Under this* section actual possession and oc-
cupancv amounts to 'actual notice' to all the 
world of gTantee :> rights even if his deed is not 
recorded Neponset Land & Live Stock Co v 
Dixon, 10 Utah 334 37 P 573 U894) 
Delivery of deed 
Deed dulv executed and acknowledged and 
fthown to be in possession of gTantee is •< 
proving both as to execution and delivery, & 
recording of deed is likewise evidence of del 
erv Chamberlain v Larsen. 83 Utah 420 
P2d 3rur) (1934) 
Inference of delivery arising from possess 
of deed b> grantet and from recording thei 
is entitled to great and controlling weight i 
can onlv bt overcome bv clear and convinc 
ev idenct Chamberlain v Larsen, 83 Utah * 
29 P2d 355 <19d4» 
Where dulv acknowledged and recorded c 
was found among papers of deceased gran 
inference of delivery and execution at al 
date stated in deed arose and burden was i 
those claiming nondelivery to show such 
Knighton v Manning 84 Utah 1. 33 P 2d 
(1934. 
In action b> administrator of grantor agj 
executor of grantee, finding of nondehve 
deed found among effects of grantee dul 
knowledged and recorded three da>s 
death of grantor was sustained by evid 
Knighton v Manning, 84 Utah 1, 33 P 2c 
(1934) 
Assuming valid de^ven. ofwarrantv de 
grandson of grantor, such deed would no 
vail over nght to propertv existing in 
person who had previouslv acquired deed 
grantcr. but who had not recorded same 
after deed to grandson, where it appeare' 
land was in possession of occupant as 
chaser from and after default as ten-
thira person Meacher v Dean, 97 Utal 
91 P2d 454 »1939 
Effect of failure to record. 
Where after mortgage wa^ executed c 
ta*n tract of land owner executed d< 
grantee on propertv not included in moi 
which deed wa«* not recorded drcref in 
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land 
ing part con\e\ed to grrartee. was noi b 
on grantee who was not partv to such 
Federal Land Bank v Pact- 87 Utah ] 
P2d 480 102 A LR 819 1935• 
Recordation is not a prerequisite to 
liduv of a dted although unrecorded de 
binding on the parties thereto Grege 
Jensen, 669 P 2d 396 Utah 1953) 
Equitable rights 
This section itself give* no equities 
applies thih section in determining e 
Federal Land Bank v Pace 87 Utah 1 
4* P2d 4M, 102 ALR 8191193:.. 
Livery of seizin. 
In Utah liven of seizin t* unknown 
utt ha* expres l^v abolished it, but bv 
is dispensed with We IK Fargo & Co \ 
2 Utah 39 1)877), afTd 104 L S 428 5 
802 (1681) 
—Trusts. 
Trustee under a deed of trust did not have 
actual notice of plaintiffs predecessors' inter-
est in the grazing land subject to the deed of 
trust where at the time the deed of trust was 
executed and recorded there were no cattle 
grazing on the land no one living on the land 
and no other evidence of anv activity on the 
propert} which would have reasonablv alerted 
the trustee to the claims of plaintiffs predeces 
aors and which would have required further 
investigation Johnson \. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 
(Utah 1983> 
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ion of grantor. 
•antor of property has no implied obli-
protect the grantee's rights by record-
rantee's interest in the property or by 
j third parties of the existence of the 
If the grantee fails to record, he as-
e risk of a subsequent grantee of the 
i acquiring superior rights to his by 
n. Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014 
App. 1987). 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-25 
J Assoc, v. Wasatch BanJc, 734 P . 2 d 
Effect. 
S ^ o f f r ? V' Con>mercial Sec 2d 398 (Utah 1986). 
«t of mortgage. 
's not in itself considered 
s, or personal represent! 
n
" - e , t h « r o f t h 5 a S t t L 
n e d n f o C e r r X t C U t e d b y ^ -
'loyees
 anw
 C h a m S e a m e n
. 
''oyees, and enacts the present B Jul.v 1, 1988. ^ M i i t 
?e or release satis-
mtten demand by the 
tgage after it has been 
or for double the dam 
:!on a^mst the mort-
-he: mortgage after the 
mortgagee to discharge 
•rthe costs of suit, and 
^arge or release the 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-16, enacted by L. Code Annotated 1953, relating to affidavits of 
1988, ch. 155, § 3. lack of notice or knowledge of power of revoca-
Repeais and Reenactments. — Laws 1988, tion, and enacts the present section, effective 
ch. 155, § 3 repeals former § 57-1-16, Utah July 1, 1988. 
57-1-17, 57-1-18. Repealed-
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24 repeals 1953, relating to powers of attorney, effective 
§§ 57-1-17 and 57-1-18, Utah Code Annotated July 1, 1988. 
57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of terms. 
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a 
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his 
successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed 
as security for the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust 
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person 
named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed 
by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 
57-1-1. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust 
deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1; 1988, ch. 
155, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "Sec-
tions 57-1-20 through 57-1-36" for "this act" in 
the introductory paragraph and in Subsection 
(3); substituted "trustor" for "grantor" in Sub-
section (3); and substituted the present provi-
sion in Subsection (5) for the former definition, 
which had listed various interests in land. 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of property 
— Time and place of sale. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Error in notice. 
—Validity of sale. 
Validity of a sale was not affected by a typo-
graphical error in a notice dated October 1, 
1983, which indicated that the sale would take 
place on October 28,1982, where the notice did 
not confuse bidders or result in an undervalua-
tion of the property. Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. 





titute or be 
the death of 
it operate to 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed 
by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
(5) "Real property" means any estate or interest in land, including all 
buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights 
of way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, heredita-
ments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, used or en-
joyed with said land, or any part thereof. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust 
deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1. and subdivision (3) apparently refers to L. 
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this 1961, ch. 181 which enacted this section and 





ig of this section 
ch enacted this 
1-17. 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
§ 15 et seq. 
55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages e» 1. 
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property — Purposes — 
Effect 
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance 
of an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a 
beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property 
acquired by the trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the execu-
tion of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for the obligation 
or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed in like manner as if 
acquired before execution of the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 6. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <s=> 1. 
3signated in a 
given, or his 
y a trust deed 
;h this act and 
performance of 
ed to a benefi-
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications. 
(1) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(a) any member of the Utah State Bar; 
(b) any bank, building and loan association, savings and loan associa-
tion, or insurance company authorized to do business in Utah under the 
laws of Utah or the United States; 
(c) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah un-
der the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(d) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do business 
in Utah under the laws of Utah; 
(e) any agency of the United States government; or 
(f) any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or regu-
lated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor. 
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Manner of acknowledging or proving 
conveyances 
Who authorized to take acknowledg-
ments. 
Acknowledgment by deputy. 
Taking acknowledgments of persons 
with United States armed 
forces. 
Certificate of acknowledgment. 
Party must be known or identified. 
Form of certificate of acknowledg-
ment. 
When grantor unknown to officer. 










Proof of execution—How made. 
Witness must be known or identi 
fied. 
Certificate of proof by subscribing 
witness. 
Form of certificate of proof. 
When subscribing witness dead-
Proof of handwriting. 
What evidence required for certifi-
cate of proof. 
Subpoena to subscribing witness. 
Disobedience of subpoenaed wit-
ness—Contempt—Proof 
aliunde. 
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving convey-
ances. 
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be 
affected shall be acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner herein-
after provided. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1984; 
C.L. 1917, § 4884; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-2-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Deed 
Either the acknowledgment or the proving 
must accompany every deed to make it valid. 
Both are not necessary to make it prima facie 
good, either being sufficient if the deed is oth-
erwise sufficient. Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5 
Utah 205, 14 P 338 (1887), affd, 142 U.S. 241, 
12 S.Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999 (1891). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
ments § 5. 
-1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledg- C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments S§ 6, 7. 
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment «=» 3, 4. 
57-2-2. Who authorized to take acknowledgments. 
The proof or acknowledgment of every conveyance whereby any real estate 
is conveyed or may be affected shall be taken by some one of the following 
officers: 
(1) If acknowledged or proved within this state, by a judge or clerk of a 
court having a seal, or a notary public, county clerk or county recorder. 
(2) If acknowledged or proved without this state and within any state 
or territory of the United States, by a judge or clerk of any court of the 
United States, or of any state or territory, having a seal, or by a notary 
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(2) When made by any other officer, under the hand and official seal of 
such officer. 
story: R.S. 1898 & C.L 1907, § 1987; 
1917, § 4887; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
.4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
orities always determinative of priorities between 
. mortgages State v. Johnson, 71 Utah 572, 268 
>ate of certificate. p ggj (1928) 
)ate of certificate of acknowledgment is not 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
\m. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am Jur 2d Acknowledg- C.J.S. — 1A C.J S Acknowledgments § 67. 
»nts § 32 et seq. Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment «» 33. 
7-2-6. Party must be known or identified. 
No acknowledgment of any conveyance whereby any real estate is conveyed 
r may be affected shall be taken unless the person offering to make such 
cknowledgment shall be personally known to the officer taking the same to 
e the person whose name is subscribed to such conveyance as a party thereto, 
r shall be proved to be such by the oath or affirmation of a credible witness 
>ersonally known to the officer taking the acknowledgment. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1988; 
:.L. 1917, § 4888; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-2-5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 1A C J S Acknowledgments § 52 
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment <s=» 22. 
57-2-7. Form of certificate of acknowledgment. 
A certificate of acknowledgment to any instrument in writing affecting the 
title to any real property in this state may be substantially in the following 
form: 
State of Utah, County of 
On the day of , 19 , personally appeared before 
me , the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowl-
edged to me that he executed the same. 
The certificate of acknowledgment of an instrument executed by a cor-
poration must be substantially in the following form: 
State of Utah, County of 
On the day of , 19 , personally appeared before 
me , who being by me duly sworn (or affirmed), did say that he 
—„;A<m+ (nr other officer or agent, as the case may be) of (naming 
_ _ : ^ ^ ^ hphalf of said 
Oi-A-H I\Ejf\U L O i n i D 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledg- C.J.S. — 1A Acknowledgments § 36. 
ments § 14. Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment e=> 16. 
57-2-4. Taking acknowledgments of persons with United 
States armed forces. 
In addition to the acknowledgment of instruments in the manner and form 
and as otherwise authorized by this chapter, any person serving in or with the 
armed forces of the United States may acknowledge the same wherever lo-
cated before any commissioned officer in the active service of the armed forces 
of the United States with the rank of second lieutenant or higher in the Army 
or Marine Corps, or ensign or higher in the Navy or United States Coast 
Guard. The instrument shall not be rendered invalid by the failure to state 
therein the place of execution or acknowledgment. No authentication of the 
officer's certificate of acknowledgment shall be required, but the officer taking 
the acknowledgment shall endorse thereon or attach thereto a certificate sub-
stantially in the following form: 
On this day of , 
19 , before me , the 
undersigned officer, personally appeared , known 
to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be serving in or with the armed forces oi 
the United States and to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged that exe-
cuted the same for the purposes therein contained. And the undersigned 
does further certify that he is at the date of this certificate a commis-
sioned officer of the rank stated below and is in the active service of the 
armed forces of the United States. 
Signature of Officer 
Rank of Officer and Command to Which Attachec 
History: C. 1943, 78-2-3.10, enacted by L. 
1943, ch. 83, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgments § 33. 
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment <s=* 16. 
57-2-5. Certificate of acknowledgment. 
Every officer who shall take the proof or acknowledgment of any convey-
ance affecting any real estate shall make a certificate thereof, and cause such 
certificate to be endorsed on or annexed to such conveyance. Such certificate 
shall be: 
(1) When made by any judge or clerk, under the hand of such judge or 
clerk, and the seal of the court. 
57-2-8 REAL ESTATE 
corporation by authority of its bylaws (or of a resolution of its board of 
directors, as the case may be), and said acknowledged to me 
that said corporation executed the same. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1989; 
C.L. 1917, § 4889; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-2-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of certificate. 
—Evidence of facts therein. 
Verification of mechanic's lien notice. 
Effect of certificate. Verification of mechanic's lien notice. 
-Evidence of facts therein. T h e u s e o f a corPorate acknowledgment 
The certificate of acknowledgment is itself m s t e a d of a sworn statement that the contents 
only prima facie evidence of the facts therein o f t h e mechanic's lien notice were true did not 
stated. It is not conclusive, and may be rebut- satisfy the requirement of § 38-1-7 that such 
ted. Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 notice must be verified. First Sec. Mtg. Co. v. 
P. 338 (1887), affd, 142 U.S. 241, 12 S. Ct. 158, Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981). 
35 L, Ed. 999 (1891). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledg- C.J.S. — 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgments § 61. 
ments § 34. Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment «=> 29. 
57-2-8. When grantor unknown to officer. 
When the grantor is unknown to the officer taking the acknowledgment, 
the certificate shall be substantially in the following form, to wit: 
State of Utah, County 
On this day of , 19 , personally appeared before 
me , satisfactorily proved to me to be the signer of the above 
instrument by the oath of , a competent and credible witness 
for that purpose, by my duly sworn, and he, the said acknowl-
edged that he executed the same. 
Such certificate when properly executed by an officer authorized to take 
acknowledgments to instruments in writing affecting the title to real property 
in this state, and attached to a conveyance in writing, shall be a sufficient 
acknowledgment and certificate that such conveyance was executed as re-
quired by law. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1990; 
C.L. 1917, § 4890; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-2-7. 
RECORDING CONVEYANCES 57-3-1 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 203. 
Key Numbers. — Deeds <s=* 207. 
tired by law to 
ified under the 
esiding in the 
sstify touching 
ed without his 
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proof of execution a prerequi-
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Record imparts notice — Recorda-
tion not affected by change in 
interest rate. 
Effect of failure to record. 





57-3-6, 57-3-7. Repealed. 
57-3-8. Failure to discharge mortgage after 
satisfaction—Liability. 
57-3-9. Conveyances prior to January 1, 
1898—Recording—Effect. 
57-3-10. Legal description of real property 
and names and addresses re-
quired in instruments. 
57-3-11. Original documents required — Cap-
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for the space 
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>mpt, § 78-32-1 
57-3-1. Certificate of acknowledgment or of proof of exe-
cution a prerequisite. 
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any conveyance, or of the proof of the 
execution thereof as provided in this title, signed and certified by the officer 
taking the same as provided in this title, shall entitle such conveyance, with 
the certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be recorded in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which the real estate is situated. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1999; 
C.L. 1917, § 4899; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-3-1. 
Cross-References. — Documents sent by 
telegraph or telephone may be recorded, 
§ 69-1-2. 
Model Marketable Titles § 57-9-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Acknowledgment by mortgagee. 
Disqualification of office taking acknowledgment. 
Acknowledgment by mortgagee. 
An acknowledgment taken by mortgagee 
himself as a notary public is void, and renders 
mortgage unrecordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68 
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). 
Disqualification of office taking acknowl-
edgment. 
If acknowledgment is taken before officer 
disqualified to act, certificate is ineffectual. 
Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 
(1931). 
423 
uurucu — assignment ui a ueneiiciai interest. 
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a beneficial interest 
under a trust deed, notice of default, trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust 
property, and any instrument by which any trust deed is subordinated or 
waived as to priority, if acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to be 
recorded. The recording of an assignment of a beneficial interest in the trust 
deed does not in itself impart notice of the assignment to the trustor, his heirs 
or personal representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by any of 
them to the person holding the note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the 
obligation by the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 18; 1988, ch. 
155, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1988, deleted "and shall, 
from the time of filing the same with the re-
corder for record, impart notice of the contents 
thereof to all persons, including subsequent 
purchasers and encumbrancers for value, ex-
cept that the" at the end of the first sentence 




57-2-1 to 57-2-9. Repealed. 
57-2-1 to 57-2-9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24 repeals 
§ 57-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, § 57-2-2, 
as amended by Laws 1987, ch. 53, § 1, and 
§§ 57-2-3 to 57-2-9, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, relating to acknowledgments, effective 
July 1, 1988. For present comparable provi-
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This cnapter ib Known as me recognition ot Acknowledgments Act." 
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-l, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 
1988, ch. 155, § 6. § 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988 
57-2a-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Acknowledged before me" means: 
(a) that the person acknowledging appeared before the person tak-
ing the acknowledgment; 
(b) that he acknowledged he executed the document; 
(c) that, in the case of: 
(i) a natural person, he executed the document for the pur-
poses stated in it; 
(ii) a corporation, the officer or agent acknowledged he held 
the position or title set forth in the document or certificate, he 
signed the document on behalf of the corporation by proper au-
thority, and the document was the act of the corporation for the 
purpose stated in it; 
(iii) a partnership, the partner or agent acknowledged he 
signed the document on behalf of the partnership by proper au-
thority, and he executed the document as the act of the partner-
ship for the purposes stated in it; 
(iv) a person acknowledging as principal by an attorney in 
fact, he executed the document by proper authority as the act of 
the principal for the purposes stated in it; or 
(v) a person acknowledging as a public officer, trustee, admin-
istrator, guardian, or other representative, he signed the docu-
ment by proper authority, and he executed the document in the 
capacity and for the purposes stated in it; and 
(d) that the person taking the acknowledgment: 
(i) either knew or had satisfactory evidence that the person 
acknowledging was the person named in the document or certifi-
cate; and 
(ii) in the case of a person executing a document in a represen-
tative capacity, either had satisfactory evidence or received the 
sworn statement or affirmation of the person acknowledging that 
the person had the proper authority to execute the document. 
(2) "Notarial act" means any act a notary public is authorized by state 
law to perform, including administering oaths and affirmations, taking 
acknowledgments of documents, and attesting documents. 
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-2, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 155, § 7. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988 
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57-2a-3. Persons authorized to perform notarial acts un-
der laws of other jurisdictions. 
The following persons authorized under the laws and regulations of other 
governments may perform notarial acts outside this state for use in this state 
with the same effect as if performed by a notary public of this state: 
(1) a notary public authorized to perform notarial acts in the place 
where the act is performed; 
(2) a judge, clerk, or deputy clerk of any court of record in the place 
where the notarial act is performed; 
(3) an officer of the foreign service of the United States, a consular 
agent, or any other person authorized by regulation of the United States 
Department of State to perform notarial acts in the place where the act is 
performed; 
(4) a commissioned officer in active service with the Armed Forces of 
the United States and any other person authorized by regulation of the 
Armed Forces to perform notarial acts if the notarial act is performed for 
any of his dependents, a merchant seaman of the United States, a mem-
ber of the Armed Forces of the United States, or any other person serving 
with or accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States; or 
(5) any other person authorized to perform notarial acts in the place 
where the act is performed. 
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-3, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 
1988, ch. 155, § 8. § 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
57-2a-4L Proof of authority — Prima facie evidence, 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), the signature, title or 
rank, branch of service, and serial number, if any, of any person described in 
Subsections 57-2a-3(l) through (5) are sufficient proof of his authority to per-
form a notarial act. Further proof of his authority is not required. 
(2) Proof of the authority of a person to perform a notarial act under the 
laws or regulations of a foreign country is sufficient if: 
(a) a foreign service officer of the United States resident in the country 
in which the act is performed or a diplomatic or consular officer of the 
foreign country resident in the United States certifies that a person hold-
ing that office is authorized to perform the act; 
(b) the official seal of the person performing the notarial act is affixed 
to the document; or 
(c) the title and indication of authority to perform notarial acts of the 
person appears either in a digest of foreign law or in a list customarily 
used as a source of such information. 
(3) The signature and title or rank of the person performing the notarial act 
are prima facie evidence that he is a person with the designated title and that 
his signature is genuine. 
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-4, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 
1988, ch. 155, § 9. § 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
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A person taking an acknowledgment shall cause a certificate in a form 
acceptable under Section 57-2a-6 or 57-2a-7 to be endorsed on or attached to 
the document or other written instrument. 
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-5, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 155, § 10. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
57-2a-6. Form of certificate. 
The form of a certificate of acknowledgment used by a person whose author-
ity is recognized under Section 57-2a-3 shall be accepted if: 
(1) the certificate is in a form prescribed by the laws or rules of this 
state; 
(2) the certificate is in a form prescribed by the laws or regulations 
applicable in the place where the acknowledgment is taken; or 
(3) the certificate contains the words "acknowledged before me," or 
their substantial equivalent. 
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-6, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 155, § 11. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 















57-2a-7. Form of acknowledgment. 
The form of acknowledgment set forth in this section, if properly completed, 
is sufficient under any law of this state. It is known as "Statutory Short Form 
of Acknowledgment." This section does not preclude the use of other forms. 
State of ) 
) ss. 
-) County of 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this (date) by (per-
son acknowledging, title or rank, and representative capacity, if any). 
(Seal) 
My commission expires: 
(Signature of Person Taking Acknowledgment) 
(Title or Rank, Branch of Service, and 
Serial Number, if applicable) 
Residing at: 
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-7, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 155, § 12. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, 
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS 
Section Section 
57-3-1. Certificate of acknowledgment or of 57-3-3. Effect of failure to record. 
proof of execution a prerequisite. 57-3-4. Certified copies entitled to record in 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Recorda- another county — Effect. 
tion not affected by change in in- 57-3-10. Legal description of real property 
terest rate — Validity of document and names and addresses required 
not affected — Third person not in documents, 
charged with notice of unnamed 57-3-11. Original documents required — Cap-
interests — Conveyance free and tions — Legibility, 
clear of unrecorded interests. 
57-3-L Certificate of acknowledgment or of proof of exe-
cution a prerequisite, 
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or of the proof of the 
execution of any document that is signed and certified by the officer taking 
the acknowledgment as provided in this title, entitles the document and the 
certificate to be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county where the 
real property is located. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1999; ment, effective July 1,1988, substituted "docu-
C.L. 1917, § 4899; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, ment" for "conveyance" throughout the section 
78-3-1; 1988, ch. 155, § 13. and made stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Law Reviews. — Recent Developments in 
Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 123. 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Recordation not affected 
by change in interest rate — Validity of docu-
ment not affected — Third person not charged 
with notice of unnamed interests — Conveyance 
free and clear of unrecorded interests. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title; each original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged; and each fi-
nancing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not ac-
knowledged; shall, from the time of filing with the appropriate county re-
corder, impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest 
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underly-
ing secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the 
document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to 
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third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to 
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he 
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this 
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2000; 
C.L. 1917, § 4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159, 
§ 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1988, added Subsections 
(3) to (5) and rewrote Subsections (1) and (2), as 
last amended by Laws 1985, ch. 159, § 7, to 
such an extent that a detailed comparison is 
impracticable. 
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this section. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v. 
Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987). 
Recordation as notice. 
—Time from which notice imparted. 
The date of recording, not the date of execu-
tion, governs the time from which an instru-
ment imparts notice to all persons. Utah Farm 
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 
904 (Utah 1986). 
Effect of failure to record. 
Where a prior deed was not recorded until 
three years after the purchasers* assignments 
of their equitable interests in the property 
were executed and recorded, the assignee had 
no constructive notice of the deed, and the as-
signee's lien was therefore superior to a bank's 
subsequent trust deed received from the pur-
chasers. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v. 
Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987). 
Mortgages. 
Mortgages are subject to the provisions of 
57-3-3- Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's conveyance is first duly recorded. 
History: RS . 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2001; 
C.L. 1917, § 4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-3-3; 1988, ch. 155, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1988, substituted "docu-
ment" for "conveyance of real estate" in the 
introductory paragraph; added Subsections (1) 
and (2), deleting comparable provisions from 
the introductory paragraph; and made minor 
stylistic changes. 
73 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION, 
a Colorado Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 








ELECTRO TECHNICAL CORPORATION/ 
a Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
OAKHILLS PARTNERSHIP, a Utah 
limited partnership, et al., 
Defendants. 
Supreme Court Docket 
No. 
Court of Appeals Docket 
No. 860355-CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Appellants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
To the Court of Appeals for the State of Utah 
Warren Patten 
W. Cullen Battle 
Douglas B. Cannon 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Respondent 
American Savings & 
Loan Assoc. 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Ron Mast and 
Mast Construction Company 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone 486-9636 
